



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.


We also ask that you:


- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>
















THE
HISTORY
OF
THE POLITICKS
OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,

FROM
THE TIME OF THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ,
TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST
GREAT BRITAIN,
WITH
AN APPENDIX,
CONTAINING A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PEACE.

To which is now added,

A POSTSCRIPT,

Containing an Examination of the Conduct of the British Ministry,
relative to the late Proposal of BUONAPARTE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.



BY HERBERT MARSH,
FELLOW OF SAINT JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

London:

PRINTED FOR JOHN STOCKDALE, PICCADILLY.

1800.

T. Gillet, Printer, Salisbury-Square.

PREFACE.

THE present war between Great Britain and France has been condemned by one class of writers as unnecessary and unjust, while another class has defended it on grounds of expediency and justice. Writers, however, of the latter, as well as those of the former description, set out in general with the supposition, that the choice of war or peace rested with the British Government; and they endeavour to justify the supposed determination of the Cabinet in favour of hostilities, by arguing, that the circumstances under which the war was begun, rendered it an evil of still less magnitude to Great Britain than peace itself would have been; a position which their adversaries

deny. Now, though it is certainly advisable of two evils to choose the less, yet, as it must be previously ascertained which of the two really *is* the less; and as the calamities which may happen to associate themselves with a continuance of peace, must be very complicated before they can even balance the calamities which are inseparable from war, it is not extraordinary that a defence grounded on a position, which, though true in the abstract, may be doubtful in its application, should not have produced universal conviction.

Let us set aside, therefore, the question of expediency, on which perhaps an unanimity of opinion will never prevail: let us try the merits of the cause on another ground, and examine whether the British Government really had it in its *power* to prevent a rupture with France. If *this* question be decided in the negative, no further vindication
can

can be necessary. Not only in a political, but likewise in a moral light, the war, on our part, will then be justified ; for, whatever doubts may be entertained of the lawfulness of commencing hostilities through mere motives of policy or expediency, no rational man will deny, that it is lawful to repel an unjust aggression. It is not indeed the bare circumstance, that the public declaration of war proceeded from the part of France, which will warrant us to say that France was the aggressor. In the year 1756, the great King of Prussia declared war on Austria ; yet he was properly not the aggressor, because he had received certain information that within a few months he himself would be attacked by Austria, in conjunction with Russia and France. Since then, the very same excuse may, before the subject has been fully investigated, be thought applicable likewise to the French National Convention, in respect to its de-

A 3
claration

claration of war against Great Britain on the 1st of February 1793, the question of *real* aggression must be determined by the relative conduct of the two Governments, antecedent to that declaration. With this view the following history has been written. It commences with the celebrated conference at Pillnitz, in August 1791, because at that time the first coalition against France was in agitation : and as it is continued to the declaration of war, it comprises an important period of eighteen months, the events of which must finally decide the question, " Who were the aggressors ? "

The plan on which the following work has been conducted, may perhaps expose the author to the charge of prolixity : but at a time when falsehood is so blended with truth, when random reports are adopted as indubitable facts, and history itself has
been

been almost converted into fable, the plan appeared absolutely necessary, in order to enforce conviction. I have made it a rule, therefore, throughout the whole work, to advance not a single fact, without supporting it by unanswerable authority: and I have not only grounded this history on authentic documents, but have every where presented those documents to the view of the reader. Further, to preserve diplomatic accuracy as much as possible, I have in general quoted French documents in their original language. The whole, therefore, is an official report, in the strictest sense.

As the *Moniteur* was the official French paper during the period which this history comprises, and the French themselves, therefore, cannot appeal from it, the first step which I took was, to examine every number of it, from August 1791 to February 1793, and to transcribe all those articles in

which French politicians had any reference, direct or indirect, to Great Britain. I then had recourse to the most celebrated publications of the French republicans. Brissot, Louvet, Chauffard, Dumouriez, &c. and especially the two collections which contain the private correspondence of Dumouriez with the War Minister Pache and General Miranda, a correspondence which, though not generally known, throws great light on our present subject. I have likewise consulted the Memoirs of the Marquis de Bouillé, Lally Tolendal's Defence of the Emigrants, the Memoirs of Bertrand de Molleville, and the collection of pieces published in defence of Louis XVI, not with the view of copying *opinions*, but of extracting *facts*, which the authors were competent to attest. The Authentic Correspondence of Mr. Miles with the French Minister Le Brun, and others, has afforded very material assistance in investigating the motives
by

by which the French rulers were actuated in their conduct towards Great Britain : and it has furnished, likewise, much valuable information in regard to the real sentiments entertained by the British Government on the subject of a war with France. These sentiments have been further developed, not only from his Majesty's speeches and the parliamentary debates, but from the *measures* which were adopted by Ministers, and which stand recorded either in official notes or authentic journals. The diplomatic papers which are quoted in this history, are taken partly from the *Moniteur*, and partly from the two Annual Registers ; treaties, whether of peace, commerce, or alliance, are quoted from the accurate collection of professor Martens at Gottingen. Various other works have been occasionally consulted, as the reader will find in the course of the history.

To the pains which I have taken in the search of materials, I have endeavoured to add a fair and candid use of them. I have suppressed no document, and no fact, which had come within my knowledge (and I believe I have overlooked nothing of importance), whether favourable or unfavourable to either party; and that what I have asserted, is indisputably true, the reader himself will every where perceive, from the authority quoted in favour of each assertion. Whether I have been guilty of errors of judgment, and have drawn false conclusions from true facts, is a matter which the reader will likewise easily determine, as he is put in possession of all those premises which will enable him to judge for himself, and is therefore in less danger of receiving a false bias, even if the author has one. Indeed, it is impossible to write a history of two living parties, without attaching one's self to either; or, if it is possible, he who possesses such

such indifference, must be destitute of that energy, and of that spirit of perseverance, which are requisite in the collecting and the arranging of the materials for an history. With regard to myself, I honestly confess, that I am sincerely attached to the present Administration, and that I take a decided part with it on the subject of the following history, not on account of any personal connections, for I have not the honour of being acquainted with any one of the members of it, but because a full investigation of the subject, to which the following history relates, has convinced me, that not the British Ministry, but the French rulers alone, were the authors of the war. Shall *the taking a decided part*, then, after an examination of the whole evidence on both sides, be termed *partiality*? If this be admitted, the decision of every court of justice must be partial. But an historian must have already collected his materials, before he *begins* to compose

compose his history ; he must already, therefore, have formed a decided opinion on the result of those materials. Consequently, even if throughout the whole of his work he appears more attached to one party than to another, yet, if he suspended his judgment till his collection of data was as complete as he could make it, that subsequent attachment can never deserve the appellation of prejudice or partiality. His judgment, indeed, may be erroneous, but so may the judgment of a man who is possessed of a stoical apathy, or an absolute indifference.

That historian alone can properly be called partial who *sets out* with the determination to justify, *at all events*, a particular party ; who knowingly suppresses facts and documents which are unfavourable to it, and thus, by presenting his readers with a mutilated picture, deprives them of the
power

power of forming a true judgment of the whole. This method has been very successfully practised during the present war, both at home and abroad: for, as most men want either the leisure, or the inclination, or the opportunity, to collect for themselves all those facts and documents which are necessary for the forming of a right judgment on a controverted point of history, they are seldom aware of the defectiveness of that information which an author thinks proper to lay before them; they fancy themselves in possession of every thing requisite for the illustration of the subject, and deduce, therefore, an inference diametrically opposite to that which they would have deduced, had they been enabled, by a complete representation of the whole picture, to make a due estimate of the respective parts. Whether the following history be likewise chargeable in this respect, the public will easily determine,

mine, because every thing which appears in the least unfavourable to the British Government, has been already collected with great diligence; has been industriously propagated, and is generally known. Indeed, had I been resolved, at all events, to justify the present Administration in regard to the origin of the war, I should no where have been even tempted to suppress a single circumstance, which, when viewed alone, appears to be unfavourable to it. For in every instance a bare comparison with the actions of the French rulers is sufficient to vindicate the measures of the British Government; and the only reason why these measures have been thought exceptionable by so many well-meaning men, has been the want of an historical parallel between the conduct of the French Government on the one hand, and that of the British Government on the other, representing in what manner the
former

former necessarily occasioned, and fully justified, the latter.

The history, now presented to the British public, I wrote originally in German,* a language, which, a long residence in the University of Leipzig, has rendered as familiar to me as my own. A desire of rescuing my native country from the calumnies of some German journalists, had induced me at the beginning of the year 1798, when the attention of all Europe was engaged with the threatened invasion of Great Britain, to draw up a short Essay, in the form of an Epistle, to a literary friend at Weimar, in which I endeavoured to shew, that whatever might be the issue of the important, and then doubtful conflict, the blame

* It was published at Leipzig, in February 1799, under the title *Historische Uebersicht der Politik Englands und Frankreichs.*

of its origin attached only to the rulers of France. This Essay was printed in the German Mercury * for March, 1798; and, as the period of the publication was very unfavourable to the author, the expectations of those who were attached to the French cause being at that time very high, it was not to be expected, that those journalists, who had asserted, that the coalition against France in 1791, was formed by the intrigues of the British Cabinet, that the French rulers were solicitous for peace, but that the Ministers of Great Britain, through mere hatred of the new republic, had resolved, at all events, to commence hostilities, and had so confidently repeated these assertions during several years, till at length they were received in almost every part of Germany, and

* Der neue Teutsche Merkur. It is published monthly at Weimar: and the editor is the celebrated Wieland.

in the adjacent countries, as indisputable truths,* it was not to be expected, that such men, under such circumstances, would silently permit the oracular authority, which they had so long enjoyed, to be questioned by a writer, who had given no proofs of experience in political history. The opposition, which was made, especially by one of them,† determined me, therefore, to bring

* An intimate friend in Leipzig, a man, in other respects extremely well informed, and moreover well-affected toward Great Britain, said to me a few months before the present history (in German) left the press: "I heartily wish you success, but I fear you have undertaken a desperate cause." But he is *now* of opinion that the cause is perfectly good.

† Mr. Archenholz, formerly an enthusiastic panegyrist of Great Britain, and who, even in 1794, expressly said, in his *Annals of the British History*, "that the British Ministers did *not* wish for war." What has since induced him so vehemently to assert the contrary, is best known to himself.

the question at once to an issue, by laying before the public all the facts and documents, arranged in historical order, which concerned the relative Politicks of Great Britain and France, from the time of the coalition in 1791, to the declaration of war against Great Britain in February 1793. The decision was soon made: for my work had not long appeared, when the first literary reviews in Germany, though the contrary opinion had, till that time, very generally prevailed, pronounced that the British Government was completely rescued from the charges which had been laid to it, and that the origin, as well as the continuance of the war, must be wholly and solely ascribed to the mad ambition of the French rulers.* Even the journalist, who had so vi-

* See the *Ailgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, for May 1799, No. 162; the *Göttingen Review* (*Göttingische Anzeigene*), 6th July, 1799, No. 106; and the analysis which

fulently attacked the Essay inserted in the German Mercury, has since thought proper to assume a very different tone: he has not ventured any longer to direct his invectives against the British Government, but has turned them against the French Directory: and, though a candid acknowledgment of his errors was not to be expected from a man of his description, yet he has virtually acknowledged his inability to write a confutation.*

which Mr. Genz, the most eminent political writer now in Germany, has given of it in his Historical Journal (*Historisches Journal*), for May 1799. The merits of this valuable Journal are already known in England, from the extracts which have been given of it in the *Mercure Britannique*.

* In one of his journals, which appeared soon after my German work, he said, "that to write a confutation would require more time and labour than he was able to bestow." This shuffling excuse, though it has not the merit of a candid confession, yet, after

The work now presented to the British public, may, in one sense, be called a translation, as it was originally written in German : but as it proceeds from the author himself, it has an equal claim to the title of an original. In fact, it contains not a literal translation, but only the same narrative drawn up in another language, and supported by the same documents. In various places new matter has been added, and several alterations have been made in the arrangement of the materials. On the other hand, all allusions to German writers, with some other passages, which would have been uninteresting, if not unintelligible, to a British reader, have been omitted.

The Appendix, containing a short statement of the attempts made by the British the violent attack with which he had commenced hostilities, could proceed only from the consciousness of his inability to continue them.

Government

Government to restore peace, is for the very reason, that it is a mere appendix, necessarily less diffuse : but, though the facts are compressed into a small compass, enough is given to enable the reader to form a just opinion on the subject. Authentic documents are here, likewise, invariably adduced in support of each fact.

With great deference I submit the whole to the judgment of my fellow-countrymen ; and if they who have hitherto believed, either that the war might have been avoided, or that peace might have been restored, should be convinced by it of the contrary, that unanimity of opinion, which is so necessary to carry us triumphantly through the present conflict, will be the result of it. Few persons indeed, since the negotiation at Lisle, in 1797, have ascribed the *continuance* of the war to the British Ministry ;

but there are thousands, who still ascribe to them its *commencement*, and consequently consider them as the original authors of every evil, which it has occasioned. If, then, the following history should convince those who still entertain this notion, that it is founded in error, the distrust, which throws a shackle on national energy, will be removed, the public burdens will be borne with patience, from the consideration, that it was not in the power of Government to prevent the cause of them ; domestic animosity will cease, and the efforts of every individual, who has not lost all affection for his country, will be directed against the French rulers, as the sole authors, as well as protractors, of the present war.

HERBERT MARSH.

August 4, 1799.

P. S.

P. S. Since the first edition of this work was printed off, a proposal of peace has at length been made by the French Government, on which some observations are made in the Postscript to the Appendix, inserted in the present edition.

March 30, 1800.



CONTENTS.

VOL. I.

CHAP. I.

CONFERENCE at Pillnitz: and Conduct of Great Britain in respect to the Coalition against France, in 1791 - - - page 33

CHAP. II.

Insurrection of the Negroes in the Island of St. Domingo. Friendly Conduct of Great Britain toward France on this Occasion: and Ingratitude of the French National Assembly to the British Government - - - page 43

CHAP. III.

Other less important Events, relative to Great Britain and France, in the Year 1791 page 58

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Meeting of the British Parliament on the 31st of January, 1792. His Majesty's Speech. Reduction of the British Forces, both by Sea and by Land. Cessation of the Treaty of Subsidy with Hesse Cassel. Abolition of Taxes to the annual Amount of two hundred thousand Pounds. Falseness of the Assertion, that Great Britain acceded in March, 1792, to what is called the Treaty of Pavia. Measures taken at this Time in France, for an Augmentation of its Forces by Sea as well as by Land - page 66

CHAP. V.

Declaration of War against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. Notification of it to the Court of Great Britain by the French Minister Chauvelin. Determination of the British Cabinet to persevere in the System of Neutrality: and Chauvelin's Letter on this Subject. Letter of Thanks from the King of France to the King of England.

England. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville, in which it was requested, that all British Subjects might be forbidden to serve under any foreign Power at War with France. Punctual Compliance with this Request, in a Proclamation of the twenty-fifth of May. Remarks on the Conduct of the British Cabinet page 81

CHAP. VI.

Proclamation of the 21st of May, 1792, against seditious Writings; and Confutation of the Objections which have been made to it page 91

CHAP. VII.

Prorogation of the British Parliament on the 15th of June. Speech from the Throne. Chauvelin's Note of the 18th of June, requesting the Mediation of Great Britain. Answer of the British Cabinet. Reflections on this Subjects page 116

CH A P. VIII.

Sensation produced in France, by the sailing of five Ships of the Line and a few Frigates, from Portsmouth, to perform naval Evolutions in the Channel. Proposal made in the National Assembly of an immediate Armament of thirty Ships of the Line. Chauvelin's Letter to his own Government, containing positive Assurances, that the British Cabinet had no Views of Hostility. Resolution of the National Assembly, that Chauvelin's Letter was satisfactory, and that a naval Armament was unnecessary page 152

CH A P. IX.

Recall of the British Ambassador from Paris, after the King of France was dethroned. Examination of the Question, whether this Recall was a Breach of Neutrality toward France. page 159

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

French Conquests in Germany, the Netherlands, and Savoy. A French Fleet in the Mediterranean harasses the Coasts of several Italian States. Other naval Armaments in France. Opening of the Scheldt. Decree of the 19th of November, by which Assistance was promised to all Nations, that were willing to take up Arms against their Governments. Deputies from certain British Societies appear at the Bar of the French National Convention, and signify their intention of establishing a National Convention in Great Britain. Encouragement thereto on the Part of the French Convention. Measures taken in Consequence, and Commotions in Great Britain. - - - page 186

CHAP. XI.

Official Communications between the Governments of Great Britain and Holland, on the Progress of the French Arms in the Austrian Netherlands.

lands. Uneasiness produced by the Resolution to open the Scheldt. Further Alarm in Great Britain, occasioned by the Decree of the 19th of November, and the concomitant Measures taken by the National Convention, in Conjunction with certain British Societies. Proclamation of the First of December, for calling out the Militia: and another of the same Date, for the Meeting of Parliament. Spirited Declaration of the Bankers, Merchants, and other Inhabitants of the City of London, in Favour of the Constitution. Meeting of Parliament, and Speech from the Throne. Means adopted for the external as well as internal Defence of Great Britain. Reflections on this Subject. - page 239

CHAP. XII.

Decree of the 15th of December, 1792, and the Interpretation of it by the Executive Council. New Exhortation to all Nations who were inclined to Insurrection. Menace in the National Convention of an Appeal from the Government
to

to the People of Great Britain, with Brissot's Interpretation of it. Barailon's Proposal to except Great Britain from the Decree of the 19th of November, rejected by the National Convention. Circular Letter of the Marine Minister, Monge, to the Inhabitants of the French Sea-Ports, to rouse them to a War with Great Britain, and to attempt the Conquest of it. Attack on a British Ship of War before the Harbour of Brest. Mission of Mr. Genet to the United States of America, with Proposals of an Alliance with France against Great Britain. Order issued by the French Executive Council to General Miranda, on the Tenth of January, 1793, to invade Dutch Flanders and the Province of Zealand, at farthest within twelve Days. Armament of thirty Ships of the Line and twenty Frigates, in Addition to the twenty-two Ships of the Line and the thirty-two Frigates already in Commission, in order to Act against Great Britain

page 312



HISTORY
OF
THE POLITICKS
OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,
FROM THE
TIME OF THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ TO
THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST
GREAT BRITAIN.

CHAP. I.

*Conference at Pillnitz : and Conduct of Great
Britain in respect to the Coalition against
France, in 1791..*

ON the 27th of August, 1791, the Emperor and the King of Prussia signed a Declaration (1) at Pillnitz, by which they agreed to take certain measures in respect to France, provided other powers, whose

(1) The following is the authentic Declaration, contained in the *Mémoires sur la Révolution Française* par

assistance had been already solicited, consented to support them. The powers which had been invited to take part with the Emperor and the King of Prussia, were Spain, Russia, England, and the principal states of

le Marquis de Bouillé, tom. ii. p. 133, and Marten's Recueil des principaux Traités, tom. v. p. 35.

“ Leurs Majestés l'Empereur et le Roi de Prusse,
 “ ayant entendu les desirs et les représentations de
 “ Monsieur Frere du Roi de France et de S. A. le
 “ Comte d'Artois, déclarent conjointement qu'elles
 “ regardent la situation où se trouve actuellement le
 “ Roi de France comme un objet d'un intérêt com-
 “ mun à tous les souverains de l'Europe. Ils esperent
 “ que cet intérêt ne peut manquer d'être reconnu par
 “ les puissances, dont les secours sont réclamés, et qu'en
 “ conséquence elles ne refuseront pas d'employer con-
 “ jointement avec leurs dites Majestés les moyens les
 “ plus efficaces relativement à leurs forces, pour met-
 “ tre le Roi de France en état d'affermir, dans la plus
 “ parfaite liberté, les bases d'un gouvernement mo-
 “ narchique également convenable aux droits des sou-
 “ verains, et au bien-être de la nation Française.
 “ Alors et dans ce cas, leurs dites Majestés l'Empereur
 “ et le Roi de Prusse sont résolus d'agir promptement,
 “ d'un mutuel accord, avec les forces nécessaires pour
 “ obtenir le but proposé en commun. En attendant
 “ elles

Italy: but their answers did not arrive till after the Conference at Pillnitz was ended, and the Emperor was returned to Vienna. On the 12th of September, therefore, the Emperor sent for the Marquis de Bouillé, and addressed him in the following terms.

“ It was not in my power to converse with
 “ you sooner on the subject, for which I
 “ had requested your attendance, because I
 “ had not received the answers of the Courts
 “ of Russia, Spain, England, and the prin-

“ elles donneront à leur troupes les ordres convenables pour qu’elles soient à portée de se mettre en activité.

“ Donné à Pillnitz le 27 Août, 1791.

“ Signé, LEOPOLD.

FREDERIC GUILLAUME.”

It appears from this authentic document, that the report of a *partition* treaty at Pillnitz has no historical foundation. Even the six secret articles, of which, however, the authenticity is very uncertain, contain nothing of a partition, either of France or of any other country. See Martens, tom. v. p. 36.

“ cipal sovereigns of Italy. At present they
 “ are arrived, and correspond to my wishes
 “ and expectations : for I am assured of the
 “ co-operation of all these powers, *with ex-*
 “ *ception to England, which is resolved to*
 “ *preserve the most strict neutrality.*”(2)

Here we have a testimony, which places the conduct of the British Cabinet in the clearest point of view. The mere circumstance, that its answer was not received by Leopold before the beginning of September, sufficiently proves, that the British Cabinet took no part in the Conference at Pillnitz : (3)

(2) The Emperor's own words were : “ Je suis affuré de la co-opération, de toutes ces puissances, à l'exception de l'Angleterre, qui est déterminée à observer la plus stricte neutralité.” Mémoires de Bouillé, tom. ii. p. 139.

(3) Another proof, and one too of the highest authority, is Lord Grenville's Dispatch to Lord Malmesbury, dated 20th June, 1797, and printed among the Papers relative to the Negotiation at Lisle. In this dispatch

and as the reply to the Emperor's proposal was decidedly in the negative, we have absolute proof that Great Britain had no concern in the coalition then forming against France. No one can object in this instance, that the real views of a cabinet are often at

dispatch Lord Grenville said : " Your Lordship should
 " take this opportunity to explain in the most distinct
 " and unequivocal terms, that if any secret treaty was
 " in fact concluded at the interview at Pillnitz, be-
 " tween the late Emperor and the King of Prussia,
 " which is, to say the least, very doubtful in point of
 " fact, this at least is certain, that his Majesty was
 " no party to such treaty ; and not only was not then
 " included in it, but has never since adhered to it,
 " nor even been apprized of its contents. The public
 " *Declaration*, which was made at that interview,
 " shews on the face of it, that his Majesty was no
 " party to it ; and it is indeed notorious, that it ap-
 " plied to circumstances, which were done away
 " long before the war broke out between Austria
 " and France, and that the subsequent negotia-
 " tions for the maintenance of peace between those
 " two powers, turned on points wholly distinct from
 " those supposed to have been referred to in the pre-
 " tended *Treaty* of Pillnitz."

variance with its protestations, since the answer was given to a question proposed, not by the Court of France, but by the Court of Austria. It is true, that if the British Government had been resolved on a war with France, it would have been consistent with its own interest, to conceal its intentions from its future adversary : in like manner, as the French Government, at the beginning of the American war, continued to give the British Ambassador the most friendly assurances, even after war was resolved on at Versailles. But the British Government could have no interest in deceiving the Emperor : on the contrary, it would have been prejudicial to its own interest, to assure the leader of the coalesced powers, that its positive determination was to preserve a strict neutrality, had it really intended to join the coalition. However, should any one still doubt, whether the dispositions of the British Cabinet were friendly toward France

or

or not, the answer given to the Emperor proves at least thus much, that Great Britain *at that period* took no part in a coalition against France.

Another very strong proof of this position is contained in a letter written by the King of Sweden, dated 2d of September, 1791, to the Marquis de Bouillé. (4) It appears from this letter that the King of Sweden at that time intended to embark troops, which were to be landed on the coast of Flanders: but he was so far from expecting assistance, that he apprehended even opposition on the part of England, and said, *it would be a grand point gained, if England remained neutral.* (5) Hence it is evident that England no more

(4) This letter is printed in the *Mémoires de Bouillé*, tom. ii. p. 142—145.

(5) His own words were: *Ce serait un grand point que la neutralité d'Angleterre, dont vous me parlez.* lb. p. 144.

made a common cause with the King of Sweden, than with the Emperor. In fact, the British Government not only refused to join the coalition against France, (6) but

(6) If further proof were necessary, we might quote the authority of the French themselves. The Minister of the war department, in a report delivered to the National Assembly on the 11th of October, 1791, which in the *Moniteur* of the 13th of October occupies four whole columns, described very circumstantially the danger which at that time threatened France from various powers of Europe, and mentioned them by name, but did not say a syllable of England. And Brissot, in his speech of the 20th of October, 1791, was so far from representing the English ministers as *encouraging* the Princes of Europe to a confederacy against France, as some late writers have done without the least foundation, that on the contrary he spoke of them as mediators, and said, “ l’Angleterre était occupée à calmer les esprits de Ratisbonne.” *Moniteur*, 22d October, 1791. But Brissot, it is said, was a friend of the English ministry! Now it must be observed, that this absurd report was first propagated in the spring of the year 1793, at the time that the power of the Girondists was on the decline; when Cambon, a principal member in the opposite party,

in

acted toward that country with the greatest friendship, as will appear from the following chapter.

in order to accelerate the fall of Brissot, suggested that he was in secret alliance with the English Ministry. The thought was so valuable to the Anarchists, who were then coming into power, that it was seized with great avidity ; and as this party, at the head of which was Robespierre, maintained their authority a considerable time, it was brought by degrees into general circulation, without any one's knowing, or even asking, whence it came. Brissot (à ses Commettans, p. 98. Paris, 1793) says : “ Cambon, craint-il là lumière ? Le mien (c'est-à-dire, bilan) est prêt ; il est, “ dans un mot—*Rien* ; et c'est la seule réponse que je “ fais à l'épithète qu'il m'a donnée, Allié de Pitt.” In fact, it would have been a very extraordinary alliance, since Pitt's adversaries have claimed Brissot as *their* friend ; and a noble Peer, at the head of the Opposition called him, in his speech of 1st Feb. 1793 (to use the words of the Moniteur 10th Feb. 1793) “ un homme aussi vertueux, qu'éclairé, de l'amitié duquel il s'honore.” Brissot's virulent abuse of the English Ministry a short time before the declaration of war, as well as on the day on which it was declared, is likewise not very reconcilable with his supposed friendship for them. But that was mere dissimulation, it is said.

said. Now if that was mere diffimulation, the Director Barras is likewise attached to the English ministry, and all his invectives are nothing more than a mask, to cover his real friendship. In fact, if another 18th of Fructidor should take place, and the same fate should befall Barras, which he prepared for his colleagues, Barthelemy and Carnot, it would be nothing extraordinary to hear Barras decried as an agent of the British Minister; for it has been the fate of the French rulers, from the beginning of the revolution, to be adored, while in power, and to be calumniated, when fallen.—Lastly in the catalogue of grievances, with which the National Convention on the 1st of February, 1793, accompanied the declaration of war against Great Britain, no charge whatsoever was laid to the British Government, prior to the 10th of August, 1792. See *Moniteur* 3d Feb. 1793. We may be assured, therefore, that the National Convention itself was conscious of the British Government's having no concern in a coalition against France in 1791.

CHAP. II.

Insurrection of the Negroes in the Island of St. Domingo. Friendly Conduct of Great Britain toward France on this Occasion : and Ingratitude of the French National Assembly to the British Government.

TOWARD the close of the summer of 1791, an insurrection broke out among the negroes of St. Domingo, which was so dreadful in its effects that the French inhabitants of the island were reduced to a state of despair. The town of Cape François was surrounded by a formidable army of the insurgents; and the inhabitants had neither a sufficient quantity of arms and ammunition to enable them to defend themselves, nor provisions sufficient to support a long

a long blockade. Without speedy relief, therefore, the French colony of St. Domingo must have been for ever lost to France: but from France itself, on account of its distance, speedy relief was not to be obtained. In this distressed situation, the Governor of St. Domingo sent deputies to Lord Effingham, the Governor of Jamaica, to request both provisions and ammunition: and Lord Effingham, with the consent of Admiral Affleck, sent immediately two frigates, the *Daphne* and the *Blonde*, provided with all necessaries, to Cape François, and a third, the *Centurion*, to Port au Prince. The *Daphne* and the *Blonde* arrived at the Cape on the 26th of September. On board the former was Mr. Bryan Edwards, who, in the preface to his *Historical Survey of St. Domingo*, has circumstantially described the manner in which the assistance afforded to the distressed colonists was received. “The inhabitants of the town,” says Mr. Edwards,

wards,

wards, (1) “being assembled on the beach,
 “directed all their attention towards us,
 “and we landed amidst a croud of specta-
 “tors, who with uplifted hands and stream-
 “ing eyes gave welcome to their deliverers,
 “for such they considered us, and acclama-
 “tions of ‘*Vivent les Anglais!*’ resounded
 “from every quarter. The Governor of St.
 “Domingo was at that time the unfor-
 “tunate General Blanchelande, who has
 “since perished on the scaffold. He did
 “us the honour to receive us on the quay.
 “A Committee of the Colonial Assembly,
 “accompanied by the Governor’s only son;
 “an amiable and accomplished youth, had
 “before attended us on board the *Blonde*,
 “and we were immediately conducted to
 “the place of their meeting. The scene
 “was striking and solemn. The hall was
 “splendidly illuminated, and all the mem-

(1) Page 5.

“ bers appeared in mourning. Chairs were
“ placed for us within the bar, and the Go
“ vernor having taken his seat at the righ
“ hand of the President, the latter addressed
“ us in an eloquent and affecting oration, o
“ which the following is as literal a transla
“ tion as the idiom of the two languages will
“ admit.”

“ We were not mistaken, Gentlemen
“ when we placed our confidence in you
“ generosity; but we could hardly enter
“ tain the hope, that, beside sending us suc
“ cours, you would come in person to give
“ us consolation. Generous islanders! hu
“ manity has operated powerfully on you
“ hearts; you have yielded to the first emo
“ tion of your generosity, in the hopes o
“ f snatching us from death, for it is already
“ too late to save us from misery. What
“ contrast between *your* conduct and that o
“ othe

“ other nations ! (2) We will avail ourselves
 “ of your benevolence ; but the days you
 “ preserve to us will not be sufficient to ma-
 “ nifest our gratitude : our children shall
 “ keep it in remembrance. Regenerated
 “ France, unapprized that such calamities
 “ might befall us, has taken no measures
 “ to protect us against their effects. With

(2) What a contrast, likewise, between the conduct of the English and that of their own countrymen ! While the northern district of St. Domingo was in the utmost want of provisions, a French ship arrived laden with meal, from Bourdeaux, but the captain refused to dispose of his cargo, because the colonists were unable to pay him ready money. On this subject a complaint was afterwards made in the National Assembly, in which the following letter from St. Domingo was read, on the 11th of January, 1792. “ *Les paroisses du Nord, manquaient de subsistances. Mr. Fournier, commandant le Triton de Bourdeaux, refusait de fourpir de la farine aux habitants de Bongres, parceque ceux-ci épuisés en ce moment ne pouvaient lui payer comptant. En vain lui avaient-ils rémontré, que son refus de fournir des farines allait les exposer aux plus affreux besoins.*” *Moniteur*, 12th Jan. 1792.

“ what

“ what admiration will she learn, *that with-*
“ *out your assistance we should no longer exist*
“ *as a dependency to any nation !*”

This address of the President of the Colonial Assembly is an unanswerable proof, that the French were at that time indebted to the friendship of the English for the preservation of their valuable colony of St. Domingo. They were under obligations likewise to the British Government: for the Governor of Jamaica would not have ventured to supply the French colonists with arms and ammunition, unless he had been assured, that the dispositions of his cabinet had been friendly toward France. And to remove all doubts on this subject, the British Ambassador at Paris was ordered to notify to the Court of France, that his Majesty approved of Lord Effingham's conduct. (3)

(3) The following is the official note of the British Minister at Paris to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On the 5th of November the note of the British Ambassador was taken into consideration by the National Assembly. (4) The person, however, who spoke first, proposed neither a vote of thanks to the British Government, nor even to Lord Effingham, but directed his whole attention to the state of the French colony, till Mr. Dubayet reminded him of the obligations which they owed to the generous Governor of Jamaica. (5) Another member of the Assem-

Affairs. " Je crois devoir vous envoyer une lettre de
 " Milord Effingham, Gouverneur de la Jamaïque, en
 " date du 7th Septembre. Je dois vous annoncer,
 " que le Roi mon maître a bien voulu *approuver la*
 " *conduite* qu'a tenu le Gouverneur, en envoyant tous
 " les secours, dont il pouvait se passer, pour soutenir
 " le gouvernement de St. Domingue." Moniteur, 6th
 Nov. 1791.

(4) The whole debate is contained in the Moniteur, 6th Nov. 1791.

(5) " Vous devez jeter vos regards sur la conduite
 " de M. Effingham, Gouverneur de la Jamaïque, digne
 " d'une grande nation, qui rivalise avec nous pour la
 " liberté. Je demande qu'il lui soit voté des remerci-
 " mens."

D

bly,

bly, but a person of so little importance that his name was unknown even to the editor of the *Moniteur*, (6) then proposed a vote of thanks to the British Government: but the motion was seconded by no one in the whole Assembly. Upon this, Mr. Goujon moved, that the thanks of the Assembly should be voted neither to the British Government, nor to the Governor of Jamaica, but to the British *Nation* (7): and this motion passed, with only the following amendment: that Lord Effingham, as a member of the British Nation, was named in particular. (8)

(6) This appears from the circumstance, that after Mr. a mere line is placed, instead of a name.

(7) Je demande qu'il soit voté des remerciemens, non pas au Gouverneur, non pas au Gouvernement Anglois, mais à la *Nation* Anglaise.

(8) Mr. le Président. La motion est faite, à voter des remerciemens à la nation Anglaise, et en particulier à Mr. Effingham, Gouverneur de la Jamaïque.

La proposition énoncée par M. le Président est adoptée.

This

This strange behaviour of the National Assembly was by no means calculated to promote that friendship with the British Government, of which they had just received so striking a proof. It was not only absurd to thank a whole nation for an act, in which merely the Government, the Governor of Jamaica, and a few individuals in that island had taken part, but it was ungrateful and affronting to reject the thanks which were proposed, and were really due to the Government of Great Britain. The object, however, which the National Assembly had in view, admits of no doubt; and we may safely conclude, that the system which the French rulers have since followed with so much success, was at that time already adopted. (9)

(9) This system consists in separating the governed from their governors, in exciting the one against the other, that both of them may at last fall a prey to French avarice and ambition. Brissot said: "Que

The conduct of the National Assembly was likewise in another respect highly ungrateful; for if the British Ministry had

“penfaient les hommes éclairés, républicains avant le
 “10. Août, les hommes qui voulaient la liberté non
 “seulement pour leur pays, mais pour toute l’Europe ?
 “Ils croyaient qu’on pouvait l’établir par-tout, *en sou-*
 “*levant les administrés contre les administrans*, en fai-
 “sant voir aux peuples la facilité et les avantages de
 “ces soulèvemens.” Brissot à ses Commettans (Paris, May 1793) p. 81. And that this system was already adopted at the end of the year 1791, appears from Isnard’s speech in the National Assembly on the 5th Jan. 1792. In this speech said Isnard: “Voici l’instant
 “qui peut-être doit décider à jamais des despotes et
 “des nations: c’est vous que le ciel réservait à ces
 “grands événemens: élevez-vous au niveau de vos
 “destinées.” And a few lines after; “Est-il bien
 “vrai qu’un langage national ne ferait entendu dans
 “aucune contrée? Ah sans doute les Anglais seraient
 “un peuple digne de l’entendre.” Moniteur, 6th Jan. 1792. This last passage shews likewise that the leaders of the National Assembly even at that time directed their attention to the people of England, who, in consequence of their political liberty, were considered as fitter subjects for French intrigue than the inhabitants of any other country.

thought

thought proper to act on the same political principles on which the French Government acted at the commencement of the American war, or to retaliate its unjust aggression, they might, without the least difficulty, have gained possession of the capital of St. Domingo. The French marine was then in such a situation, that it could not have made the least resistance. Ever since the year 1789 the French sailors had been in a continual state of insurrection: (10) almost all the naval officers were dissatisfied, (11) the greatest part of them had ac-

(10) All the documents relative to this subject are contained in the *Mémoires Secrets, pour servir à l'histoire de la dernière année du règne de Louis XVI.* Par A. F. Bertrand de Molleville, Ministre d'Etat à cette époque, (Londres 1797, tom. iii. 8.) tom. ii. p. 315—335.

(11) Bertrand de Molleville (tom. i. p. 291) says: "Un esprit d'insubordination et de révolte s'était manifesté de lui-même dans les principaux ports de mer, et à bord de plusieurs vaisseaux de guerre depuis l'année 1789. Plusieurs officiers avaient été out-

tually quitted the service, and many had already emigrated. Even those who were appointed in their stead returned, almost to a man, their commissions, as soon as they received them; (12) and Bertrand de Molleville, at that time Minister of the Marine, has himself acknowledged, that he should have found it difficult at the end of 1791 to have found an officer, who would have accepted the command of a ship of war. (13)

“ragés et insultés par les matelots: aussi tous les officiers en général étaient dégoûtés du service, et je crus fermement que le Duc d’Orléans et le Comte d’Estaing seraient les seuls d’un rang distingué qui consentiraient à servir, tant que la marine serait soumise aux nouveaux réglemens.”

(12) “La défobéissance et la révolte étaient non seulement tolérées, mais encouragées et regardées comme les marques distinctives du patriotisme: aussi, presque tous les officiers m’envoyèrent leurs commissions dès qu’ils eurent reçu la lettre, par laquelle je leur annonçais leur promotion,” *Ib.* tom. i. p. 278.

(13) *Tom.* i. p. 263, he relates the following conversation, which took place at that period between himself and M. de Narbonne, the War Minister. “Le jour

“où

But even if the French marine had been in the best possible condition, there would have been no necessity for using force, in order to accomplish the end; for the inhabitants of St. Domingo were so exasperated against the National Assembly, to whose proceedings they imputed their disasters, (14)

“ où je parlai au conseil de ce refus des officiers, M. de Narbonne m’entreprit en ces termes.

“ Quoi ! *tous les officiers refusent ?* c’est donc à dire, “ que si nous avons quelqu’ inquiétude relativement “ aux dispositions de l’Angleterre, et que je vous de- “ mandasse une frégate pour croiser sur nos côtes, “ vous ne pourriez la fournir.

“ Ce ne sont pas les frégates, qui nous manquent, “ répondis-je : mais *dans ce moment je serais fort em- “arrassé pour trouver un officier, qui voulut se charger “ d’en commander une.”*

(14) Edwards’s Historical Survey of St. Domingo, preface p. 10. They accused particularly those members of the Assembly who call themselves Amis des Noirs, and whose conduct, as well as the effects which it produced, Mr. Edwards has described in ch. vii. See also Bertrand de Molleville Mémoires Secrets,

that all the classes of the whites were disposed to renounce their allegiance to the mother country. "The black cockade," says Mr. Edwards, (15) "was universally substituted "in place of the tri-coloured one, and very "earnest wishes were avowed in all companies, without scruple or restraint, that "the British Administration would send an "armament to conquer the island, or rather to receive its voluntary surrender "from the inhabitants." Very earnest application was likewise made to the British Ministry, that an armament might be sent to take possession of the country: but no attention was paid to the solicitations of the colonists, till the French Government had

tom. ii. p. 241—245, where an account is given of some papers, found in the hands of the mulatto Raymond, which contained the instructions communicated to the negroes of St. Domingo by the Amis des Noirs during the years 1790 and 1791, in order to excite them to rebellion.

(15) *Ib. ib.*

thought

thought proper to declare war against Great Britain. (16) And this generous conduct has been repaid, on the part of France, with the blackest ingratitude.

(16) *Ib.* p. 140.

CHAP. III.

Other less important Events, relative to Great Britain and France, in the Year 1791.

ON the 28th of September, 1791, the King of France issued a proclamation, in which he formally notified his acceptance of the new constitution: and he wrote likewise circular letters to the different courts of Europe, to the same purpose. The Court of Great Britain was one of the first which sent an answer, and this answer was delivered in terms of great respect. (1) It may be said indeed, that answers of this kind are mere matters of form: yet, when we con-

(1) It is contained in the *Moniteur*, dated 5th Nov. 1791, and is dated Oct. 6th, 1791.

sider that several of the European Courts answered much later, others not at all; that the King of Spain gave for answer, he regarded not the acceptance as an act of free will; and that the King of Sweden returned the letter delivered to him by the French Minister at Stockholm, without even opening it; (2) the new Legislative Power of France had certainly reason to be satisfied with the early and friendly answer of the Court of Great Britain.

But another event took place before the close of the year, which could by no means afford the Court of Great Britain reciprocal satisfaction. By the twenty-fourth article of the treaty of commerce (3) it had been stipulated, that if one of the two contract-

(2) *Moniteur*, 5th November 1791.

(3) The treaty of commerce between Great Britain and France is printed among the State Papers, in the *Annual Register* for 1796: and also in *Marten's Recueil des Principaux Traités*, tom. ii. p. 680—707.

ing powers should be engaged in war with a third, all vessels belonging to subjects of the other power should be provided with sea-letters and certificates, that the masters of them, in case they should be suspected of carrying ammunition or any warlike stores to the enemies of the former power, which was strictly prohibited by the twenty-second article, might be able to clear themselves. It had been further stipulated by the twenty-sixth article, that if a ship of war belonging to the former power met a merchant-ship belonging to any subject of the latter, the captain of the ship of war should have the liberty of sending a person on board the merchant-ship to examine the sea-letter and certificate. Agreeably to these stipulations, Sir Richard Strachan, at that time Captain of the Phoenix, meeting with some French merchantmen on the coast of Malabar, in November, 1791, determined to examine their sea-letters and certificates; but as they
were

were under convoy of a French frigate, he first sent off an officer to signify his intentions to the Captain, and to request him to make the proper signal to the merchantmen under his convoy. Now, as England was then engaged in a war with Tippoo Saib, who, as well as his predecessor, had always stood in close alliance with France, and a suspicion therefore must necessarily arise that these merchantmen were carrying warlike stores to the enemies of Great Britain, especially since they were under convoy of a frigate, which, as France was then engaged in no war, appeared unnecessary for vessels which had nothing contraband on board, the captain of the French frigate was in duty bound to attend to the representations of Sir Richard Strachan, and to make a signal to the vessels under his convoy, to bring to and clear themselves. But instead of this, he made a signal to the merchantmen to croud sail and get off: and, to prevent

vent Sir Richard Strachan from following them, he attacked the Phoenix, as if Great Britain and France were then at war, nor did he even wait till the English lieutenant was returned on board, to make report to his captain. It is true, that the French frigate, after a short engagement, was obliged to strike, (4) and that her captain was so severely wounded, that he paid for his temerity with the loss of his life: his conduct however, was not only a violation of the treaty of commerce, but an act of open hostility.

As soon as intelligence of this event arrived in England, Government, of course, complained of it to the Court of France; but the complaint was delivered in terms of great moderation, and it was requested

(4) Commodore, now Admiral, Cornwallis, who then commanded the English fleet at Tellichery, gave orders, however, for her immediate release.

only,

only, that orders might be given to prevent similar accidents in future, which might tend to destroy that harmony, which the British Government sincerely wished to preserve. But when the note of the British Ambassador (5) was read in the National

(5) It is contained in the *Moniteur*, 12th April, 1792, and is as follows :

“ Milord Gower a l'honneur de communiquer à M.
“ Dumourier la traduction des pièces dans lesquelles
“ se trouvent les détails du combat, qui a eu lieu entre
“ le *Phoenix*, et la frégate Française la *Réfolue*. La
“ première est une lettre écrite par M. Strachan au
“ Commodore Cornwallis : l'autre un récit de M.
“ Parker lieutenant envoyé par le Capitaine Anglais
“ à bord de la frégate Française. Il est aisé de se con-
“ vaincre, que la conduite du Capitaine Anglais est
“ conforme aux traités, et que cette affaire ne doit
“ pas porter atteinte à la bonne harmonie qui subsiste
“ entre les deux nations. Il paraît que son objet était
“ de s'assurer, si les batimens Français ne contenaient
“ aucunes des provisions militaires, qu'on est convenu
“ par le traité de regarder comme contrebande, et qu'il
“ est réciproquement défendu de fournir aux ennemis
“ de l'une ou l'autre des parties contractantes. C'est
“ après cette communication amicale, que le Capitaine
Français

Assembly, the members of it were so far from offering any satisfaction for the violation of the treaty of commerce, and the act of open hostility committed on the part of France, that they did not condescend to make even an apology for the past, or to promise security for the future.(6) On the contrary, they sought only evasions, to justify the conduct of the French Captain. At last, the matter was referred to a Committee, and there it ended.

“ Français fit un signal sur son bord pour que les batimens Français fissent voile, au lieu d’amener. Il fit feu, sans attendre aucune explication ultérieure. La conduite de ce dernier est reprehensible, sur-tout en ce qu’il a fait feu, avant que le lieutenant du vaisseau Anglais fût de retour à son bord. Sa Majesté Britannique ne doute pas que le Roi ne donne des ordres, pour prévenir désormais des événemens semblables, qui pourraient troubler la paix, qu’il aura toujours à cœur de maintenir.”

(6) See the Debates in the Moniteur, 12th April, 1792.

The preceding transaction, though in itself of no great importance, shews at least the spirit which animated the British Government on the one hand, and the French National Assembly on the other. It shews that the former was desirous to maintain peace, and that the latter was totally indifferent about it. (7)

(7) It shews the dispositions of the two Governments even so late as April, 1792; for though the engagement between the frigates took place in Nov. 1791, on which account I have related the whole transaction in this chapter, yet the news of the engagement arrived not in London before the beginning of April, 1792.

CHAP. IV.

Meeting of the British Parliament on the 31st of January, 1792. His Majesty's Speech. Reduction of the British Forces both by Sea and by Land. Cessation of the Treaty of Subsidy with Hesse Cassel. Abolition of Taxes to the annual Amount of two hundred thousand Pounds. Falseness of the Assertion, that Great Britain acceded in March, 1792, to what is called the Treaty of Pavia. Measures taken at this Time in France, for an Augmentation of its Forces by Sea as well as by Land.

ON the 31st of January, 1792, the session of the British Parliament, was opened by a speech from the throne, (1) in

(1) See Rivington's Annual Register, 1792, p. ii. State Papers, p. 187; or New Annual Register, Public papers, p. 50.

which

which his Majesty, having mentioned the treaty of peace between the Emperor and the Porte, and the preliminaries already signed between the latter power and Russia, concluded in the following terms: “The
 “ friendly assurances, which I receive from
 “ foreign powers, and the general state of
 “ affairs in Europe, appear to promise to
 “ my subjects the continuance of their pre-
 “ sent tranquillity. Under these circum-
 “ stances, I am induced to think, *that some*
 “ *immediate reduction may be safely made in*
 “ *our naval and military establishments*; and
 “ my regard for the interests of my subjects
 “ renders me at all times desirous of avail-
 “ ing myself of any favourable opportunity
 “ *of diminishing the public expences.*”

On the 9th of February, when this subject was taken into consideration by the House of Commons, the number of sailors and marines to be employed for the year 1792,

was reduced to sixteen thousand : (2) and on the 16th of February, even the army of Great Britain, though at that time so inconsiderable in point of number, that no foreign power could have taken umbrage at it, likewise underwent a reduction. (3) Further, on the 17th of February, Mr. Pitt informed the House that the Hessian subsidy being now expired, " his Majesty's Ministers were not " of opinion, that the circumstances of the " country required its renewal." (4) By these and similar reductions the annual expenditure of Great Britain received a diminution of four hundred thousand pounds : and it was resolved, that taxes should be abolished

(2) *Ib.* p. 183. *Ib.* p. 145.

(3) On the 15th of February, guards and garrisons were estimated, from December 25, 1791, to June 24, 1792, at 17,013 men : but from June 25, to Dec. 24, 1792, at only 15,701. *Ib.* *ib.*

(4) *New Annual Register*, 1792, British and foreign history, p. 38.

to

to the amount of one half of this sum, and that the other half should be applied to the diminution of the national debt.(5)

The preceding measures sufficiently evince the peaceful disposition of the British Cabinet, and its determination to take no part in a war against France. And as there seemed no reason to believe, at the beginning of the year 1702, that France itself would so soon attempt to disturb the repose of Great Britain, Ministers flattered themselves with the pleasing expectation, that the plans, by which they endeavoured to promote the happiness of their country, would be continued without interruption. "Though
" I am not so vain," said Mr. Pitt, on the 21st of February, "as to suppose, that *all*
" my present speculations should succeed
" agreeably to my wishes, or that no un-
" foreseen event should prevent the execu-

(5) *Ib.* p. 40.

“ tion of any one of them : yet it is not un-
“ reasonable to expect, that the peace, which
“ we at present enjoy, should continue at
“ least *fifteen years*, since at no period of the
“ British history, whether we consider the
“ internal situation of the kingdom, or its
“ relation to foreign powers, has the prof-
“ pect of war been further removed, than at
“ present.” But unfortunately for Great
Britain, and unfortunately for all Europe,
these expectations were annihilated, in less
than a year, by events, which no human
sagacity could at that time predict.

The report, that England acceded in
March, 1792, to what was called the treaty
of Pavia, (6) is contradicted by the facts,
which have been already related in this
chapter. It is even doubtful, whether the
treaty itself, which is said to have been con-

(6) This treaty may be seen in Martens' *Recueil des
principaux Traités*, tom. v. p. 5.

cluded in July, 1791, be genuine or not : (7) but even if we suppose it to be genuine, England was no party to it, for there is not only no signature on the part of England, (8) but England is not once mentioned in it, either directly or indirectly. Consequently, the only question to be examined is, whether the report be true, that England acceded to it in the month of March following: and that this report, in support of which not a single fact has ever been adduced, is devoid of foundation, appears from the general conduct of the British Government at this very period, which is wholly

(7) Martens, in the place just quoted, says, that he is " fort éloigné d'annoncer comme digne de foi une piece, que le contenu, les circonstances qui ont précédé, la signature même, semblent déclarer apocryphe."

(8) The only names signed to this treaty are, Leopold, Prince of Nassau, Count Florida Blanca, Bishofswerder.

irreconcilable with the prospect of a war with France. But to remove all doubts on this subject, it will be necessary to enquire into the origin of the report, which took its rise, not at the time of the pretended accession, but in the following month of November. In the *Moniteur* of the 18th November, 1792, the treaty of Pavia was printed: and after the signatures, which close every treaty, was added the following note by the editor, "England *passively* acceded to it in March, 1792." (9) This anonymous note is the source from which the report in question took its rise. In the first place, therefore, we must ask: what did the unknown author intend to express by this *passive* accession? Does the epithet apply to the act of accession, as the construction seems to indicate, or to the measures which England was to adopt in consequence of the

(9) "Nota. L'Angleterre y a *passivement* accédé en Mars, 1792."

accession?

accession? Either to the one, or to the other, it must necessarily apply, if the note be not absolutely devoid of meaning. But no government can accede to a treaty, without signifying its accession by some *positive* act, such as the signature of an Ambassador. A *passive* accession, therefore, if regard be had to the accession itself, is a contradiction. Nor will the explanation be more satisfactory, if reference be made to the measures, which England was to adopt in consequence of the accession: for the accession to a treaty on the one hand, and a perfectly passive conduct on the other, are two things, which, though not in direct contradiction, are yet of such a nature, that the one destroys the other. The note, therefore, in the *Moniteur*, in whatever way we interpret it, contains its own confutation. This was clearly perceived by those commentators and quoters of the note, who

were

were inimical to the British Government: and for that reason they have omitted the inconvenient word “passively,” which the author of the note had cautiously inserted, because six months had then already elapsed after the pretended accession, and yet no visible effect had been produced in the conduct of the British Administration.

It appears then, on a near examination, that the report in question is founded, first on an anonymous and contradictory note in the *Moniteur* of the 18th November, 1792, and secondly on arbitrary alterations, which have been made in subsequent copies of it. How then is it possible, that any man, who has a regard for truth, can subscribe to a report, which rests on *such* a foundation? Indeed I believe that every man, who has seriously enquired into it, must perceive its falsity. The author of the British and foreign
reign

reign history in the New Annual Register, for 1793, whom no one will accuse of partiality in favour of Ministers, is himself of opinion, "that the insinuation is merely the effect of party malevolence." (10) Nor did Brissot believe in this idle story: for in his speech of the 12th of January, 1793, which was delivered nearly two months after the treaty of Pavia, and the above-mentioned note appeared in the *Moniteur*, he acknowledged, (11) that England had observed the most strict neutrality in respect to France, till after the 10th of August, 1792. (12) And on the 13th of January, 1793, the Na-

(10) See p. 7.

(11) His own words are, "*Le Cabinet de Saint James a plusieurs fois protesté d'observer scrupuleusement la neutralité envers la France, et en effet elle a été jusqu' à l'immortelle journée du 10 Août.*" *Moniteur*, 15th January, 1793.

(12) Whether the neutrality was violated after this period is a question which will be examined in the sequel.

tional

tional Convention itself admitted, (13) that the observation of this strict neutrality toward France, on the part of England, had been continued even to the beginning of the year 1793. But the National Convention would certainly not have made this confession, unless at least a majority of its members had been persuaded, that the report of England's accession to the treaty of Pavia was ungrounded. The very same confession contains likewise a direct acknowledgment on the part of the French Government, that England had no concern in any coalition against France, either in 1791 or 1792.

(13) The introduction to the decree of the 13th Jan. 1793, is as follows. “ La Convention Nationale
“ informée par le ministre des affaires étrangères des
“ préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, considé-
“ rant le changement de conduite de ce pays relative-
“ ment au caractère de neutralité, *qu'il avait con-*
“ *servée jusqu'ici, touchant les affaires de la France,*
“ *etc.*” *Moniteur*, 16th Jan. 1793.

We

We have seen that the British Cabinet, in the spring of the year 1792, by a reduction of the army and navy, by the abolition of the treaty of subsidy with Hesse Cassel, by the repeal of taxes to the amount of two hundred thousand pounds, and by a decided resolution to engage in no coalition against France, evinced a manifest disposition to peace with that country. Yet at this very period France itself not only took very active measures for an augmentation of its army, but likewise, what is not generally known, and what could have reference only to England, made preparations for an augmentation of its marine. On the 18th of March, 1792, which was full six weeks after the British Parliament had reduced the sailors and marines to be employed that year to *sixteen thousand*, Theodore Lameth, in the name of the Committee for Naval Affairs, delivered a report to the National Assembly, in which he said, "that about *eighty thousand*

"sailors

“ failors would be necessary, in order to man
 “ the vessels now at the disposition of the
 “ state, and which the honour of the na-
 “ tion, as well as the interest of its com-
 “ merce, *does not permit us to reduce.*” (14)
 The Committee further requested the Na-
 tional Assembly to take the speediest mea-
 sures for the organisation of the navy: (15)
 and the proposal was made with an enthu-
 siasm, which indicated a disposition to en-
 gage in a war by sea, (16) as well as by
 land.

(14) “ L’armement entier des batimens, dont l’état
 “ peut disposer aujourd’hui, et que l’honneur de la
 “ nation, ainsi que l’intérêt de son commerce *ne per-*
 “ *met pas de réduire*, exigerait environ 80,000 mate-
 “ lots.” *Moniteur*, 31 Mars, 1792.

(15) “ C’est au nom de ces troupes, dont le cou-
 “ rage soutint toujours l’état du pavillon Français, etc.
 “ que notre comité vous supplie, *de ne pas différer*
 “ l’organisation de l’artillerie, et des troupes de la
 “ marine.” *Ib.*

(16) Notre artillerie *prête à gronder sur tous les*
mers, etc. *Ib.*

It

It is true, that these were only preparatory steps to an augmentation of the French marine: but, as they were taken at a time when England had just made so considerable a diminution in its own naval force, the conduct of the National Assembly unavoidably excited the suspicion of an hostile disposition toward England. The English Government, however, still adhered to its principles of neutrality: and as the whole attention of France was soon after directed to a war on the Continent, the intended augmentation of the French marine was of course deferred to a more convenient opportunity.

CHAP. V.

Declaration of War against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. Notification of it to the Court of Great Britain by the French Minister Chauvelin. Determination of the British Cabinet to persevere in the System of Neutrality: and Chauvelin's Letter on this Subject. Letter of Thanks from the King of France to the King of England. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville, in which it was requested, that all British Subjects might be forbidden to serve under any foreign Power at War with France. Punctual compliance with this request, in a Proclamation

clamation of the twenty-fifth of May. Remarks on the Conduct of the British Cabinet.

ON the 20th of April, 1792, the National Assembly decreed almost unanimously, (1) and amidst the plaudits of a numerous croud of spectators, war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. The French Minister in London made a formal notification of it to the Court of Great Britain: and the conduct which our Government observed on this occasion, affords a new proof of its resolution to preserve the most strict neutrality. Chauvelin's letter to his own court, dated 28th of April, is decisive on this subject. (2)

(1) Only seven members voted against the war. See the *Moniteur*, 22d April, 1792.

“ Londres, le 28 Avril, 1792.

(2) “ J’ai communiqué au Lord Grenville toute les
 “ pieces, que vous m’aviez adressée relativement à
 Vol. I. F “ la

Immediately on the receipt of Chauvelin's letter, the King of France wrote a letter of thanks to the King of England, (3) dated 1st of May, in which he said, "I embrace ^{the} this opportunity to express to your Majesty, how sensible I am of all the public marks of affection you have given me. *I thank you for not having become a party to*

"la déclaration de guerre. L'effet de cette nouvelle a été de produire une baisse considérable dans les fonds publics. M. Pitt a fait démentir dans tous les papiers les bruits qui couraient, que des ordres avaient été donnés pour la presse. Il a répondu formellement à une députation de commerce, que le Gouvernement ne se mêlerait pas des affaires de la France. L'intérêt qu'il met à soutenir les fonds publics et une nouvelle garantie de sa neutralité. La guerre n'est pas du goût de la nation; on ne fait aucuns préparatifs, ni dans les ports, ni dans les arsenaux. Il est certain, que le système de neutralité, débattu au conseil, y a été adopté." Moniteur, 8th May, 1792.

(3) See New Annual Register, 1792. Public Papers, p. 96: or Rivington's Annual Register, 1792. State Papers, p. 256.

"the

*“ the concert formed by certain powers against
“ France.”*

On the 15th of May the French Ambassador communicated a Note to Lord Grenville, (4) in which, after a long and detailed representation of the motives which had induced the National Assembly to declare war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia, and after the most solemn protestation, first, that France renounced every idea of aggrandizement, and secondly, that

(4) In the Annual Register, 1792. Public Papers, p. 99, this note is dated 15th of May; but, probably owing to an error of the press, it is called in the superscription, p. 97, a note presented 12th of May. That 15th May is the true date, is certain: for not only Lord Grenville in his answer to this note, but likewise Mr. Chauvelin himself in his two following notes, of the 24th of May and the 18th of June, quotes it as a note dated 15th of May. This determination is not superfluous, because several writers, in consequence of the above mentioned typographical error, have ascribed to the note in question a false date.

France would never interfere in the internal concerns of other nations, (5) the following demand was made of the Court of Great Britain : “ That, conformably to the treaty
 “ of navigation and commerce, of the 26th
 “ of September, 1786, his Britannic Ma-
 “ jesty shall prohibit all the subjects of Great
 “ Britain and Ireland (and publish the order
 “ in the usual way throughout the two
 “ kingdoms, and the islands and countries
 “ dependent thereon) from committing any
 “ hostilities against French ships at sea : and
 “ that they shall not take out any patent,
 “ commission, or letters of reprisal, from the
 “ different Princes or States who are, or

(5) Whether the French Rulers have kept their word, in regard to this solemn protestation, which they had-already made in their Manifesto to all States and Nations, on the 29th of December, 1791, is a question which no one *at present* will venture to answer in the affirmative. An appeal to it, therefore, can prove nothing more than the *hypocrisy* of those who made it.

“ shall

“ shall be at war with France, or make use,
“ in any way, of such patents or commif-
“ sions.”

With this demand the Court of Great Britain punctually complied : for in ten days after the receipt of Mr. Chauvelin's note, a proclamation, (6) dated 25th of May, (7) was published, agreeably to his own prescription, containing the following order relative to the subject in question. “ Whereas

(6) See Rivington's Annual Register, 1791, State Papers, p. 195 ; or New Annual Register, 1792, Public Papers, p. 99.

(7) On the preceding day Lord Grenville sent a Note to Mr. Chauvelin, in which, after expressing his concern for the hostilities which had broken out between France and Austria, he assured the French Ambassador, that the Court of Great Britain was ready “ to fulfil, in the most exact manner, the stipulations of the treaty of navigation and commerce, “ of which his most Christian Majesty required the “ execution.” See Rivington's Annual Register, 1792, State Papers, p. 259.

“ the most Christian King hath caused appli-
“ cation to be made to his Majesty, that his
“ Majesty would, conformably to the article
“ of the treaty of navigation and commerce
“ concluded at Versailles 26th of September,
“ 1786, renew and publish, in all his do-
“ minions and countries, the strict and ex-
“ press prohibitions contained in the said
“ article; his Majesty doth hereby strictly
“ forbid all his subjects to receive any com-
“ mission, for arming and acting at sea as
“ privateers, or letters of reprisals, from any
“ enemy of the most Christian King, or,
“ by virtue or under colour of such com-
“ missions or reprisals, to disturb, infest,
“ or any ways damage his subjects; or to
“ arm ships as privateers, or to go out to sea
“ therewith, under the severest punishments
“ that can be inflicted on the transgressors,
“ besides being liable to make full restitu-
“ tion and satisfaction to those to whom
“ they have done any damage.”

The

The French Government had certainly reason to be satisfied with this friendly conduct of the British Court: and in fact it was so, as appears from the following paragraph in Mr. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville, of the 18th of June. (8) "The
 " undersigned Minister Plenipotentiary of
 " his Majesty the King of the French, has
 " transmitted to his Majesty the official
 " note which Lord Grenville addressed to
 " him on the 24th of May last, on the
 " part of his Britannic Majesty, in answer
 " to that which he had the honour to de-
 " liver to him on the 15th of the same
 " month, together with the royal proclama-
 " tion published in consequence of it. He
 " is directed to assure his Britannic Majesty
 " of the due sense which the King entertains

(8) The original is printed in the *Moniteur*, 20th July, 1792; and an English translation in *Rivington's Annual Register*, 1792. *State Papers*, p. 263. In the *New Annual Register* it is omitted.

“ of the friendly dispositions, and of the sentiments of humanity, of justice and of peace, which are so clearly manifested in that answer.” (9) Since then the French Government itself expressed so much satisfaction at the conduct of the British Court relative to Mr. Chauvelin’s note of the 15th of May, one should suppose, that no one would venture to make this very conduct a subject of animadversion and complaint. But as the three following charges have been preferred by British writers, first, that Mr. Chauvelin was suffered to wait too long for his answer ; secondly, that in Lord Grenville’s answer no notice was taken of the motives which had induced the National Assembly to declare war against the King of Hungary ; and thirdly, that in the inter-

(9) The words of the French original are, “ Il a reçu l’ordre de présenter à sa Majesté Britannique le témoignage de la sensibilité du Roi aux dispositions amicales, et aux sentimens d’humanité, de justice, et de paix, si bien manifestés dans cette réponse.”

val

val was issued a proclamation against seditious writings in Great Britain; it is necessary to make a particular reply to each. With respect to the first charge, every impartial man must admit, that an interval of nine days, for it was really no more, (10) was by no means an exorbitant length of time for the deliberations on the demand of the French Government, and the preparation of a proclamation, which was to serve as a rule for all British subjects during the war; especially as the British Government was at that time engaged with domestic concerns of the highest importance. The second charge is still more extraordinary: for if Lord Grenville, in his answer to Mr. Chauvelin's note, had taken notice of the motives which had induced the National Assembly to declare war against the King

(10) Lord Greville's answer was dated 24th of May, and Mr. Chauvelin's note, as I have already proved, was dated 15th of May.

of Hungary, he would have acted in direct opposition to the principle which the French themselves continually repeated, that no nation has a right to intermeddle in the affairs of another. And in regard to the proclamation against seditious writings, which was issued on the 21st of May, it stood in no connection with the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and France: it related solely to matters of national police, and these were of too much consequence to be deferred, in order that Mr. Chauvelin might receive his answer a few days sooner. In fact, the proclamation of the 21st of May has so little reference to the present history, that it might be safely passed over in silence: but, as several writers have contended that it evinced a hostile disposition toward France, we will examine it at full length in the following chapter.

CHAP. VI.

*Proclamation of the 21st of May, 1792, against
Seditious Writings; and Confutation of the
Objections which have been made to it.*

DURING a considerable time before the appearance of this proclamation, various political publications, which by no means contributed to promote the welfare of the British Constitution, had been circulated with great assiduity throughout Great Britain. And these publications were not works of cool and philosophical inquiry, they were not calculated to exercise the judgment of the learned, but to inflame the passions of the illiterate. They were designed

signed chiefly for the lower classes, to whose understandings they were particularly adapted: and that the poorest individual might be enabled to procure them, not only the cheapest possible editions were published, but even those cheap editions were sold at a price which could hardly repay the expences of printing. In these publications the lower classes were taught, that the British Constitution, the pride of Britons and the envy of foreigners, a constitution which Montefquieu and De Lolme had made the theme of their admiration, was a system of slavery. (1)

(1) This was particularly Mr. Paine's doctrine, who asserted in the most general terms, that "*all kings were tyrants, and their subjects slaves.*" See New Annual Register, 1792, British and Foreign History, p. 72, whence it likewise appears, that Paine's writings had been circulated even in public schools. That Paine's second part of the Rights of Man was a libel on the Constitution, was admitted in the House of Commons on the 30th of April, 1792, by an eminent leader of Opposition: and a celebrated writer of the same party has likewise granted, that several publications

They were taught to believe, that evils, which not even the wisest Administration can remove, were merely the result of political institutions, which distributed wealth and power in unequal portions, as if the same advantages were to be derived from indolence and ignorance, as from industry and talents. Even imaginary evils were represented as real ones; and causes, which had formerly produced content, were converted into motives of complaint. Before this period the lower, as well as the higher orders of society, had been instructed in the useful lesson, that, as they were privileged

lications, at that time in general circulation, "were, according to the just theory of the law, unquestionably libels." The same writer adds: "These irregularities and excesses were for a considerable length of time wholly overlooked by Government:" and it may be further added, that, if these avowed excesses had been any longer treated with indulgence, the revolution, which soon after deprived the King of France of his throne, would in all probability have extended itself to Great Britain.

on

on the one hand to exercise the rights of free-born Britons, they were bound on the other hand to fulfil the duties of good citizens. But by the new doctrine the lower classes especially were informed, that the *Rights* of man must now occupy their whole attention, and that these rights, if properly exercised, would lead to wealth, to power and to honour. This doctrine unavoidably produced a very sensible effect: for where shall we find a man, who possesses not vanity and ambition, who would not rather be rich than be poor, who would not rather govern than be governed? The ignorant and the unwary regard only *immediate* consequences, and have not sufficient penetration to discover *ultimate* effects. They perceive not, that a system in which all men choose to govern, can no where be of long duration; that, though well calculated to destroy an existing constitution, it must cease the moment a new one is erected, whatever
shape

shape the new constitution assumes, or however splendid the title with which it is adorned. They perceive not that a system, which leads immediately to anarchy, must ultimately lead to despotism, and that the severity of the latter is always proportioned to the excesses of the former (2): nor are they aware, that they are mere instruments in the hands of a few ambitious demagogues, who amuse mankind with the magic words of liberty and equality, not with a view of promoting the happiness of their fellow citizens, or of introducing a real system of equality, which can no where exist, but solely to exchange the old system of inequality for one which is better adapted to gratify their private vanity and ambition. Further, the effects of the new doctrine were so much the more extensive, as the writings in which it was contained were not merely

(2) The tyranny of Robespierre affords a striking proof.

circulated in the common course of trade, but were industriously distributed by numerous societies, who had correspondents in every part of the kingdom. Lastly, one at least of these societies, the Society for Constitutional Information, a short time before the proclamation of the 21st of May, opened by its own avowal a correspondence with the Jacobin Club in Paris, whose grand object was the destruction of monarchical government of every description, in which it likewise succeeded in its own country, within ten weeks after the period in question. (3)

(3.) So early as the 4th of May, 1792, the Society for Constitutional Information resolved, that a committee should be appointed to consider of a correspondence with the Jacobin Club in Paris, as appears from an advertisement inserted by order of the Society in the Morning Chronicle, 8th May. And about the middle of this month an address was actually voted and sent to the Jacobin Club, containing the following passages: "Brothers, and Fellow-citizens
" of the World, the cordial and affectionate reception with which you have honoured our worthy
" country-

Under these circumstances the British Cabinet deemed it necessary to issue the following proclamation :

“ countrymen Mr. Thomas Cooper and Mr. James
 “ Watt, members of the Society at Manchester, and
 “ united with our Society, has been communicated to
 “ us by the correspondence of those Gentlemen.”
 (From this passage we learn, that even before the
 month of May, 1792. deputies had been sent to the
 Jacobin Club.) “ It is not among the least of the
 “ revolutions which time is unfolding to an astonished
 “ world, that two nations, nursed by some wretched
 “ craft in reciprocal hatred, should so suddenly break
 “ their common odious chain, and rush into amity.
 “ The principle that can produce such an effect is the
 “ offspring of no earthly *court*: and whilst it exhibits
 “ to us the expensive iniquity of *former* politics, it en-
 “ ables us, with bold felicity, to say, *We have done with*
 “ *them*. In contemplating the political condition of
 “ nations, we cannot conceive a more diabolical sys-
 “ tem of government, than that which has hitherto
 “ *generally* been practised over the world.” Though
 this language is cautiously obscure, its meaning is very
 easy to be discovered. That the Address was sent to
 the Jacobin Club at Paris at least a week before the
 proclamation of the 21st of May was issued, appears
 from the resolution entered into by the Society on the

“Whereas divers wicked and seditious
 “writings have been printed, published,
 “and industriously dispersed, tending to ex-

18th of May, (which in the Morning Chronicle of the 25th of May immediately precedes the address itself, namely, “The following Address to the Friends
 “of the Constitution at Paris, commonly called Jacobins, and which was by the direction of this Society sent to them *last week*, was ordered for publication.” The information, therefore, which Government received of this address, was probably one of the principal motives to the proclamation of the 21st of May: and every man who thinks the British Constitution worth preserving, must admit, that it was high time to put a stop to proceedings which tended to the destruction of it. The Society of the Friends of the People, at a meeting held on the 12th of May, in consequence of a letter from the Chairman of the Society for Constitutional Information, and four days after the advertisement relative to the then intended address to the Jacobin Club had appeared in the Morning Chronicle, resolved that an answer should be returned, which concluded in the following words: “We decline all intercourse with a
 “Society whose views and objects, as far as we can collect them, from the various resolutions and proceedings which have been published, we cannot
 help

“cite tumult and disorder, by endeavouring
 “to raise groundless jealousies and discon-
 “tents in the minds of our faithful and
 “loving subjects, respecting the laws and
 “happy constitution of Government, civil,
 “and religious, established in this kingdom,
 “and endeavouring to vilify and bring into
 “contempt the wise and wholesome provi-
 “sions made at the time of the glorious re-
 “volution, and since strengthened and con-
 “firmed by subsequent laws, for the pre-
 “servation and security of the rights and
 “liberties of our faithful and loving sub-
 “jects; and whereas divers writings have
 “help regarding as *irreconcilable with those real in-*
 “*terests* on which you profess to inform and enlighten
 “the people.” See the Morning Chronicle, 14th
 May, 1792. Since then the Society of the Friends of
 the People have declared, that the proceedings of the
 Society for Constitutional Information were irrecon-
 cileable with the real interests of the People of Great
 Britain, no one of its members can represent the pro-
 clamations of the 21st of May as unnecessary, without
 arraigning the proceedings of his own Society.

CHAP. V.

Declaration of War against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. Notification of it to the Court of Great Britain by the French Minister Chauvelin. Determination of the British Cabinet to persevere in the System of Neutrality: and Chauvelin's Letter on this Subject. Letter of Thanks from the King of France to the King of England. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville, in which it was requested, that all British Subjects might be forbidden to serve under any foreign Power at War with France. Punctual compliance with this request, in a Proclamation

“ the full enjoyment of their rights and
 “ liberties, both religious and civil: We
 “ therefore being resolved, as far as in us
 “ lies, to repress the wicked and seditious
 “ practices aforesaid, and to deter all per-
 “ sons from following so pernicious an ex-
 “ ample, have thought it fit, by the advice
 “ of our Privy Council, to issue this our
 “ Royal Proclamation, solemnly warning all
 “ our loving subjects, as they tender their
 “ own happiness and that of their posterity;
 “ to guard against all such attempts, which
 “ aim at the subversion of all regular go-
 “ vernment within this kingdom, and which
 “ are inconsistent with the peace and order
 “ of society; and earnestly exhorting them
 “ at all times, and to the utmost of their
 “ power, to avoid and discourage all pro-
 “ ceedings tending to produce riots and tu-
 “ mults. And we do strictly charge and com-
 “ mand all our magistrates in and through-
 “ out our kingdom of Great Britain, that

“ they do make diligent inquiry, in order to
“ discover the authors and printers of such
“ wicked and seditious writings as aforesaid,
“ and all others who shall disperse the same:
“ and we do further charge and command
“ all our sheriffs, justices of the peace, chief
“ magistrates in our cities, boroughs and
“ corporations, and all other our officers and
“ magistrates throughout our kingdom of
“ Great Britain, that they do, in their se-
“ veral and respective stations, take the most
“ immediate and effectual care to suppress
“ and prevent all riots, tumults, and other
“ disorders, which may be attempted to be
“ raised or made by any person or persons,
“ which, on whatever pretext they may be
“ grounded, are not only contrary to the
“ law, but dangerous to the most important
“ interests of this kingdom. And we do
“ further require and command all and every
“ our magistrates aforesaid, that they do
“ from time to time transmit to one of our

Principal

“ Principal Secretaries of State, due and
 “ full information of such persons as shall
 “ be found offending as aforesaid, or in any
 “ degree aiding or abetting therein : it being
 “ our determination, for the preservation of
 “ the peace and happiness of our faithful
 “ and loving subjects, to carry the laws vi-
 “ gorously into execution against such offen-
 “ ders as aforesaid.”(4)

It is evident, that this proclamation had
 no relation to the Government of France :
 it was a mere act of national police, which
 no more concerned the French Government,
 than the measures taken in France relative
 to the emigrants concerned the English Go-
 vernment. France, therefore, had no right
 to complain of it, as an eminent opposition
 writer has himself acknowledged. But if

(4) Rivington's Annual Register, 1792, State Pa-
 pers, p. 192 ; or New Annual Register, 1792, Public
 Papers, p. 52.

France had no right to complain of it, what right can any man possess, to represent it as inimical to France? The period, however, it is said, at which the proclamation was issued, was very critical. This is perfectly true; but the period was critical for *England*. Why, therefore, might not Government take measures to prevent an impending evil, as well at this, as at any other time? It is further objected, that there is an expression in the proclamation, which *may* be applied to certain Frenchmen, namely, "that correspondencies have been entered into with fundry persons in foreign parts." Now, the term "fundry persons in foreign parts" is so general, that no one would apply it to himself who was not conscious of having corresponded with a political society in England.(5) Nor does the question relate to a

(5) Condorcet, in his report to the National Assembly, on the 16th of February, 1792, relative to a conspiracy against the new Constitution of France, spoke
in

government, but simply to *individuals*: no government, therefore, and consequently not even that of France, could be affected by it, however clear the reference might have been to certain inhabitants of that country. Even if a particular expression had been used instead of a general one, if instead of "fundry persons in foreign parts, had been said "fundry Frenchmen," no objection could have been made to it, since the Society for Constitutional Information, by its own avowal, commenced a correspondence with the Jacobin Club in Paris, before the appearance of the present proclamation, not to mention the numerous, but less dangerous, addresses, which had been transmitted to various societies in France during more than two years

in much stronger terms of a connexion between the leaders of it and persons in other countries. Why did not the British Government apply to itself the general expressions used by Condorcet? The answer is obvious. Because it was conscious of having no concern in a conspiracy against the French Constitution.

past.

past.(6) In fact, it was the *British* Government, and the British Government alone, which had a right to complain on this subject: it had a right to demand of the French Government, if not satisfaction, at least an explanation, and an assurance of its disapprobation of the conduct of certain individuals in that country in regard to Great Britain, especially as the principle, that no one had a right to intermeddle in the internal affairs of another nation, was no where so strongly enforced as in France itself. It is true, that the British Government made no formal demand of any such explanation: but Mr. Chauvelin himself was so convinced of the necessity of making one, that on the 24th of May he sent a note to Lord Grenville,(7) in which he declared,

(6) See Rivington's Annual Register, 1792, part ii. p. 128—144.

(7) Rivington's Annual Register, 1792, State Papers, p. 260.

“ If certain individuals of this country have
 “ established a correspondence abroad, tend-
 “ ing to excite troubles therein, and if, as
 “ the proclamation seems to insinuate, cer-
 “ tain Frenchmen have come into their
 “ views, this is a proceeding wholly foreign
 “ to the French Nation, to the Legislative
 “ Body, to the King, and his Ministers; it
 “ is a proceeding, of which they are en-
 “ tirely ignorant, which militates against
 “ every principle of justice, and which,
 “ whenever it became known, would be
 “ universally condemned in France.” Fur-
 ther Mr. Chauvelin was so desirous of rescu-
 ing his Court from all suspicion of favour-
 ing sedition in Great Britain, a suspicion
 which the British Cabinet did not enter-
 tain, for no allusion was made in the pro-
 clamations to any Government, but merely
 to certain individuals, that he even requested
 his note might be laid before the two Houses
 of Parliament, previous to the debates on
 the

the proclamation, which, however, could not be granted, because it was contrary to the forms of the British Constitution, as Lord Grenville informed him in a note written on the following day, (8) to which Mr. Chauvelin immediately replied, (9) "In making this request, my Lord, I intended to obviate the false interpretations, which might be occasioned in the two Houses by the article of the proclamation, which is the subject of it: I flattered myself by these means to contribute toward the maintenance of that harmony and of that cordiality between the two states, of which I with joy remarked the expression in the assurance, which you gave me, that it is no less desired by his Britannic Majesty, than by the King of the French."

Since then, the proclamation of the 21st of May, by no means disturbed the har-

(8) *Ib.* p. 261. (9) *Ib.* p. 262.

mony which subsisted between the Courts of Great Britain and France; it seems unnecessary, in a history of their political conduct, to say any thing further on the subject. But an eminent writer has endeavoured to excite a suspicion, that, beside the avowed object of suppressing sedition, the proclamation had a *secret* tendency, and that “at this time
“the seeds of war were sown, which we
“have ever since been unfortunately reap-
“ing.” I request, therefore, every impartial man, to re-consider the conduct of the British Government toward France, as described in the preceding chapters of this work: I request him to recollect the absolute refusal to join the coalition, to remember the strict regard paid to the principles of neutrality, in the rejection of the advantageous offer made by the colonists of St. Domingo, to take a review of the general conduct of Administration, from the opening of Parliament on the 31st of January,

nearly a month after the appearance of the proclamation, declared, that he had received orders from his Court, to thank his Britannic Majesty *for his friendly dispositions, his sentiments of humanity, of justice, and of peace*:(10) and when Lord Gower quitted Paris, after the King was dethroned, he received a note from Le Brun, in the name of the Executive Council, containing the following declaration, "The French Nation has reason to hope, that the British Cabinet will not depart, at this critical moment, from *that justice, that moderation, and that impartiality which it has hitherto displayed.*"(11) Mr. Chauvelin himself, likewise, in a letter sent to his own Government on the 17th of

(10) See the preceding chapter, note 9.

(11) "La Nation Française a lieu d'espérer que le Cabinet Britannique ne se départira point, en ce moment décisif, *de la justice, de la modération, et de l'impartialité, qu'il a montré jusqu'à présent.*" Moniteur 26th August, 1792.

July, (12) bore ample testimony to the friendly dispositions of the British Court. When the advocates of the French therefore contend, that Government endeavoured in May, 1792, to promote a war with France, they assert what their clients themselves deny. In fact, there is no connexion what soever between the premises and the conclusion, unless certain intermediate ideas be introduced, which will hardly occur to any man, who is a real lover of his country. That they who wish to overturn the British Constitution have considered the cause of the French as their own, and have regarded, therefore, the proclamation of the 21st of May, which was certainly inimical to *them*, as inimical likewise to France, is very possible. But then they must not give too great a latitude to their conclusion: by the word

(12) This letter, which is printed in the *Moniteur*, 29th July, 1792, will be quoted at length in the eighth chapter.

"France" they must not understand the French Government, and still less the French nation at large: for the Jacobins, though their influence was very great, had not brought matters so far in May, 1792, that they could be considered at that time, as constituting either the French Government, or the representation of the whole body of the people. The utmost, therefore, that can be inferred, by help of this association of ideas, is, that the proclamation was inimical to a certain society in Paris. Now this society had either entered into the views of those persons, against whom the proclamation was levelled, or it had not. In the latter case, the general expression "fundry persons in foreign parts," could no more affect the Jacobins, than any other society in Europe. In the former case, they had still less cause for complaint, since he, who makes the first attack, can have no reason to take it ill, if his adversary defends himself. And
in

in this latter case, which admits of no doubt, (13) those writers who endeavour to throw the blame of the present war on the British Government, will defeat their own purpose, if they consider the term "Jacobin Club" as synonymous with France at large: but if this synonymity be rejected, all *appearance* of foundation for the inference, that the proclamation was inimical to France, is removed.

(13) See note 3.

CHAP. VII.

Prorogation of the British Parliament on the 15th of June. Speech from the Throne. Chauvelin's Note of the 18th of June, requesting the Mediation of Great Britain. Answer of the British Cabinet. Reflections on this Subject.

ON the 15th of June, the British Parliament, after a session replete with measures, which indicated the expectation of continued peace, was prorogued with a speech from the throne, (1) in which his Majesty, after expressing his satisfaction at the steps which had been taken for the di-

(1) *Annual Register*, 1792, State Papers, p. 196: or *New Annual Register*, Public Papers, p. 58.

minution of the public burthens, and the reduction of the national debt, proceeded as follows: "I have seen with great concern
 " the commencement of hostilities in different parts of Europe. In the present
 " situation of affairs, it will be my principal
 " care to maintain that harmony and good
 " understanding which subsists between me
 " and the several Belligerent Powers, and to
 " preserve to my people the uninterrupted
 " blessings of peace. And the assurances
 " which I receive from all quarters, of a
 " friendly disposition toward this country,
 " afford me the pleasing hope of succeeding
 " in these endeavours."

Within three days, however, after the prorogation of Parliament, a proposal was made on the part of France, which, had it been accepted, would have effectually disturbed the repose then enjoyed by Great Britain, namely: On the 18th of June,

Mr. Chauvelin communicated a Note to Lord Grenville, (2) in which the mediation of the British Cabinet was requested between France and the allied powers of Austria and Prussia. In this Note, after an introduction, expressive of the friendly conduct of Great Britain on the one hand, (3) and the danger which threatened France from the two great Continental Powers on the other, the interposition of the former was requested on the following grounds, and in the following words: "The consequences
 " of such a conspiracy, formed by the con-
 " currence of powers who have been so
 " long rivals, will be easily felt by his Bri-
 " tannic Majesty: the balance of Europe,
 " the independence of the different powers,

(2) The French original is printed in the *Moniteur*, 20th July, 1792, under the title *Copie de la Note adressée à Milord Grenville par M. Chauvelin du 18 Juin, 1792*. An English translation of it is in the *Annual Register*, 1792, *State Papers*, p. 263.

(3) See above, chap. v. note 9.

" the

“ the general peace, every consideration,
 “ which at all times has fixed the attention
 “ of the English Government, is at once
 “ exposed and threatened. The King of the
 “ French presents these serious and import-
 “ ant considerations to the solicitude and
 “ the friendship of his Britannic Majesty.
 “ Strongly penetrated with the marks of
 “ interest and of affection which he has re-
 “ ceived from him, he invites him to seek
 “ in his wisdom, in his situation, and in his
 “ influence, means compatible with the in-
 “ dependence of the French Nation, to stop,
 “ while it is still time, the confederacy, &c.”
 “ His Majesty has thought, that in the ex-

To this proposal, which involved the in-
 terests and the tranquillity of Great Britain,
 was returned, on the 8th of July, after ma-
 ture deliberation, the following answer. (4)

(4) The French original is printed in the *Moniteur*,
 20th July, 1792, and an English translation in the *An-
 nual Register*, immediately after M. Chauvelin's note.

“isting circumstances of the war now be-
“gun, the intervention of his councils, or
“of his good offices, cannot be of use, *un-*
“*less they should be desired by all the parties*
“*interested.*”

The refusal of the British Cabinet to interpose between France and the other Belligerent Powers, unless those powers likewise desired its mediation, was certainly the most prudent conduct which could have been adopted. Yet this prudent conduct has been the subject of severe reprehension; and Ministers have been censured, for not standing forward as the champions of France. Had France then so strong a claim on the gratitude of Great Britain, as to be entitled to expect that we should involve ourselves in a war merely on her account? For every one knows, that a mediation, unsupported by an armament, must be wholly ineffectual; and Mr. Chauvelin himself had very
clearly

clearly suggested, that the requested mediation was to consist, not in bare solicitations, but in effectual and decisive measures. Let us ask, then, For whom was England to take these effectual and decisive measures? For whom was England to engage in a continental war? For whom was England to sacrifice those advantages which were then the favourite objects of Government, and which could not be preserved without a continuance of peace? For a nation, which has never ceased to be our mortal enemy: for a nation, which has embraced every opportunity of humbling its neighbour, which never saw the British Government in distress without taking ungenerous advantage of it, and at the beginning of the very last war, which was concluded hardly ten years before the period in question, had proved itself as treacherous as hostile! Strange, therefore, was the request of France; and still more strange the censure of British subjects, because

because it was refused. This censure ill becomes those who accuse Ministers of being the authors of the war, which broke out in the following year, unless the case of commencing hostilities *in favour* of France is to be excepted from the general animadversion. The requested mediation has been termed indeed an act of peace, and the non-acceptance of it has been represented as indicating a disposition to hostilities. But since this pretended act of peace would have previously involved us in a war, before any effect could have been produced, we may rather conclude, that the same principle of neutrality, and the same desire to avoid hostilities in general, which had induced the British Cabinet to refuse to join the adversaries of France, occasioned likewise the resolution to take no part against them. And as to the supposed hostile disposition toward France, at the time when the answer of the British Cabinet was given, it is completely contradicted

contradicted by the avowal of the French themselves, by Mr. Chauvelin's letter to his own Government, of the 17th of July, and by Le Brun's note to Lord Gower on his departure from Paris in the month of August. (5)

Suppose, however, that the British Government had accepted the proffered mediation, and, what must necessarily have taken place, unless the mediation was to consist in mere words, had resolved to join France, if the other parties refused to accept it, the resolution, though highly detrimental to ourselves, would have rendered very little service to those who required it. The danger which at that time threatened France, proceeded not from any maritime power, but from the two great continental powers, Austria and Prussia, in comparison of whose

(5) See the latter part of the preceding chapter.

armies, that of Great Britain in the year 1792, at least in point of number, was a mere nothing. A mediation therefore could have produced no effect, unless these two powers *voluntarily* consented to it : and for this very reason, the answer of the British Cabinet was the most proper which could be given. The case would have been totally different, if France had been engaged in a war at sea, since Great Britain, with its formidable fleet, would then have possessed the means of obliging the adversaries of France to accept its mediation. But even in this case, it would have been imprudent to have incurred the expences of a naval armament : for the experiment had been already made, when we attempted a mediation between Russia and the Porte, and had met with sufficient opposition to dissuade Ministers from making a second attempt of the same kind, within so short a period after the first.

I have

I have hitherto argued on the supposition, that the French Government really wished for the re-establishment of peace. That the King of France himself sincerely wished it, may be readily granted: but on the 8th of July, when the answer of the British Cabinet was given, the Government of France had ceased to be vested in the hands of the King. It is true, that he was not *formally* deposed till a month after the period in question: but nearly three weeks had elapsed after the celebrated 20th of June; and from this day the whole power of France, executive as well as legislative, was lodged in the National Assembly. Consequently, it was the business of the British Cabinet, in all matters relative to the political situation of the two countries, to regulate its conduct by the views and motives of this Assembly. The question therefore is, Did the National Assembly, or at least a majority of its members, at the time of the proposed mediation,

mediation, sincerely wish the re-establishment of peace? Or did they not, on the contrary, ardently wish for a continuance of the war? This question shall be minutely examined.

It was hardly two months before Mr. Chauvelin's note of the 18th of June was presented to the British Government, that the National Assembly had decreed the war against the King of Hungary, with an unanimity and an enthusiasm which clearly proved, that, in the opinion of almost all its members war was more advantageous to them than peace. (6) Even so early as the

(6) See the debates, in the *Moniteur*, 22d April, 1792. In vain said Mr. Becquet, one of the seven members, who alone out of the seven hundred and fifty voted against the war, "*Renonçons à une entreprise qui n'a aucun objet réel; bornons-nous à nous défendre, si quelque puissance nous attaque, et probablement nous n'aurons pas de guerre.*" for his speech excited in the Assembly a violent tumult.

29th of December, 1791, Brissot had declared in the National Assembly, that “ war
“ was a real benefit to the nation, and that
“ the only evil which they had to dread was
the not having war:” (7) and a few days
after Isnard explained to the Assembly, in
what *respect* a war was to be considered as a
national benefit, namely, as being the means
of completing the revolution. (8) The com-
pletion of the revolution, therefore, or, in

(7) “ La guerre est actuellement un bienfait na-
“ tional, et la seule calamité qu’il y ait à redouter;
“ c’est de n’avoir pas la guerre.” *Moniteur*, 31st De-
cember, 1791. Even two months before, in a debate
of the 20th of October 1791, Brissot had said: “ Il ne
“ faut pas seulement vous défendre, *il faut attaquer*
“ vous-même.” See Lally Tolendal, *Défense des Emi-
grés Français*, tom. i. p. 189.

(8) “ Une guerre est prête à s’allumer, *guerre in-*
“ *dispensable pour consommer la révolution.*” *Moniteur*,
6th Jan. 1792. On the 4th of January, the same ora-
tor had already said: “ Que tous les Français ac-
“ courent au Club des Jacobins; voici le moment où
“ nous allons publier la guerre.” See Lally Tolendal,
Défense des Emigrés Français, tom. i. p. 198.

other

other words, the deposition of the King and the establishment of a republic, was to be effected by a foreign war, which should divert the general attention from the cabals in the centre of the kingdom to the military operations on the borders. That this was the real object of the war which was declared against Austria, the chiefs of the revolution avowed openly, as soon as their object was attained. For on the very day after the National Convention had decreed the abolition of royalty in France, (9) Brissot boasted in his celebrated journal, that “without the war the revolution of the 10th of August would not have taken place; that without the war, France “would not have become a republic:” (10)

(9) This decree, which was the first act of the National Convention, passed on the 21st of September, 1792. See the *Moniteur*, 22d September, 1792.

10) “Sans la guerre la révolution du 10 Août n’aurait pas eu lieu : sans la guerre la France ne serait pas république.” *Journal du Patriote Français*, 22d Sept. 1792.

and

and a few weeks afterwards he declared, in the most positive and unequivocal terms, that "it was the abolition of royalty which he had in view, when he provoked the declaration of war." (11) Louvet also, in his address to Robespierre, said, "We wished for war, we genuine Jacobins, because peace was certainly destructive to the republic:" (12) and a few lines afterwards he added, "Republicans, who were worthy of the name, demanded the war, they dared aspire to the lasting renown, to the immortal honour, of abolishing royalty itself, of abolishing it for ever, at

(11) "C'était l'abolition de la royauté, que j'avais en vue, en faisant déclarer la guerre." Brissot à tous les républicains de France sur les Jacobins, (Paris, Oct. 1792) p. 8.

(12) "Nous voulions la guerre, nous purs Jacobins, parcequ' à coup sûr la paix tuait la république." I. B. Louvet à Maximilien Robespierre et à ses royalistes (Dec. 1792), p. 18.

“ first in France, and then throughout the
“ world.” (13)

The object, therefore, of the National Assembly in involving France in a war, lies open to public view : and in order to attain this favourite object, the principal members of it had such a thirst after hostilities, and so frequently expressed it in their public speeches and writings, that if any man should take the pains to collect the scattered

(13) “ Ils appellaient la guerre les républicains
“ dignes de l’être : ils osaient aspirer à la gloire solide,
“ à l’immortel honneur de *tuer la royauté même, de la*
“ *tuer à jamais, d’abord en France, et puis dans l’uni-*
“ *vers.*” Ib. Likewise Collot d’Herbois said : “ Nous
“ avons voulu la guerre, parceque la guerre devait
“ tuer la royauté.” See Lally Tolendal Défense, etc.
tom. i. p. 208. And Cambon, after the war had be-
gun to take a favourable turn, made the following de-
claration, in the name of the three united committees
of War, Finance and Diplomacy : “ Ils se sont de-
“ mandé d’abord quel est *l’objet* de la guerre que vous
“ avez entreprise ? C’est sans doute *l’anéantissement*
“ *de tous les privilèges.*” Moniteur, 18th Dec. 1792.

expressions

expressions on this subject, from the *Moniteur* and other political publications, he might fill with them a complete volume. Cambon even declared, that “it was necessary to break with *all* the courts:” (14) and Brissot himself acknowledges, that the resolution was formed “to set all Europe at defiance.” (15) Lastly, as soon as the plan, which had been long in agitation, approached to its maturity, this same Brissot went so far as to assert, “We must set fire to the four corners of Europe, for there lies our salvation.” (16)

(14) “Il faut rompre avec *tous* les cabinets.” These words of Cambon are quoted by Brissot in his work à ses Commettans (Paris 1793), p. 74.

(15) “Voilà les grands idées, qu’il fallait concevoir, qu’il fallait exécuter, puisque l’on *voulait braver toute l’Europe.*” *Ib.* p. 73.

(16) “Il faut incendier les quatre coins de l’Europe : notre salut est là.” These words are quoted from one of Brissot’s letters by Mallet du Pan, in his

This salvation was first fought in a war with Austria: and in order to effect it, the first step taken by the National Assembly was the removal of Delessart, Narbonne, Bertrand de Molleville; with the other French Cabinet Ministers, who, as well as the King himself, were desirous of preserving peace, and the appointment of a new Ministry, which consisted entirely of Jacobins, and, agreeably to the wishes of the National Assembly, obliged the King to propose a declaration of war. (17) It cannot be here objected, that the members of the National Assembly demanded a declaration of war *merely* because they themselves were apprehensive of a similar declaration on the part

Confidérations sur la Nature de la Révolution Française, (Londres, 1793) p. 37.

(17) "Le Ministère fut alors complètement composé de Jacobins, qui sous la protection du côté gauche de l'Assemblée demandaient à grand cris une "déclaration de guerre." Bertrand de Molleville Mémoires Secrets, tom. ii. p. 145.

of

of Austria, and that they had *no other object* in view than to secure to themselves the advantages arising from the first attack; for their own confessions prove the contrary. Nor is it by any means so probable, as is commonly supposed, that the Austrian Cabinet would have declared war against France, even if the National Assembly had not declared war against Austria. It is true, that in the year 1791 a coalition had been formed against France: but in April, 1792, when France declared war against Austria, the coalition, which even in 1791 had produced no effect, appeared to have been abandoned. The King of Sweden, one of the chief instigators to a war with France, was already murdered; (18) and after his death the state of politicks in Sweden took a totally new turn. The Emperor Leopold was

(18) It was on the 18th of March, 1792, that the King of Sweden was mortally wounded by the murderer Ankerström.

likewise dead ; (19) and his successor Francis II. gave no indications of a warlike disposition. (20) The character of Leopold was likewise pacific ; and there is reason to believe that it was not his design to commence hostilities against France, but merely to alarm the Jacobins by a junction of several powers, and to deter them from offering violence to the persons of his brother-in-law and his own sister, whose fate he could not regard with indifference. (21) That it

(19) The Emperor Leopold died on the 1st of March, 1792, and almost as suddenly as the King of Sweden.

(20) Even a month before the declaration of war, Dumouriez, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to the French Ambassador at Vienna, dated 18th March, 1792, in which he said : “ Les affaires doivent “ prendre, par la mort de Léopold, une nouvelle “ marche.” His letter is printed in the *Moniteur*, 18th April, 1792.

(21) In a note to the French Ambassador at Vienna, which is printed in the *Moniteur*, 24th Dec. 1791, he expressed

was the wish neither of Leopold, nor of his Ministers, to engage in a war with France, is attested by the Marquis de Bouillé, who was well acquainted with the sentiments of the Austrian Cabinet. (22) And if the

expressed himself as follows : “ On ne peut plus douter
 “ de ma façon de penser sur les affaires de la France.
 “ Ma dernière déclaration, et les ordres que j’ai fait
 “ donner par mon Gouverneur à Bruxelles, l’agent des
 “ émigrés Français, prouvent que je regarde mon beau
 “ frère comme libre, et que mon intention n’est pas
 “ de me mêler des affaires de son royaume, aussi long-
 “ tems que les Français lui laisseront tout ce qu’ils lui
 “ ont assuré volontairement, et ce qu’il a volontaire-
 “ ment accepté dans le nouveau contrat constitu-
 “ tionnel.”

(22) In his *Mémoires sur la Révolution Française*, tom. ii. p. 136, where he speaks of his arrival in Prague, at the coronation of the Emperor, he says :
 “ J’y arrivai au commencement de Septembre, et j’y
 “ restai huit ou dix jours sans recevoir le moindre ordre
 “ de l’Empereur. J’y appris, de manière à n’en pouvoir
 “ plus douter, que les dispositions du Cabinet de Vienne
 “ n’étaient point du tout à la guerre ; et je dois au Ma-
 “ réchal de Lasca la justice de déclarer, qu’il m’a plu-
 “ sieurs fois répété, que les ressources de la France

testimony of a friend of Louis XVI. be thought insufficient, we may produce the confession of the opposite party. On the 20th of October, 1791, nearly two months after the conference at Pillnitz, Brissot declared to the National Assembly, "I can assure you, that there is no reason to be alarmed at the conduct of the Court of

"étaient immenses, ses frontières impénétrables, et
 "qu'il ne presserait jamais la déclaration d'une guerre,
 "qui dans son opinion pourrait avoir les suites les plus
 "désastreuses pour l'Empereur et pour l'empire. Telle
 "était aussi, je l'avouerai, l'avis de tous les Ministres
 "impériaux. Léopold espérait toujours terminer les
 "affaires de France par une négociation." This moderate conduct of the Emperor was so much the more commendable, as the King of Prussia was decidedly in favour of war: for M. de Bouillé, in relating the conference at Pillnitz (*Mémoires*, tom. ii. p. 134) says: "Les vues de l'Empereur étaient pacifiques. Le
 "Roi de Prusse au contraire voulait absolument la
 "guerre. Plusieurs circonstances de cette entrevue ne
 "me permettent pas de douter des dispositions dont
 "ces deux Souverains étaient animés. Elles m'ont
 "d'ailleurs été confirmées par des personnes qui jouissent de leur confiance."

Austria.

Austria. Its sovereign loves peace, and wishes
 “ for peace.—All circumstances unite to in-
 “ duce Leopold to abstain from displaying
 “ the force of arms.”(23) On the 29th of
 December, 1791, Brissot said again, “ The
 “ wavering measures of the Cabinet of Vi-
 “ enna afford us no reason to apprehend a
 “ war on the part of the Emperor. As
 “ Prince, he wishes for peace, as head of
 “ the German empire he gives himself the
 “ *air* of wishing for war.”(24) And this con-
 fession was so much the more remarkable,
 as it was delivered in the very same speech,

(23) “ Je dois vous rassurer sur la conduite de la
 “ Cour Autrichienne. Son chef aime la paix, veut la
 “ paix.—Tout fait à Léopold la loi, de ne point dé-
 “ ployer la force des armes.” *Moniteur*, 22d Octo-
 ber, 1791.

(24) “ Les oscillations du Cabinet de Vienne ne
 “ doivent pas nous faire redouter la guerre de la part
 “ de l’Empereur. Comme Prince il veut la paix :
 “ comme chef de l’empire Germanique il a *l’air* de
 “ vouloir la guerre.” *Moniteur*, 30th Dec. 1791.

in which Brissot recommended war, as a national benefit to France. (25) From the 29th of December, 1791, when the pacific designs of Leopold were acknowledged in the National Assembly, till the time of his death, no circumstances occurred, which could excite a suspicion of his having changed his political system. On the contrary, all his measures evinced a determined resolution to avoid hostilities with France. At the request of the French Government, all military exercise and the assembling of troops was strictly forbidden to the emigrants on the borders of Germany: (26) and so con-

(25) See Note 7.

(26) By desire of the Emperor, the Elector of Treves issued an edict (printed in the *Moniteur*, 10th Jan. 1792), in which he engaged to fulfil the following articles:

1. De faire quitter l'Electorat dans huit jours d'ici, ou disperfer tous ceux qui portent la dénomination d'un corps militaire.

2. Toute espece d'exercise militaire sera défendu itérativement, et ceux qui agiront contre l'ordonnance
seront

ciliatory was Leopold in his conduct toward the National Assembly, that when the Prince of Condé, with about eleven hundred emi-

feront tenus de quitter l'Electorat dans trois jours ; et à cette fin on dénoncera les logemens.

3. Tous les recruteurs étrangers, à l'exception de ceux de sa Majesté l'Empereur seront arrêtés et condamnés, suivant une ordonnance émanée depuis deux mois, à la forteresse, et aux travaux publics pour deux ans.

In the other articles, it was strictly forbidden to furnish the emigrants with ammunition, horses, wag-gons, or any thing which could assist them in military operations. And with regard to the Electorate of Mayence, the French Minister himself resident at that Court, gave the following testimony in a note to his own Government, printed in the *Moniteur*, 2d Feb. 1792: "Que ni dans l'archevêché de Mayence, ni dans l'évêché de Worms, il ne s'était fait de ras-semblemens militaires." Further the Emperor himself, in his letter to the Elector of Treves (printed in the *Moniteur*, 24th Jan. 1792) said, "He had given
" orders, that in case, and *in that case only*, (*dans ce*
" *cas déterminé, et dans aucun autre*, as expressed in
" the *Moniteur*) that he should be attacked by the
" French without having given provocation by per-
" mitting the emigrants to arm and assemble on his
" territories,

grants, after having been ordered on the 2d of January, 1792, to depart from Worms, retreated to Ettenheim, he gave further orders to the Prince to depart likewise from that place. (27) In the Austrian Netherlands the number of troops did not exceed the usual peace establishment: and neither magazines were formed, nor any other measures taken, which indicated a preparation

“ territories, (sans que nous y eussions donné lieu en
 “ favorisant ou en tolérant des attroupemens ou des
 “ préparatifs de guerre de la part des Français émigrés)
 “ Austrian troops should be sent into the electorate.”

This order, which clearly evinced the resolution of the Emperor to act only on the defensive, was, with the usual French artifice, on the 20th of April, 1792, the day on which war was declared, converted into an act of hostility, by omitting all the words, which I have placed in parentheses, and thus metamorphosed was, for want of better reasons, alleged as one of the motives to a war with Austria. See the *Moniteur*, 21st April, 1791.

(27) Lally Tollendal *Défense des Emigrés*, tom. i.
 p. 196.

for

for war. (28) Yet at this very time, France itself made the most vigorous military exertions: for it appears by the official report of the War Minister to the National Assembly on the 12th. of Jan. 1792, that there were already assembled on the borders, from Dunkirk to Befançon, two hundred and forty battalions, an hundred and sixty squadrons, and artillery sufficient for an army of two hundred thousand men. The War Minister further reported, that magazines, sufficient to supply two hundred and thirty thousand men, and twenty-two thousand horses, for six months, were already prepared, and that the most active measures were then taking for a further augmentation of them. (29)

(28) It is a well-known fact, that, when the French army invaded the Netherlands soon after the declaration of war against Austria, General Beaulieu was so little prepared for their reception, that he was obliged to order post horses to expedite the transport of artillery.

(29) “ Depuis Dünquerque jusqu’ à Befançon l’armée présente une masse de 240 bataillons, et 160
“ escadrons

This extraordinary armament, and these vigorous preparations, could not have merely the French emigrants for their object, or be designed merely to protect the frontiers from an invasion on their part; for even if the emigrants had been permitted to form themselves into a military corps, which they really were not, still the whole number of those who had attached themselves, as well to the brothers of the King, as to the Prince of Condé, did not *at that time* exceed four thousand seven hundred.(30) Nor could the

“ escadrons avec l’artillerie nécessaire pour 200 mille
 “ hommes. Les magasins, tant en vivres qu’en fou-
 “ rage, assurent la subsistance de 230 mille hommes,
 “ et 22 mille chevaux, pendant six mois. On travaille
 “ à la plus grande activité à les augmenter encore.”
 Moniteur, 14th Jan. 1792.

(30) Lally Tollendal Défense des Emigrés, tom. i. p. 196, 197. It is true that at the latter end of July, when the Duke of Brunswick was at Coblenz, their number was thrice as great: but more than three months had then elapsed after the declaration of war.

armament

armament have been a mere *defensive* measure against the Emperor, since Brissot himself had acknowledged, only fourteen days before the War Minister made his report to the National Assembly, that the designs of Leopold were pacific. It was evidently, therefore, the intention of the National Assembly to act on the offensive, which actual experience soon afterwards confirmed. (31)

(31) I shall not investigate any farther the origin of the war between France and Austria, because the present history is confined to the relations between France and Great Britain. Whoever wishes to examine the subject more fully, may consult the correspondence between the Courts of France and Austria, from Jan. 15th to April 7th, 1792, printed in Rivington's Annual Register, 1792, State Papers, p. 212—242: the counter declaration of the Austrian Court of the 4th of July, compared with the report delivered to the National Assembly on the 20th of April; Lally Tollendal, *Défense des Emigrés Français*, tom. i. p. 189—209; and the *Collection des meilleurs ouvrages qui ont été publiés pour la défense de Louis XVI.* tom. i. p. 307—313, 335—388. In this last place is printed a remarkable letter, written to Necker on the 8th of July,

But suppose, for the sake of argument, that Austria would have attacked France, if France had not attacked Austria, it will still remain an undeniable fact, that the National Assembly, or at least a great majority of its members, were as desirous of war as any Sovereign in Europe could be. The testimonies of its leading members, which

July, 1792, by Delessart, late Minister for Foreign Affairs, from his prison at Orleans, in which he says :

“ Je commence à croire, que toutes les difficultés possible sont épuisées ; la communication des pièces qui m'étaient nécessaires va bientôt me mettre en état de travailler à ma défense. Mais je regretterai toute ma vie, qu'elle n'a pu paraître dans le moment actuelle ; car elle sera curieuse, non pas pour ce qui sera de moi, mais par la manifestation de ce qui s'est passé dans les cours étrangères ; *par la démonstration qu'on ne voulait point nous faire la guerre ; par la preuve sans réplique, que c'est nous, qui l'avons provoquée, qui l'avons commencée, qui avons mis l'Europe contre nous.*” This testimony is so much the

more credible, as Delessart could have no view of deriving any advantage from it, since it was delivered in a private letter, to a man in a private station, and then resident out of France.

have

have been already quoted, remove the question beyond all doubt. The same testimonies further prove, that the grand object of the National Assembly, in declaring war against Austria, was to effect the deposition of the King, and the abolition of royalty in France. (32) But this grand object was not

(32) A secondary motive was the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands, where they had already a considerable party. It is true, that on the very day on which war was declared against Austria, they made the most positive declaration, “ de n’entreprendre aucune guerre dans la vue de faire des conquêtes.” *Moniteur*, 22d April, 1792. But at present we all know by experience, what construction is to be put on French declarations. Mr. Becquet, however, said very candidly, on the day on which war was declared : “ Elle (l’Autriche) n’a pris, depuis que les négociations sont entamées, que des mesures défensives ; “ trois armées formidables bordaient vos frontières ; “ elle n’y a opposé qu’un nombre de troupes très-inférieur. Vous le savez, et sans doute vous ne voulez “ l’attaquer en ce moment, que parceque vous êtes “ certains d’être plus préparés qu’elle dans vos mesures.” *Moniteur*, 22 Avril, 1792.

yet attained, when the mediation of Great Britain was requested : for Mr. Chauvelin's note was dated the 18th of June, and the King of France was not dethroned before the 10th of August. Consequently, had it been in the power of the British Cabinet to have instantly produced a general peace, the National Assembly would in all probability have declared war a second time : for if a general peace had taken place in June, 1792, and that peace had continued, the King of France would have preserved both his life and his crown. But it is evident that the leaders of the National Assembly were resolved to run all hazards, rather than not attain their favourite object. The danger from without gave them very little concern, provided they could continue, without interruption, their intrigues in the interior : and for this reason the march of the Prussian army made no alteration in the sentiments which they entertained, when they declared

war

war against Austria. They knew, likewise, beforehand, that a declaration of war against Austria included a declaration of war against Prussia; for these two powers had, in February, 1792, concluded a defensive treaty, by which it was stipulated, that in case either of the contracting parties should be attacked, the other party should immediately send a succour of fifteen thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry; and, if these should be deemed insufficient, augment their number according to the nature of the circumstances. (33) All this was

(33) The genuine treaty, concluded between Austria and Prussia, in Feb. 1792, is printed in Martens' *Recueil des Principaux Traités*, tom. v. p. 77—81, and is merely defensive, not offensive, as some writers have asserted. The preliminaries are dated 7th of February, the ratification 19th of February: and this date proves the spuriousness of the pretended offensive treaty, which bears date the 18th of February, and is printed in the *Moniteur*, 13th April, 1792. Even the editor of the *Moniteur* did not venture to assert its authenticity, for he called it only “une pièce qui

known to the members of the National Assembly, before they decreed war against Austria: it cannot, therefore, be said, that they were threatened in the month of June with a danger, which they did not apprehend in the month of April. And that during this interval they had not changed their sentiments, is evident from all their speeches: for whoever consults the *Moni-*

"périsse authentique." And the National Assembly was fully persuaded of its spuriousness, as appears from the circumstance, that a whole week had elapsed after its appearance in the *Moniteur*, when the war against Austria was decreed, and yet it was not mentioned among the motives which were alledged in justification of the war, though the offensive treaty, had it really existed, would have been the best vindication which the National Assembly could have produced. It must be referred, therefore, to the class of fabrications which the French rulers and their advocates have propagated with great industry and success: and we may safely conclude, that it was inserted in the *Moniteur* a week before the intended declaration of war, in order to prepare men's minds for the event.

teur,

teur, from the declaration of war against Austria to the proposal of a mediation, will find, that not a single expression escaped the leaders of the Assembly, which indicated a disposition to peace. The augmentation of the force with which they had to contend, diminished not in the least their ardour for hostilities: on the contrary, as Brissot himself said, " vast ideas, grand designs, and an " object sublime and difficult, were necessary to form men, and a great nation." (34) It was, in fact, their *own* desire " to break " with *all* the courts:" it was their own resolution " to set all Europe at defiance:" it was their own determination " to set the " four corners of Europe on fire." (35)

(34) "Pour former des hommes, une grande nation, il faut de vastes idées, de grands objets, un " but sublime et difficile." Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 76.

(35) See the 14th, 15th and 16th notes to this chapter.

These are the men for whom Great Britain was requested to procure the blessings of *peace*: these are the men, for whose sakes the British Government has been so severely reprehended for not attempting to confer a favour which the former were as unwilling to accept, (36) as the latter was unable to bestow. The advocates, therefore, of the

(36) Beside the motives already alledged, another reason would have induced the National Assembly, in the summer of 1792, to reject all offers of peace, namely, fear for their own personal safety. For Roland, the French Minister of the Interior, said at that time to a friend of Mr. Miles in France: "Peace is out of the question: we have 300,000 men in arms; we must make them march as far as their legs will carry them, or they will return and cut our throats." See the Authentic Correspondence with Mr. Le Brun the French Minister, and others, to February, 1793, inclusive. London, 1796-8, p. 144, 2d. edition. The same reason, independent of schemes of ambition, prevents, likewise, the Directory from making a general peace: for the moment the French armies cease to be occupied with the plunder of foreign countries, they will demand, with arms in their hands, the promised thousand millions, and, as it will be impossible

French, who represent them as "solicitous for peace," defend them on grounds which were openly and avowedly discarded by their clients themselves: and if Mr. Chauvelin's note of the 18th of June, be regarded as a request from the National Assembly, it will become a proof of the blackest hypocrisy.—Consequently, in whatever light we view the answer of the British Cabinet of the 8th of July, it is in every respect unexceptionable.

to pay them, will overturn the present Government. Unhappy Constitution, which requires for its support the wretchedness of all Europe!

CHAP. VIII.

Sensation produced in France by the sailing of five Ships of the Line and a few Frigates, from Portsmouth, to perform naval Evolutions in the Channel. Proposal made in the National Assembly of an immediate Armament of thirty Ships of the Line. Chauvelin's Letter to his own Government, containing positive Assurances, that the British Cabinet had no Views of Hostility. Resolution of the National Assembly, that Chauvelin's Letter was satisfactory, and that a naval Armament was unnecessary.

ON the 11th of July, 1792, a small fleet sailed from Portsmouth, under the command of Admiral Lord Hood, to perform naval evolutions in the channel.

The

The whole fleet consisted only of five ships of the line, beside frigates and sloops: it had only a fortnight's provision on board, and had manifestly no other destination, than a sea-review, (1) which, being nothing new in England, ought no more to have excited alarm, than a land-review at Potsdam or Berlin. The matter, however, was so magnified in France, and was represented in so false a light, that on the 26th of July, an immediate armament of thirty ships of the line was proposed in the National Assembly, and the Marine Committee was ordered to draw up a report on the subject, and present it within a few days. (2)

In the mean time, the following letter from Mr. Chauvelin to Mr. Chambonas,

(1) All these circumstances are confirmed by Chauvelin's letter.

(2) See the *Moniteur*, 28th July, 1792.

dated

dated London, 17th July, 1792, was published: (3)

“ You may have seen, Sir, from the public papers of this country, that a fleet,

(3) It was printed in the *Moniteur*, 29th July, 1792, and in the original is as follows:

“ Londres, le 17 Juillet, 1792.

“ Monsieur, vous avez pu voir, dans les papiers
 “ publics de ce pays-ci, que depuis assez long-tems il
 “ a été question de l’escadre qui vient de sortir du port
 “ de Portsmouth. D’après tous les renseignements,
 “ que je me suis empressé de prendre dès le premier
 “ moment que j’en ai eu connaissance, j’ai partagé à
 “ ce sujet, et je partage encore la sécurité de tous les
 “ Anglais même les plus jaloux des opérations du Gouvernement. Tous ont pensé et pensent encore, que
 “ cet armement n’a d’autre objet que de faire faire
 “ quelques évolutions aux matelots Anglais, et de préparer pour la Famille Royale, pour le mois prochain,
 “ le spectacle d’une revue, qu’on peut regarder comme le pendant de celle du camp de Baginhot. Aussi,
 “ Monsieur, le silence que j’ai gardé à cet égard, aura-t-il sans doute été pour vous une preuve du peu
 “ d’importance qu’on doit attacher à cet armement,
 “ et je n’aurais pas rompu ce silence sans les alarmes
 “ que m’ont témoignées quelques Français, qui re-
 “ cemment

“ which has lately sailed from Portsmouth,
 “ has been for some time the topic of con-
 “ versation. From all the information which
 “ I have endeavoured to procure, from the
 “ moment I had knowledge of it, I have par-
 “ taken, and still partake, on this subject, of
 “ the security of the English, even of those
 “ who are the most jealous of the opera-
 “ tions of Government. They have all been;

“ cemment arrivés du Continent paraissent avoir con-
 “ servé certaines fausses idées sur les dispositions du Gou-
 “ vernement Anglais. Ce n'est donc que pour rassurer
 “ ceux qui en France pourraient penser comme eux,
 “ d'autant plus que dans de pareils cas les objets vus
 “ de loin grossissent plutôt qu'ils ne diminuent, que
 “ je me suis déterminé de vous rendre compte, Mon-
 “ sieur, de cet armement dont je vous envoie la liste,
 “ et à vous assurer, que toutes les données que j'ai pu
 “ recueillir se réunissent à me convaincre, qu'il n'est
 “ en aucune manière, relatif aux affaires, soit de la
 “ France en particulier, soit du Continent en général.

“ Le Ministre Plénipotentiaire de France,

“ Signé, CHAUVELIN,

“ Liste des vaisseaux sortis le 11 Juillet au matin du
 “ port

“ and are still of opinion, that the arma-
 “ ment has no other object, than to exercise
 “ the English sailors in certain evolutions,
 “ and to prepare for the Royal Family, in the
 “ following month, the spectacle of a sea-
 “ review, which may be considered as the
 “ counterpart of the camp at Bagshot. The
 “ silence, therefore, which I have observed,
 “ Sir, on this subject, must prove to you
 “ my conviction, that the armament is of

“ port de Portsmouth, pour croiser dans la Manche,
 “ sous le commandement de Lord Hood.

“ Vaisseaux

Canons.

1.	Le Duc	-	90
2.	L'Alfred	- -	74
3.	Le Brunswick		74
4.	L'Orion	-	74
5.	L'Annibal		74

“ Frégattes

6.	L'Iphigénie	-	32
etc.	etc.		etc.

“ En commission dans le port de Plymouth : 1 vais-
 “seau de 74, 1 de 24, 2 cutters de 16, 1 yacht de 10.

“ L'escadre n'a des vivres à son bord que pour quinze
 “ jours.”

“ no

“ no importance : and I should not have
 “ broken silence even now, without the
 “ alarms signified to me by some French-
 “ men lately arrived from the Continent,
 “ who seem still to entertain *certain false*
 “ *notions on the dispositions of the English Go-*
 “ *vernment.* With a view, therefore, of re-
 “ moving the apprehensions of those who
 “ may be of the same opinion in France, es-
 “ pecially as in similar cases objects seen at
 “ a distance are magnified rather than dimi-
 “ nished, I have determined, Sir, to give
 “ you an account of the armament, of which
 “ I send you a list, and to assure you, that
 “ all the intelligence which I have been
 “ able to collect, unites in convincing me,
 “ that the armament has no relation what-
 “ soever either to France in particular, or to
 “ the Continent in general.”

The Minister Plenipotentiary of France.

Signed, CHAUVELIN.

On

On the 4th of August, the day on which the Marine Committee had been ordered to make its report, Mr. Forfaix, the chairman of the Committee, read Mr. Chauvelin's letter before the National Assembly: and it was considered as so satisfactory, in regard to the sentiments of the British Cabinet, that the proposed armament was declared unnecessary. (4) We have the testimony, therefore, of the National Assembly itself, that the British Cabinet, as far as August, 1792, had no hostile views toward France.

(4) See *Moniteur*, 6th August, 1792.

CHAP. IX.

*Recall of the British Ambassador from Paris,
after the King of France was dethroned.
Examination of the Question, whether this
Recall was a Breach of Neutrality toward
France.*

IT is well known, that on the 10th of August, 1792, the palace of the King of France was attacked by an armed populace, that his guards were murdered, and he himself obliged to seek refuge in the National Assembly, where he was at last doomed to hear the decree, by which he was deposed and sent prisoner to the Temple. Now, as according to the Constitution of 1791, which placed the legislative power in
the

the National Assembly, but the executive in the hands of the King, the credentials of the British Ambassador in Paris ceased after this event to be valid, his further residence in that city was deemed unnecessary. On the 17th of August, therefore, a letter of recall (1) was dispatched by the British Government to Lord Gower, who communicated a translation of it to Le Brun, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and member of the Council, to which the executive power was entrusted after the deposition of the King. To

(1) It is printed in Rivington's Annual Register, 1792, State Papers, p. 326. In this letter the following instructions were given to Lord Gower: "In all the
" conversations, which you may have occasion to hold
" before your departure, you will take care to express
" yourself in a manner conformable to the sentiments
" herein communicated to you: and you will take
" especial care not to neglect any opportunity of de-
" claring, that at the same time *his Majesty means to*
" *observe the principles of neutrality in every thing which*
" *regards the arrangement of the internal Government*
" *of France.*"

this

this letter the French Minister returned an answer, in the name of the new republican Government of France, (2) expressing the greatest satisfaction at the friendly conduct of the British Cabinet, and containing as-

(2) Le Brun's note to Lord Gower is printed in the *Moniteur*, 26th August, 1792; and as it is a document of some importance, it is necessary to produce it at length in the original.

“ Le soussigné, Ministre des affaires étrangères, s'est
 “ empressé à communiquer, au Conseil Exécutif pro-
 “ visoire, la lettre dont son excellence M. le Comte
 “ de Gower, Ambassadeur extraordinaire de S. M.
 “ Britannique lui a fait part.

“ Le Conseil a vu avec regret, que le Cabinet Bri-
 “ tannique se décidât à rappeler son Ambassadeur, dont
 “ la présence attestait les dispositions favorables d'une
 “ nation libre et généreuse, et qui n'avait jamais été
 “ l'organe que de paroles amicales, et de sentimens
 “ de bienveillance. S'il est quelque chose qui puisse
 “ diminuer ce regret, c'est le renouvellement de l'as-
 “ surance de neutralité donnée par l'Angleterre à la
 “ nation Française.

“ Cette assurance paraît être le résultat de l'intention
 “ sagement réfléchie et formellement exprimée par S.
 “ M. Britannique, de ne point se mêler de l'arrange-
 Vol. I. L ment

surances, that the same justice and impartiality would be observed by the French Executive Council.

“ ment intérieur des affaires de France. Une pareille
 “ déclaration ne peut surprendre de la part d’un peuple
 “ éclairé et fier, qui le premier a reconnu et établi le
 “ principe de la souveraineté nationale ; qui substi-
 “ tuant l’empire de la loi, expression de la volonté de
 “ tous, aux caprices arbitraires des volontés particu-
 “ lieres, le premier a donné l’exemple de soumettre les
 “ rois eux-mêmes à ce joug salutaire, qui enfin n’a
 “ pas cru acheter trop cher, par de longues convul-
 “ sions et de violens orages, la liberté à laquelle il a
 “ dû tant de gloire et de prospérité.

“ Ce principe de souveraineté inalienable du peuple
 “ va se manifester d’une manière éclatante dans la
 “ Convention Nationale, dont le corps législatif a dé-
 “ créé la convocation, et qui fixera sans doute tous
 “ les partis et tous les intérêts. La nation Française
 “ a lieu d’espérer, que le Cabinet Britannique, ne se
 “ départira point, en ce moment décisif, *de la justice,*
 “ *de la modération, et de l’impartialité, qu’il a montré*
 “ *jusqu’à présent.*

“ Dans cette confiance intime *fondée sur les faits,*
 “ le soussigné renouvelle à son excellence M. le Comte
 “ de Gower, au nom du Conseil Exécutif provisoire,
 “ l’assurance qu’il a eu l’honneur de lui donner de vive
 “ voix,

But as the recall of Lord Gower has been since represented as a violation of that neutrality, which by the acknowledgment of Le Brun himself in the above mentioned answer, and afterwards by the acknowledgment even of the National Convention, (3) had been at least till that time observed by the British Government, historical accuracy requires a full investigation of the subject. To determine this question, there is no ne-

“voix, que les relations de commerce entre les deux
“nations, et toute les affaires en général seront suivies
“de la part du Gouvernement Français avec la même
“justice, et la même loyauté. Le Conseil se flatte,
“que la réciprocité fera entière de la part du Gou-
“vernement Britannique, et qu’ainsi rien n’altérera
“la bonne intelligence, qui régne entre les deux
“peuples.

“Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,

“LE BRUN.”

(3) In the list of grievances alledged against the British Government, at the time of the declaration of war, there is none prior to the recall of Lord Gower. See *Moniteur*, 3d Feb. 1793.

cessity for previously inquiring, whether the mere *Legislative* Assembly of France had a right to annihilate the Constitution of 1791, in which a decree of the Constituent Assembly had forbidden the Legislative Assembly to make the least alteration, which had been accepted by the King as well as by the people, and to which the Legislative Assembly itself had thrice sworn allegiance, first at its meeting on the 3d of October, 1791; secondly, on the 7th of July, 1792, in its public hall; and lastly, before the altar of freedom, on the 14th of July, only three weeks before the resolution was formed to overturn it. There is no necessity for inquiring, whether, after the disapprobation expressed by seventy-one out of the eighty-three departments at the events of the 20th of June, (4) the Legislative Assembly had a

(4) Les réclamations contre la journée du 20 Juin
“ furent générales dans tout l’empire ; sur 83 départe-
“ ments soixante et onze écrivirent à la Législature,
“ pour

right to deprive the King of his authority, though he committed none of the three misdemeanors, (5) which alone, by the constitution of 1791, warranted his deposition. These are questions which belong to other courts of inquiry, and we have at present only to consider the result of the fact itself, whether the injustice which occasioned it be admitted or not. (6)

“ pour demander la punition des féditieux, qui avaient
 “ offensé la loi si scandaleusement.” *Coll. de meilleurs*
ouvrages pour la défense de Louis XVI. tom. i. p. 208.
 Likewise Brissot says : “ Les révolutions répondait-on,
 “ ne se font qu’avec les minorités. *C’est la minorité qui*
“ a fait la révolution Française.” A ses Commettans,
 p. 87.

(5) Namely, the refusal to take the oath required by the constitution, the placing himself at the head of a foreign army destined to act against France, or his quitting the kingdom. See ch. ii. sect. 1. art. 5, 6, 7, of the constitution of 1791.

(6) However. I cannot avoid quoting a remarkable confession made by the celebrated legislator Condorcet, who, in his speech of the 20th of April, 1792,

An immediate and unavoidable consequence of the revolution of the 10th of August, was a suspension of the diplomatic relations between the British Ambassador in Paris and the French Government; for, since his letters of credence had been made out to Louis XVI. as to the person invested with the executive power of France, they of course ceased to be of any value, after the King was deposed, and his authority transferred to a provisional Executive Council. (7)

said: "La Nation Française a une Constitution; cette Constitution a été reconnue, adoptée par la généralité des citoyens: elle ne peut être changée que par le vœu du peuple, et suivant les formes qu'elle-même a prescrites." *Moniteur*, 22 Avril, 1792.

(7) This was mentioned in the letter to Lord Gower, of which a translation was communicated to the French Minister, for it is there said: "As it appears, that in the present state of affairs the exercise of the executive power has been withdrawn from his Most Christian Majesty, the credentials which have hitherto been made use of by your Excellency can no longer be valid."

There

There were only three possible modes, therefore, which could be adopted by the British Government: either to let Lord Gower continue in Paris in a private capacity, or to renew his diplomatic relations by fresh letters of credence, or to recall him. But it would have rendered no service either to France in general, or to the National Assembly in particular, to have suffered a person who, by the revolution of the 10th of August, was reduced to a private station, to continue his residence in that country. On the contrary, it would in all probability have produced rather discontent than satisfaction: for, though he was become a private person, and must remain as such till he had received new credentials, yet his former diplomatic relations would not have been forgotten, and his presence would have so frequently reminded the new executive power of the difference between his former and his present character, that it would have gradually be-

come a subject of complaint. With regard to the second mode, there were likewise very weighty reasons which dissuaded the British Government from adopting it. For had new letters of credence been sent to Lord Gower, he must have been accredited either to the Executive Council or to the National Assembly. But the very title of the Executive Council, *Conseil Exécutif provisoire*, (8) clearly indicated, that its institution was merely temporary. Consequently letters of credence, addressed to the Executive Council, could likewise have been only temporary; and it might be expected, that in a very short time fresh credentials would be required for some other council or committee. Still less could a British Am-

(8) Le Brun himself, in his note to Lord Gower, used this title. Likewise, in the 4th article of the decree which passed in the night of the 10th of August, was said: "Les Ministres actuellement en activité continueront *provisoirement* l'exercice de leurs fonctions." *Moniteur*, 12th August, 1792.

bassador

bassador be accredited to the National Assembly; for this very Assembly had, in the night of the 10th of August, pronounced its own dissolution, and ordered the election of a National Convention. (9) Further, it was declared in the same decree, that the King was only *provisionally* suspended from his functions. (10) All authorities, therefore, in France were at that time merely transient; and, consequently, the most prudent part which England could take, was to wait at least till the new constitution had been determined by the National Convention, for

(9) The first article of the decree of the 10th of August is: “ Le peuple Français est invité à former “ une Convention Nationale.” *Ib.*

(10) The second article is: “ Le chef du Pouvoir “ Exécutif est *provisoirement* suspendu de ses fonctions, jusqu’ à ce que la Convention Nationale ait “ prononcé sur les mesures, qu’elle croira devoir adopter pour assurer la souveraineté du peuple, et le “ règne de la liberté et de l’égalité.”

which

which purpose it was ordered to assemble. This was certainly no breach of neutrality, especially as in the letter by which the British Ambassador was recalled, the most solemn declaration was made, that it was not the intention of the British Government to interfere in the arrangement of the internal affairs of France. Besides, when it is the intention of a Court to abandon its system of neutrality, its Ambassador usually quits the country against which hostilities are intended, without taking leave of the Government. But this did not happen in the present instance, for Lord Gower communicated his letter of recall even to the *new* Government of France: nor did Le Brun, in his answer, express the least suspicion, that it was the design of the British Cabinet to violate the neutrality toward France. On the contrary, he declared, not only that the French Nation confided in "the justice, the moderation, and the impartiality of the British

tish

tish Cabinet," but likewise, that "this confidence was *founded on facts*:" (11) and in his report on the situation of France in respect to the different powers of Europe, delivered to the National Assembly on the 23d of August, he asserted, that on the subject of neutrality the British Ambassador "had left a *satisfactory testimony of the sentiments of his Court*." (12) Indeed the whole conduct of the British Government afforded ample proof, that it was not its intention to seek a quarrel with France: for had it really entertained any such design, it would not have neglected the most favourable oppor-

(11) Dans cette confiance intime *fondée sur les faits*, etc. See Note 2.

(12) "Il reste à parler de l'Angleterre et de la Hollande: ces deux puissances annoncent toujours le désir de rester dans les termes de stricte neutralité. L'Ambassadeur Britannique, en s'éloignant momentanément de la France, nous laisse à cet égard un *témoignage satisfaisant des sentimens de sa Cour*." *Moniteur*, 25 Août, 1792.

tunity

tunity that ever offered of humbling its rival, the month of August, 1792. A glorious peace with Tippoo Saib, which was already known in Europe, afforded full scope to the operation of the British arms: France stood unsupported by a single ally, like England at the commencement of the American war: yet, though France had taken ungenerous advantage of the one period, England refused even to retaliate at the other, notwithstanding the repeated solicitations of the Confederate Powers. (13) Nay, so favourable was the conduct of Great Britain toward France, that the free ex-

(13) We have already seen that the British Government was solicited, in 1791, to join a coalition against France, and that the proposal was rejected. That it was again invited by various powers in the summer of 1792, and with the same success, appears from the speech of Mr. Dundas in the House of Commons, on the 14th of December, 1792. See likewise Mr. Miles's Letter to Le Brun, the French Minister, dated 18th December, 1792, in the *Authentic Correspondence*, Appendix, p. 75.

portation

portation of arms and provisions was still permitted, and ceased not till the decree of the 19th of November, with its concomitant circumstances, had placed beyond a doubt the hostile disposition of France.

How then can any man with justice assert, that the British Government was guilty of a breach of neutrality toward France in August, 1792? The mere recall of an ambassador from a foreign court, if attended with no indications of hostility, cannot possibly be construed into a breach of peace. Almost all the other ambassadors left Paris about the same time with Lord Gower: even the Danish Ambassador, Baron Blohm, received letters of recall; and the only reason why he did not leave Paris was, that he was too ill at that time to undertake a long journey. No one has ever reproached the Danish Court with having violated, by the
command

command sent to the Danish Ambassador, its neutrality toward France. Why then shall the English Government be accused for sending a similar command? An appeal has indeed been made to the second article of the treaty of commerce between France and England: but the proof which has been founded on this article rests on a false interpretation of it. For by this article was stipulated, not that the mere recall of an Ambassador, either from Paris or from London, should be regarded as a breach of peace, but simply, that in case the two powers should happen to be at variance, and a rupture should be likely to ensue, hostilities should not be considered as actually commenced, till the Ambassadors of both powers were either recalled or dismissed. (14) Now the

(14) " Si quelque jour il survient quelque mauvaise
" intelligence, interruption d'amitié ou rupture entre
" les couronnes de leurs Majestés, ce qu' à Dieu ne
" plaise,

case assumed in this article did not take place in August 1792, and consequently the article itself is not applicable to the recall of Lord Gower. Besides, the French Minister in London was still permitted to remain there; for he continued in England not less than five months after the period in question, and even communicated with the British Ministry, though his communications, for obvious reasons, could not be considered as strictly official. (15)

“plaise, (laquelle rupture ne sera censée exister que lors
 “du rappel ou du renvoi des ambassadeurs et ministres
 “respectifs), etc.” Martens’ Recueil des Principaux
 Traités, tom. ii. p. 681.

(15) It is likewise to be observed, that the whole of the British embassy did not leave Paris with Lord Gower: for Mr. Lindsay, the Secretary of Legation, staid behind, and would probably have continued his residence there, if the murder of two British subjects, under the pretext of their being aristocrats, and the butcheries of the 2d of September, had not excited apprehensions for his personal safety.

But

But it is said, if the French nation thought proper to establish a republic, what necessity had the British Government to trouble itself about the forms of a letter of credence? An Ambassador might have been accredited to the nation at large, without regard to the persons who, in August 1792, conducted its affairs!—But in the first place we must ask what is meant by an Ambassador's being accredited to the nation at large. No Ambassador can negotiate with the whole body of the people; his conferences must be confined to the persons who are in actual possession of the executive authority. These persons may indeed assert that they act in the name of the whole nation: and in a republic, in which order and durability of government is to be found, the actual rulers may assert it without contradiction. But in 1792 and 1793 the administration of public affairs in France was highly defective, as well in order as in durability: one party rapidly succeeded

ceeded another, and each party pretended, while in power, to act in the name of the nation, but was branded, when fallen, with the appellation of a faction. By what criterion then was the British Government to determine, to which of the parties the honourable title of nation, and to which the disgraceful name of faction was due? Had the Girondists been asked, they would have answered, *we* represent the nation: and the very same answer would have been given by the Anarchists, who considered *themselves* as the nation, and the Girondists as a faction.

(16) In this situation the British Govern-

(16) The public administration of affairs at that time is represented by Brissot in his work, *à ses Commettans*, in very striking colours: The following passages may serve as examples:—P. 2. Des lois sans exécution, des autorités constituées, sans force et avilies, le crime impuni, les propriétés attaquées, la sûreté des individus violée, la morale du peuple corrompue, *ni constitution, ni gouvernement, ni justice*—P. 33. Maintenant je le demande à tout homme de bonne foi: où donc est maintenant la puissance suprême?

ment could not treat with the party which was in power, and which called itself the

Est-ce dans la Convention, ou dans le Tribunal révolutionnaire ? Est-ce dans ce Tribunal, ou dans Marat ? Est-ce dans Marat, ou dans les factieux, qui le protègent ?—P. 37. Ce n'est pas encore dans la commune de Paris que réside l'exercice de la souveraineté nationale, c'est dans un club, ou plutôt dans une vingtaine de brigands, qui dirigent ce club, qui font courber devant eux toutes les autorités constituées par la nation.—P. 39. Je le demande à tout homme, qui a étudié les bases des républiques, peut-il exister à côté d'un foyer aussi actif de conspirations, qui communique à ceux de la municipalité, des sections et des autres clubs de l'empire ; peut-il exister une convention libre et indépendante, un gouvernement, une justice ?—P. 41. Tous les pouvoirs sont nécessairement au club ; voilà le corps législatif, ou plutôt voilà le corps au dessus de la loi, au dessus de toutes les autorités constituées, voilà le souverain de la France entière. J'ai fait voir que le club des Anarchistes était le souverain de la Convention ; il est encore des Ministres depuis le 10 Août.—P. 46. Je reviens aux Ministres qui, puisqu'il faut enfin trancher le mot, *ont été et sont plutôt les ministres des Jacobins de Paris, que ceux de la nation.* It is true that the description which Brissot here gives of France applies immediately to the spring of 1793 :

but

nation, without incurring the danger of being accused by the succeeding ruling party of having treated with factionists. The new party might have even asserted that Great Britain intermeddled in the internal affairs of France: (17) and, according to the doctrine of the National Assembly itself, this was one of the greatest offences which one nation could commit toward another.

Besides, all diplomatic connexions with so fluctuating an administration appeared to be useless: a treaty made with one party might

but it is equally applicable to the latter half of 1792, and one passage in particular is expressly dated from the 10th of August.

(17) For this reason, in the Letter to Lord Gower, immediately after the passage quoted above in Note 7, was added: "His Majesty is therefore of opinion that you ought not to remain any longer in Paris, as well on this account, as, because, this step appears to him the most conformable to the principles of neutrality, which he has hitherto observed."

have been regarded as not valid by the other : and therefore Great Britain could not expect, under such circumstances, that any convention with France would have a lasting effect. (18) Nor was it certain, in August 1792, that the King of France would not be re-instated : for no one expected, after the celebrated declaration at Coblenz, of the 25th of July, that the close of the Prussian campaign would so ill correspond to the commencement of it. And if Louis XVI. had been restored to his former authority, the British Government, by a connexion with either of the republican parties in France,

(18) Brissot, in the above quoted work, p. 103, says : " Les puissances étrangères, qui voudraient
 " traiter avec nous, dans l'état où nous sommes, pour-
 " raient-elles concevoir un espoir semblable ? Non,
 " elles se disent : la France est divisée par des fac-
 " tions ; l'une triomphe aujourd'hui, demain ce sera
 " l'autre. Traitez avec l'une, l'autre casse le traité.
 " Rien n'est stable ; attendons cette stabilité, et nous
 " traiterons." And p. 112, he says, " On ne traite
 " point avec l'anarchie."

would

would have materially injured its own interests in regard both to the King and to the allied powers, which no one had a right to expect, since there is a duty which we owe to ourselves as well as to our neighbours. But even if this duty be set aside, and even if no attention was due to the possibility of a revolution in favour of the deposed King, at least regard was to be had to another revolution, which was expected by the republicans themselves: for Brissot, in his Address to the republicans of France, which is dated October, 1792, declared, that as the first revolution destroyed despotism, and the second overturned royalty, a third was necessary to put an end to anarchy. (19) Consequently the most prudent conduct which Great Britain could observe was to continue

(19) His own words are: " J'ai toujours pensé qu'il nous fallait trois révolutions: la première a renversé le despotisme, la seconde la royauté, la troisième détruira l'anarchie."

neutral toward all parties, (20) and not to renew the diplomatic connexions with France, which the revolution of the 10th of August had interrupted, till a stable government, or a settled constitution, whether monarchical or republican, was fully established. But the new constitution, which it was the business of the National Convention to determine, and then present to the Primary Assemblies for their approbation, was not even drawn up before February, (21)

(20) See Note 17.

(21) It was first presented to the Convention on the 15th of February, 1793, by Condorcet, in the name of the Constitutional Committee. See the *Moniteur*, 17th and 18th Feb. 1793. But though presented, it was not adopted by the Convention: for that which is called the constitution of 1793, and was really adopted, was drawn up much later in that year. And even this constitution was not only suspended within a short time after its adoption, but is considered by the present rulers of France as so defective, that on the 16th of April, 1796, a law was made, which condemned to *death* all persons who, by their *writings* or *speeches*, should

1793: and after that period, the residence of a British Ambassador in Paris was no longer a question, since, on the first of that month, the Convention had already declared war against Great Britain.

Lastly, the personal safety of the British Ambassador in Paris was not unworthy of consideration. But in a city, in which the

should attempt to re-establish it: for on that day the following law, proposed by Treillard, was unanimously decreed by the Council of Five Hundred, and immediately ratified by the Council of Elders: “ Sont coupables de crime contre la sûreté intérieure de la république et contre la sûreté individuelle des citoyens, et seront punis de la *peine de mort*, conformément à l'article 612 du code des délits et des peines, tous ceux qui par leurs discours, ou par leurs écrits, soit imprimés soit distribués, soit affichés, provoquent la dissolution de la représentation nationale ou celle du directoire exécutif, ou le meurtre de tous ou aucuns des membres qui le composent, ou le rétablissement de la royauté, ou celui de la constitution de 1793, &c.” *Moniteur*, 20 Avril, 1796.

licentiousness of a blood-thirsty populace either was not, or could not be restrained within due bounds, in a city where the most horrid murders were committed without regard either to age or character, and where even British subjects had fallen a prey to the fury of a Parisian mob, no British Ambassador could have remained with safety. On *this* ground, therefore, as well as on the preceding, his departure from Paris was the most adviseable step which, under those circumstances, could have been taken.

From the present period to the middle of November, no events took place which belong to an history of the relations between Great Britain and France. During this interval, which comprised about three months, the former remained a quiet spectator of all that passed on the Continent: and the latter was too much engaged with Austria and Prussia

Prussia to pay much attention to Great Britain. (22) But in the middle of November the scene changed, and at that time, as will appear from the following chapter, was laid the foundation of the war, which still subsists between the two countries.

(22) I designedly say "*much attention*," because even before the end of September, France began the augmentation of its marine.

CHAP. X.

French Conquests in Germany, the Netherlands, and Savoy. A French Fleet in the Mediterranean harasses the Coasts of several Italian States. Other naval Armaments in France. Opening of the Scheldt. Decree of the 19th of November, by which Assistance was promised to all Nations, that were willing to take up Arms against their Governments. Deputies from certain British Societies appear at the Bar of the French National Convention, and signify their Intention of establishing a National Convention in Great Britain. Encouragement thereto

on

on the Part of the French Convention. Measures taken in Consequence, and Commotions in Great Britain.

TOWARD the middle of November, 1792, the arms of France were victorious in every quarter. The decisive battle of Gemappe, which was fought on the 6th of this month, had rendered the French absolute masters of the Austrian Netherlands: and General Custine was not only in possession of Mentz and Francfort, (1) but was making vigorous preparations to penetrate still further into Germany. (2) The dutchy of Savoy had been already conquered, and, before the expiration of the month,

(1) It was not before the 2d of December, that Francfort was re-captured.

(2) All these facts are so well known, that it would be superfluous to quote authority for them.

it.

it was formally incorporated into France. (3) At the same time the Toulon fleet, under the orders of Admiral Truguet harassed both the coast of Piedmont, and that of other Italian states. Nor was this fleet, which consisted of fifteen sail of the line, (4) the only naval armament, which France had fitted out at this period : for it appears from the report delivered to the National Convention by the Marine Minister, Monge, on the

(3) "Gregoire lit un projet de décret sur l'incorporation de la Savoie. La question est mise aux voix par assis et levé. *Un seul membre se leve contre.*" *Moniteur*, 28 Novembre, 1792. The circumstance that there was only one dissenting voice on this question, is so much the more remarkable, as the incorporation of Savoy was in direct contradiction to the solemn pledge, repeatedly given by the French rulers, "that they renounced all conquest and aggrandizement."

(4) Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 42. N. B. Whenever I quote this Work, I mean the original Paris edition.

23d of September, 1792, that even then not less than *twenty-one ships of the line, thirty frigates, ten ships armed en flute, and forty-two smaller ships of war* were actually at sea. (5)

It appears further from the same report, that, *thirty-four ships of the line*, in addition to the preceding, were in a state to be instantly commissioned, that nineteen more were capable of being refitted, that seven were building, of which three were ready to be launched, and that out of one and forty frigates, twenty-three were in such a state of forwardness, that they were capable of being put in immediate commission, beside six

(5) Séance du 28 Septembre " M. Monge fait un rapport sur le département de la marine. Il en résulte que la république *fait flotter sur mer* 102 pavillons tricolors ; savoir 21 gros vaisseaux, 30 frégattes, 18 corvettes, 24 avisos, 10 flottes ou gabarres ; que 34 autres vaisseaux de ligne sont prêts à être armés, 19 susceptible de radoubement, 7 sont en construction, dont 3 prêts à être mis en mer, que sur 41 frégattes, 23 sont en état d'être armés sur le champ, outre 6 qui sont sur les chantiers." *Moniteur*, 25 Septembre, 1792.

which

which were on the stocks. Such was the naval armament, and such were the preparations, which were made in France, for a still further augmentation of it, at a time when Great Britain had only sixteen thousand sailors and marines in pay, which were hardly sufficient to man even twelve ships of the line, with the proportionate number of frigates, sloops, and cutters.

The rapid progress of the French arms, and the vigorous preparations which were making for new conquests, unavoidably excited the attention of the British Government. The plan of subjugation and aggrandizement, which had hitherto lain concealed in embryo, began now to unfold itself; and the system which the French rulers have since followed with so much success, became visible to the eye of the sagacious observer. By the incorporation of Savoy they had trodden under foot the principle

ciple on which they had solemnly pledged themselves to found the new fabric of French politicks: and it was now become evident, that the promised renunciation of conquest and aggrandizement was nothing more than a mask, under which they endeavoured to cover their real designs. In the Netherlands, however, they thought it prudent not to lay aside the mask at once, as they did in Savoy: they declared the Belgians a free and independent people, and expressed only a desire of affording them the protection of a friendly neighbour. But the Belgians possessed too small and too open a country to be able, in the neighbourhood of France, to form a perfectly independent state: and it was certain that their new protectors would at the same time, exercise the power of governors. In respect to England, therefore, it was a matter of indifference, whether Belgia bore the title of an independent state, or that of a French department, since in the former,

former, as well as in the latter case, the coast of Flanders, like the coast of France itself, must necessarily become an hostile coast to England. The declaration, however, of Belgia's independence, was nothing more than a prelude to its union with France, and the only reason why its incorporation did not immediately follow that of Savoy, was the necessity of deceiving the *people*, though not the Government of Great Britain: for the war against Great Britain had been declared only two days, when the Commissioners of the French Convention assembled at Brussels, decided that Belgia should be incorporated with France. (6)

(6) The documents relative to this subject are printed in Chauffard Mémoires Historiques et Politiques sur la Révolution de la Belgique et du pays de Liege. (Paris, 1793. 8. p. 78—85) Chauffard's own vote was delivered in the following words: "Je vote la réunion de la Belgique à la France.—On m'oppose le vœu du peuple; *le vœu d'un peuple enfant ou imbecille serait nul, parceque qu'il stipulerait contre lui-même.*" The
vote

Ten days after the battle of Gemappè had put the Austrian Netherlands in the possession of the French, the Executive Coun-

vote of Chèpy is likewise worthy of notice : “ Je vote
 “ pour que la réunion de la Belgique à la république
 “ Française soit opérée par la puissance de la raison,
 “ par les touchantes insinuations de la philanthropie,
 “ de la fraternité, et par tous les moyens de tactique
 “ révolutionnaire ; et au cas que nos efforts soient in-
 “ fructueux, et que l’on continue à nous opposer le
 “ système désespérant de la force d’inertie, j’estime
 “ que le droit de conquête, devenu pour la première fois
 “ utile au monde et juste, doit faire l’éducation poli-
 “ tique du peuple Belge et le préparer à de brillantes
 “ et heureuses destinées.” Further, that notwith-
 standing the all-promising manifesto, with which the
 entry of the French army into Belgia was accompa-
 nied, it was by no means the intention of the French
 Government to establish an independent republic
 there, appears from the following confession of Ge-
 neral Dumouriez : “ L’intention *secrète* à Paris n’était
 “ point que le peuple Liegeois, et encore moins celui
 “ de la Belgique se réunît en corps de nation pour se
 “ donner une constitution et des loix ; on craignait
 “ qu’une fois assemblés, ces deux peuples ne connus-
 “ sent leurs forces et ne fondassent une république
 “ indépendante.” Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 348.

cil resolved, that the Scheldt, in which the Dutch, by virtue of various treaties, possessed the exclusive right of entering with ships of a certain burden, and especially ships of war, should be opened. (7) It would be useless to examine whether these treaties, as the Executive Council asserted, were contrary to the law of nature or not. (8) It is

((7) This resolution was made by the Executive Council on the 16th of November, 1792, and on the 21st was presented to the National Convention, which received it with great applause. See *Moniteur*, 22d November, 1792.

(8) The Executive Council adopted, as the basis of the resolution, the following principle: "that rivers are the common and inalienable property of *all* those nations, through whose territories they flow." Now, the Scheldt, from only a league below Fort Lillo, to the mouth of it, flowed through Dutch territory, for on the north side lay the province of Zealand, and on the south side Dutch Flanders: and every nation considers itself as possessing the right to exercise sovereignty over a river as far as its own territory extends. The French themselves, at least, would certainly not suffer

sufficient that such treaties existed: France itself had guaranteed them, (9) in conjunction with other powers; and they could not be violated without destroying that law of nations, which, from the time of the general treaty of Westphalia, had united the European states into a kind of great republic.

In declaring that the Dutch should no longer exercise their accustomed sovereignty

suffer any nation to deprive them of this right in regard to their *own* rivers: and if, in the year 1792, the inhabitants of Geneva, or of the country of Valais had applied to the Rhone the principle, which the Executive Council applied to the Scheldt, and had said: "the Rhone flows through our territory, consequently we have as good a right as you to the free navigation of it from Lyons to the Mediterranean," the inference would certainly have been rejected as devoid of foundation.

(9) See the second article of the treaty of 1785, between France and Holland, in Martens' *Recueil des Principaux Traités*, tom. ii. p. 614.

over the Scheldt, the French Government had two objects in view, an immediate and a distant one. The immediate object was to send French ships of war into the Scheldt, to bombard the citadel of Antwerp; and this object was very soon attained: for, on the first of December, 1792, a French frigate, a brig, two gun-vessels, and three other armed vessels from Dunkirk, entered the Scheldt, in defiance of the solemn protestation of the States General. (10) The dis-

(10) In a note delivered by the States General to the Imperial Ambassador at the Hague, was contained the following passage: "Que L. H. P. ont prié S. A. le Prince d'Orange, etc. d'ordonner à l'officier qui commande le vaisseau de garde, stationné a l'embouchure de l'Escaut, de ne pas accorder le passage, mais d'informer le commandant Français, qu'en vertu de traités la riviere d'Escaut est close pour les vaisseaux de guerre." *Moniteur*, 16 Dec. 1792. And immediately in the same article is added: "On apprend que, ce nonobstant, une frégate Française, l'Ariel, un bricq, deux chaloupes canonnières, et
trois

tant, but main object, was to convert the mouth of the Scheldt into a station for French ships of war, in order to acquire a naval advantage in the North Sea, which France had hitherto not possessed. This design did not escape the notice of the British Ministers: and it could not be a matter of indifference to them, whether France, which at that time had no harbour on the northern coast in which ships of the line could enter, acquired this advantage or not, because it exposed not only the British commerce, but the eastern coast of Britain itself to a new and very material danger.

By another resolution of the Executive Council, likewise of the 16th of November, the Commander in Chief of the French army in the Netherlands was ordered to attack the Austrians, even on the Dutch territory, in

“trois barques de pêcheur Dunquerqueises armées,
“ont remonté l'Escaut le 1er. de ce mois.”

case they retreated thither. (11) It is unnecessary at present to examine, whether, according to the usual practice of war, it is allowable in any instance to attack an enemy on neutral ground : for whether it be allowable or not, the haste with which this resolution was made shews, that the Executive Council regarded the neutrality of Holland as a matter of absolute indifference. They would otherwise have made previous representations to the States General, they would

(11) “ Extrait du Registre des Délibérations du Conseil Exécutif Provisoire. Du 16 Novembre, 1792, l’an premier de la République.

“ Le Conseil Exécutif Provisoire, délibérant sur l’état actuel de la guerre, notamment dans la Belgique—arrête, qu’en conséquence de la délibération du 24 Octobre dernier, il fera donné ordre au Général commandant en chef l’expédition de la Belgique, de continuer à poursuivre les ennemis même sur le territoire Hollandois, dans le cas où ils s’y Metaient retirés.”

Correspondance du Général Dumouriez avec Pache.
(Paris, 1793-8.) p. 71.

have

have waited till the Austrian army had been permitted to take refuge on the Dutch territory, and they would not have made the resolution at a time when the Austrians were retreating to Liege, and every movement indicated that it was not their design to enter Holland.

But all the measures which the French Government had hitherto taken, though they necessarily excited uneasiness in the British Cabinet, were trifles, in comparison of other measures, which were adopted in the same month; for at this very time was formed the determination to overturn the British Government and the British Constitution. By the correspondence of the Jacobin Club with various societies, the seeds of discord and sedition had been already sown in great abundance: and the principle adopted by the French rulers, “ that the

N 4

governed

governed must be excited to rebel against their governors," (12) had been already applied in England with great industry and success. For, in the first place, on account of the political liberty which existed in England, it was easier to set the people in commotion, than the people of any other state in Europe: (13) and in the next place, no

(12) "Que pensaient les hommes éclairés, républicains avant le 10 Août, les hommes qui voulaient la liberté, non seulement pour leur pays, mais pour toute l'Europe ? Ils croyaient qu'on pouvait l'établir par-tout en soulevant les administrés contre les administrans, en faisant voir aux peuples la facilité et les avantages de ces soulèvements." Brissot à se Commettans, p. 81.

(13) So early as the 5th of January, 1792, Isnard had said : "Voici l'instant qui peut-être doit décider à jamais des despotes et des nations ; c'est vous que le ciel réservait à ces grands événemens : élevez-vous au niveau de vos destinées : " and a few lines after, "Est-il bien vrai qu'un langage national ne ferait entendu dans aucune contrée ? Ah ! sans doute
" les

object appeared so desirable to the French as the utter destruction of their ancient and formidable rival, which the excitement of a civil war afforded both the easiest and the surest means of attaining. During a considerable time their operations were carried on in the dark : but as soon as they became all-potent conquerors, and the National Convention had acquired sufficient power to act an open part, it was no longer thought necessary to make a secret of their designs. The decisive battle of Gemappe, and the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands, presented the most favourable opportunity for a public declaration : and accordingly, on the 19th of November, 1792, the National Convention announced by a formal decree, which was translated into all the European languages, *that France was ready*

“ les Anglais feraient un peuple digne de l’entendre.”
Moniteur, 6 Jan. 1792.

to assist every nation which was willing to rebel against its own government. (14)

“ Séance du Lundi, 19 Novembre.

(14) Lépaux propose, et la Convention adopte, la “ rédaction suivante. La Convention Nationale déclare, au nom de la nation Française, qu’elle accordera fraternité et secours à tous les peuples qui “ *voudront* recouvrer leur liberté; et charge le pouvoir exécutif de donner aux généraux les ordres nécessaires pour porter secours à ces peuples, et défendre les citoyens qui auraient été vexés, ou qui “ pourraient l’être pour la cause de la liberté.

“ Sergent. Je demand que ce décret soit traduit et “ imprimé dans *toutes les langues*.

“ Cette proposition est décrétée.” Moniteur, 20 Nov. 1792. Brissot, though he made no objection to this decree at the time when it was proposed, for it passed with enthusiasm, (le décret passa d’enthousiasme) as he himself says, called it afterwards, on mature reflection, “ l’absurde et impolitique décret du 19 Novembre, qui a *justement* excité les inquiétudes des cabinets étrangers.” A ses Commettans, page 68. It is remarkable, that the person who proposed this decree was elected one of the first five Directors, though in other respects he is by no means a distinguished character.

The

The measures adopted by the National Convention even previous to this decree, but more particularly the decree itself, produced in England the desired effect, and set various societies, who were already disaffected to Government, in agitation. So early as the 7th of November (15) an address, voted by five thousand persons, members of the united societies of London, Manchester and other places, (16) was delivered to the National Convention, containing the following passages: "They are of opinion (namely, " they who voted the address), that it is the " duty of true Britons to support and assist

(15) Even on the 14th of August several Englishmen appeared at the bar of the National Assembly, and congratulated the French on the energy which they had displayed on the 10th of August (*de l'énergie qu'ils ont montrée dans la journée du 10 Août*). *Moniteur*, 17 Août. 1792.

(16) Cette adresse a été votée par 5,000 Anglais réunis dans les sociétés de Londres, Manchester, etc." *Moniteur*, du 8 Nov: 1792.

" to

“ to the utmost of their power the defenders
 “ of the Rights of Man, the propagators of
 “ human felicity, and to swear inviolable
 “ friendship to a nation which proceeds on
 “ *the plan which you have adopted*”—(It
 is to be observed, that this plan was the
 abolition of royalty).—“ What is liberty?
 “ What are our rights? Frenchmen, you
 “ are already free, *and Britons are preparing*
 “ *to become so.* A triple alliance, *not of crowns,*
 “ but of the *people* of America, of France,
 “ and of *Great Britain, &c.*” (17) This

(17) “ Ils croient qu’il est du devoir des vrais Bre-
 “ tons, de soutenir et assister de tous leurs moyens les
 “ défenseurs des droits de l’homme, des propagateurs
 “ du bonheur, de l’humanité, et de jurer à une nation,
 “ qui procède *d’après le plan que vous avez adopté,*
 “ une amitié inviolable. Qu’est-ce que la liberté?
 “ Quels sont nos droits? Français, vous êtes déjà
 “ libres; *mais les Bretons se préparent à le devenir.*
 “ La triple alliance, *non de couronnes,* mais des peuples
 “ de l’Amérique, de la France, et de la *Grande Bre-*
 “ *tagne, etc.*” Moniteur, 8 Nov. 1792. The ad-
 dress is signed, Maurice Margarot, President; Thomas
 Hardy, Secretary; and contains several other passages
 equally

language was very intelligible : but no sooner was the decree of the 19th of November generally known, than a more open and daring language was adopted ; for within nine days after the publication of this decree, deputies from certain British societies appeared at the bar of the National Convention, and signified their intention of adopting the form of Government introduced in France, and of establishing *a National Convention in Great Britain*. “ We hope,” said the orator of the first deputation, “ that
 “ the troops of liberty will never lay down
 “ their arms as long as tyrants and slaves shall
 “ continue to exist. (18) Our wishes, Citi-

equally expressive of a determination to abolish royalty in England. They who have not access to the *Moniteur*, will find the whole address, in English, in *Rivington's Annual Register*, 1792, *State Papers*, p. 344.

(18) Every rational man must deplore the existence both of tyrants and of slaves ; but *these* gentlemen by the word “ tyrant ” understood every king, however mild his government, or however limited his authority ;

“zen-Legislators, render us impatient to see
 “the moment of this *grand change*. Not
 “are we alone animated by these senti-
 “ments: we doubt not that they would
 “be equally conspicuous in the great ma-
 “jority of our fellow countrymen, if the
 “public opinion were consulted there, *as*
 “*it ought to be*, in a NATIONAL CON-
 “VENTION.” (19) To this address the

rity; and by the word “slave” they understood every
 inhabitant of a country where kingly government
 was established. Thus do men become the dupes of
 mere names, as if the word “king” necessarily in-
 volved the idea of slavery, or the word “director”
 the idea of liberty. It is not the title, but the power
 annexed to it, which is to be taken into considera-
 tion: the Sovereign of Great Britain is called King,
 the Sovereigns of France are called Directors: yet
 Great Britain is still the land of liberty, and France is
 now the land of abject slavery.

(19) “Nous espérons que les troupes de la liberté
 “ne les (i. e. les armes) poseront, que lorsqu’ils n’y
 “aura plus de tyrans ni d’esclaves. Nos vœux, Citoy-
 “ens Législateurs, nous rendent impatiens de voir le
 “moment heureux de grand changement. Nous ne
 “sommes

President made the following reply, in the name of the French Convention: "Citizens of the world, etc. Principles are waging war against tyranny, which will fall under the blows of philosophy. *Royalty in Europe is either destroyed, or on the point of perishing* on the ruins of feodality: and the declaration of rights, placed by

"sommes pas les seuls animés de ces sentimens, nous ne doutons pas, qu'ils ne se manifestassent également chez la grande majorité de nos compatriotes, si l'opinion publique y était consultée, *comme elle devait l'être, dans une Convention Nationale.*"

Séance 28 Novembre: Moniteur, 29 Nov. 1792.

Le Président à la députation,

"Citoyens du monde, etc. Les principes font la guerre à la tyrannie, qui tombera sous les coups de la philosophie. La royauté est en Europe ou détruite ou agonisante sur les décombres féodaux: et la déclaration des droits placé à côté des trônes est un feu dévorant, qui va les consumer. (Applaudissemens). *Estimables républicains, félicitez vous en pensant, que la fête que vous avez célébrée en l'honneur de la révolution Française, est le prélude de la fête des nations.*" Ib.

"the

“ the side of thrones, is a devouring fire,
 “ which will consume them. *Worthy re-*
 “ *publicans*, congratulate yourselves on think-
 “ ing, that the festival which you have ce-
 “ lebrated in honour of the French revolu-
 “ tion, is *the prelude to the festival of nations.*”

But the language held on the same day by the Deputies of the Society for Constitutional Information, (20) as well as the language of the President, in his reply to *them*, was still more expressive. “ Citizens of “ France,” said the orator of the deputation, “ we are sent by a patriotic society “ in London to congratulate you, in their “ name, on the triumphs of liberty.—After the example which France has lately “ given, *revolutions will be rendered easy :*

(20) The same Society in its address to the Jacobin club, which was sent a few days before the royal proclamation of the 21st of May was issued, displayed similar principles, though not so openly, as after the decree of the 19th of November.

“ and

“and it will not be extraordinary if, in a *short space of time*, addressees of congratulation be sent to a NATIONAL CONVENTION OF ENGLAND.” (21) At these words the French Convention applauded. The address itself was then read by one of the secretaries, which, after much abuse of the English, and much panegyric on the French Government, concluded with a sentence containing the following words: “others will *soon* march in *your* footsteps, in this career of *useful changes*.” (22) And

(21) “Citoyens de France, nous sommes députés par une société patriotique de Londres, pour vous féliciter en son nom des triomphes de la liberté.— D’après l’exemple que vient de donner la France, les révolutions vont devenir faciles; il ne serait pas extraordinaire, que dans un court espace de tems il arrivât aussi des félicitations à une Convention Nationale d’Angleterre.” (Applaudissemens). *Moniteur* 29 Nov. 1792.

(22) “D’autres marcheront *bientôt* sur vos traces dans cette carrière d’utiles changemens.” *Ib.* The address is signed, Sempill, President; D. Adams, Secretary.

these *useful changes*, according to the interpretation of the deputies themselves, were to consist in the establishment of a National Convention, and consequently in the *total* abolition of the British Constitution. (23)

cretary. In the *Moniteur*, it is signed likewise by Joel Barlow and John Frost, the deputies who delivered it to the French Convention.

(23) It is extraordinary that, notwithstanding the public acts of this and other similar societies which are recorded in the *Moniteur*, and lie open to the whole world, both eminent orators and eminent writers should so long have persisted in the assertion, that nothing more was intended than a parliamentary reform. In like manner it has been asserted, even till the breaking out of the Irish rebellion, that the United Irishmen had no other object in view than a reform in the Commons House of Parliament. But at present we all know, from the report of the Secret Committees of the two Houses of the Irish Parliament, published in August 1798, and founded on the evidence of Arthur O'Connor, Emmet, Macnevin, and other chieftains of the rebellion, that a parliamentary reform was nothing more than a mask, under which the United Irishmen endeavoured to cover their real designs, that they were in fact closely allied with the enemies

As soon as the speech of the deputies was ended, and the address itself had been read,

enemies of Great Britain, and that, in the summer of 1796, Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor went to Francfort as deputies from the Irish Union, to settle with General Hoche the plan of the landing in Ireland, which was then in agitation, and which was attempted, though unsuccessfully, before the close of the year. And still more extraordinary is it, that members of the British Senate, hardly two months before Arthur O'Connor himself made these acknowledgments, could venture to declare in a Court of Justice, that they were acquainted with the political character of this man, and that they believed him to be sincerely attached to the principles which placed the present family on the throne. The impositions which have been practised since the French revolution, by the term "Parliamentary Reform," appear further from a memoir delivered in 1797 by Lewines, the ambassador of the United Irishmen, to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, in which was the following passage: "The *delusions* of Reform and Emancipation are beginning to fail from the delay, &c." See the report of the Secret Committee of the Irish House of Commons, in August 1798, an extract from which is printed in the Times, of the 27th of August. Thus have the common people in Ireland,

the President of the French Convention returned an answer, which contained the following passages: "The defenders of *our* liberty will one day become the defenders of *your own*.—The shades of Pym, of Hampden, and of Sydney, hover over your heads; and without doubt *the moment is approaching*, when the people of France will come to offer their congratulations to **THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF GREAT BRITAIN.**" (24)

who, as Oliver Bond acknowledged, cared very little about a parliamentary reform, been rendered the dupes of those who, as the same person added, "thought for them," or, in plain terms, wished to sacrifice their country to gratify their private ambition. The same *delusions of reform* were attempted to be practised in England, when the above-quoted addresses were presented to the French Convention in November, 1792: but, fortunately for Great Britain, they produced not the intended effect.

(24) "Les défenseurs de *notre* liberté le feront un jour de *la* *votre*.—Les ombres de Pym, de Hampden, de Sydney, planent sur vos têtes: *et sans doute*
qu'il

Such answers to such societies, (25) united

*“ il approche le moment, où les Français iront féliciter
“ la Convention Nationale de la Grande Bretagne.”*
Moniteur, 29 Nov. 1792. The Convention then decreed, that the addresses, with the answers of the President, should be translated into all languages. Ib.

(25) On the 29th of November another address was presented to the Convention from a society at Rochester, in which, after much declamation against the British Government, mention was made, in very intelligible, though general expressions, of people, “ who wished to receive from the French Nation the benefit of liberty” (*qui aspirent à recevoir de lui la bienfait de la liberté*). Moniteur, 30 Nov. 1792. Another passage in this address, “ résolu que le président de la société invitera tous les amis de l’égalité, toutes les sociétés correspondantes en France, à employer leur zèle, leurs efforts, leurs sollicitations auprès du Conseil Exécutif,” etc. affords an additional proof, not only that societies in England corresponded with societies in France, but likewise that these societies stood in immediate connexion with the French Executive Council.—Beside this address and the three others above-mentioned, several more were sent to France about this time: for Lord Grenville, in his speech of the 13th of December, 1792, said: “ he held in his hand no less
“ than ten addresses presented to the National Con-

with the decree of the 19th November, (26) were equivalent to a formal declaration of hostilities against the British Government ; and the general promise of assistance, which had been given to revolutionists of all nations, was, by the conduct of the National Convention, on the 28th of November, confirmed, and applied to Great Britain in particular. This was the reward of all the benefits which had been conferred on France : this was the return, which was made for the refusal to join the coalition, for the salvation of the French colony of St. Domingo, for the permission to import from England bread

“vention of France by subjects of this country.” See the *New Annual Register*, 1793 ; *British and Foreign History*, p. 22. See also *Rivington's Annual Register*, 1792 ; *State Papers*, p. 344—352.

(26) The explanation of this decree, which was afterwards given by the French Executive Council, will be examined in a subsequent chapter, where it will appear that the explanation was founded on the blackest hypocrisy.

and

and arms, and for the preservation of neutrality, even at a time when France might have been attacked with the utmost advantage. But what gratitude could be expected from men, who convert religion and morality into subjects of ridicule? They acted only, at that time, as they have acted ever since; for their whole conduct affords one continued proof, that from the moment they acquire the means of conquest, neither neutrality, nor justice, nor gratitude, prevent them from the execution of their designs.

It is true, that the National Convention pretended an especial friendship for the *people* of Great Britain. But what right did they possess to interfere in the internal affairs of a neutral country, and to separate the people from the government? According to their own maxims, this was the greatest offence of which one nation could be guilty toward another. The British Government had not

acted in this manner toward France ; for so late as the end of August Le Brun himself acknowledged, that “it had conducted itself to that very period, with justice, with moderation, and impartiality.”(27) But let us ask, what they meant by friendship for the people, and enmity to the Government of Britain ; and how they could attack the latter, yet leave the former unmolested ? It is not the members of a Government which usually take the field when a country is invaded, but the soldiers and the other inhabitants, who fight under the orders of government ; the very persons, therefore, for whom the French pretended a particular friendship, were those who were immediately exposed to the effects of their enmity. Who, therefore, can be so blind, as not to see, that

(27) Le Brun's own words were, “ la justice, la modération, et l'impartialité, qu'il a montrée jusqu' à présent.” See his note to Lord Gower, quoted Ch. ix: Note 2.

Such declarations were nothing more than attempts to delude the unwary, and to convert them into instruments of French ambition ? If we further ask, in what the amity of the French rulers for the *people* of foreign countries really consists, the answer is obvious. Agreeably to their pretended doctrine, they declared war only on the Stadtholder of Holland, and yet reduced the once wealthy inhabitants of that country to beggary : they declared war, as they asserted, only on the oligarchs of Bern, and then subjected even the democratic cantons of Switzerland to slavery : they declared war on the Senate of Venice, and sold the *people* to a foreign master. Such is the friendship of these promoters of the rights of man, and such is their regard for what they call the sovereignty of the people. It was surely, therefore, the duty of the British Government to rescue the natives of our free and
happy

happy island from the influence of *friendship*. (28)

In fact, the means which have been adopted by the republican Governors of France,

(28) It is true, that the number of those, who have suffered themselves to be deceived by the specious professions of the French rulers has been very considerable even in Great Britain; but at present, after an experience of seven years has enabled us to compare promises with the performance of them, I believe that every man, who *chooses* to see, *must* see the error. On this subject I can quote so high an authority as that of Mr. Sheridan himself, who, in the admirable speech which he delivered in the House of Commons on the 20th of April, 1798, said: "If then they attempt to invade us, they will no doubt come furnished with flaming manifestoes. The Directory may instruct their Generals to make the fairest professions of how their army is to act, *but of these professions surely not one can be believed.*" And a few lines after, he added with great energy: "*Can there be supposed an Englishman so stupid, so besotted, so befooled, as to give a moment's credit to such ridiculous professions?*" See the Morning Chronicle, 21st April, 1798.

to

to gratify their ambition and extend their conquests, are the most detestable, which human ingenuity can invent. The Monarchs of France, especially Louis XIV, had indeed likewise attempted to subjugate the neighbouring states: but they went more openly to work, and deluded not the inhabitants of the countries which they invaded, by promises of felicity, which they were determined not to fulfil. They made no ostentation of propagating the rights of man: yet they oppressed them infinitely less than the modern despots of republican France. They intrigued, as well as the Convention and the Directory; but their intrigues were less injurious to mankind, for the intrigues of the former were confined chiefly to the great, or to the courts of Princes, whereas the intrigues of the latter operate on whole nations. The republican Governors of France set the vilest of the human passions in commotion, they work on the illiterate multitude, who
are

are not aware, that they are mere engines in the hands of their employers, and that they themselves, as well as those against whom they are employed, will at last become the miserable slaves of their pretended deliverers. The National Convention, toward the close of the year 1792, had its secret agents in almost every quarter, who endeavoured by all the arts of systematic deception, to seduce especially the lower orders of society. Chauffard, who was well acquainted with the principles of the new French Government, and was himself one of the agents in the Austrian Netherlands, speaking of the revolution professors, (29) as he calls them, says, "it is not at the tables of the great, but under the thatch of the cottager, that the toasts of liberty must be given." (30) He has described, likewise, the

(29) "Professeurs de révolution."

(30) "Ce n'était point aux banquets des administrateurs, qu'il fallait porter les toasts de la liberté; c'était

means which were adopted to bring the people of foreign countries into the views of the French Convention : and these means consisted in promises of unlimited freedom, and an absolute exemption from all taxes. (31) By such insidious and delusive professions, by assurances of wealth and liberty, have the

“ c’était sous la chaume du pauvre.” *Chaussard Mémoires Historiques*, etc. p. 53.

(31) lb. To set the populace more effectually in commotion, a procession of butts of beer, ornamented with branches, and bearing the inscription, “ free and exempt from duties,” was held at Brussels for this very purpose. Chaussard’s own words in the place just quoted are : “ Ces tonneaux chargés de palmes promenés en pompe, portant pour inscription : *Libres et affranchis de droits*, escortés d’une cour plus pompeuse, que celle des monarques, c’était celle du peuple ; ces acclamations de joie et de franchise, ces flots de la liqueur nationale écumeux et ruisselans, tout présentait une leçon en action, tout cela parlait plus haut et plus éloquemment encore que la philosophie.” See likewise the first article of the decree of 15th Dec. 1792, where the same delusive promises are given.

modern

modern Governors of France reduced those, who have been weak enough to believe in them, to the lowest indigence and the meanest servitude. (32)

The engines, which they set to work with so much success in the Netherlands, they endeavoured likewise to employ in England: for at the end of November and the beginning of December, 1792, London abounded with revolution professors, as Chauffard called them, or missionaries, as they were termed by Gregoire, (33) who

(32) Dumouriez himself says: "C'est le 15 Décembre que fut donné le fameux décret qui prouve aux Belges et à tous les peuples, qui avaient appelé les Français ou qui les avaient reçus, que la Convention n'envoyait les armées chez eux que pour les spolier et les tyranniser.—On disait aux Belges dans le préambule, qu'ils étaient libres; on les traitait en esclaves." Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 373, 374.

(33) In a report which Gregoire delivered to the National Convention on the 27th of November, 1792,

he

were amply supplied with money, for the purpose of bribing and seducing the lower orders of the people. Various circumstances attending this infamous plot are well known: but as no one seems to have been more intimately acquainted with it, than the author of a tract published in the Collection of the Works which have been written in defence of Louis the Sixteenth, (34) it will not be

he said: “ Veut-on nous dire, que les peuples ayant
 “ des constitutions différentes les fonderont toutes sur
 “ les principes de l'égalité, de la liberté, et se chéri-
 “ ront en frères? C'est le cas d'appliquer le conseil
 “ d'un ministre à l'Abbé St. Pierre. *Envoyez préa-*
 “ *lablement des missionnaires pour convertir le globe.*
 “ Plusieurs contrées de l'Europe et de l'Amerique ag-
 “ grandiront bientôt le domaine de la liberté.” Mo-
 niteur, 28 Novembre, 1792. But Camille Jourdan
 has given these missionaries their true name, and call-
 ed them *apostles of rebellion*. “ Continuant à professer
 “ toutes les maximes révolutionnaires et inondant tous
 “ les pays de leurs apôtres de rebellion, etc.” Camille
 Jourdan à ses Commettans sur la révolution du 18
 Fructidor, p. 90.

(34) Collection des Meilleurs Ouvrages qui ont été
 publiés

superfluous to quote the following passage. (35) "The King of England," says the author of this tract, "knew the leaders, " the agents, the societies, the correspond- " ences, the emissaries, the periods of their " meeting, their journies, and their resolu- " tions. He knew that the plan was laid " to seize the Tower, to plunder the arse- " nal, to break open the prisons, to pillage " the public buildings and the houses of the " rich, and to cut off at one stroke the fe- " veral branches of the constitution. His " Majesty knew that the execution of the " plan was fixed for Saturday the first, or " Monday the third of December: he saw " likewise a model of the daggers with " which the insurgents were to be armed, " and this model was found in the hands of

publiés pour la défense de Louis XVI. Paris, 1793.
tom. ii. p. 8. This tract is printed in tom ii. p. 251
—286.

(35) P. 272, 273.

" a French-

" a Frenchman. He knew where twenty
 " thousand pounds of iron lay, in such a
 " state of readiness, that in the space of six
 " and thirty hours the whole could be forged
 " into pikes. He knew what member of
 " the National Convention complained, that
 " the plot was not conducted with sufficient
 " vigour ; who wrote to one of the agents;
 " that he did not work as he ought, and
 " that he did not earn the money of the re-
 " public. His Majesty knew what other
 " members of the French Convention form-
 " ed a plan for the insurrection and the arm-
 " ing of the negroes, to ruin the English
 " colonies, and to annihilate, whatever it
 " might cost, the power of England. He
 " knew what emissary, after remaining only
 " four and twenty hours in London, set
 " off for the Hague, with orders to revolu-
 " tionize Holland. He knew what other
 " emissary wrote to France in the middle

“ of November, with assurances that the
“ insurrection should soon break out, but
“ wrote again in the middle of December,
“ that all hopes of an insurrection were lost.
“ His Majesty knew which of the emissaries
“ warned his agents to take care, as the first
“ attempt had failed, how they engaged in
“ a second. He knew the number and the
“ names of the French cannoniers, who be-
“ ing no longer of use in England, after the
“ plot had failed, were ordered to embark
“ for Ireland on Monday, the 17th of De-
“ cember: he knew which of the leaders re-
“ called this order, and sent them to France,
“ whither he repaired also himself.”

Here we have a minute description of several remarkable circumstances relative to the plot, which was laid to excite an insurrection in London, toward the close of the year 1792, a plot, of which the existence

ence (36) may be proved from the actions, speeches, and confessions of the French rulers themselves. For that the avowed principles, "the governed must be excited to rebel against their governors," "missionaries and revolution-professors must be sent out to convert the globe," "every nation which chooses to rebel against its government shall receive assistance from France," were particularly applied to England, appears from the above-described conduct of the National Convention on the 28th of November. (37) The application of these prin-

(36) As the bare *existence* of the plot is sufficient for the present history, it is immaterial whether credit be given to the above mentioned *circumstances* or not: nor do I quote them as absolutely certain, because they are not taken from an official document.

(37) From the documents on this subject, which are recorded in the *Moniteur*, there lies no appeal: and these documents alone are a sufficient proof that the National Convention co-operated in the plan to overturn the British Constitution.

ciples to England and Ireland, appears further from the confession of Brissot himself: for in his Address to his Constituents he said, "it was necessary to encourage the movements of liberty in Ireland," (38) "we could set England in alarm by *exciting a fermentation in its own bosom.*" (39) And that the French emissaries in London were supplied with considerable sums by the National Convention, to enable them to operate with the utmost vigour, appears likewise from the same work. For Brissot says: "These republicans have never ceased to

(38) "L'Irlande dont il fallait *encourager les mouvemens de la liberté.*" Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 73.

(39) "Nous pouvions inquiéter l'Angleterre *en excitant la fermentation dans sons sein.*" Ib. 78. That attempts were made to excite an insurrection in England, long *before* the declaration of hostilities (which is very different from assisting a disaffected party when two nations are *already* at open war), appears likewise from the circular letter of the Marine Minister Monge, dated 31st December, 1792, which will be quoted in a following chapter.

"assert,

“ assert, that, if we expect to succeed we
 “ must have *money for secret expences*, partly
 “ for the purpose of dividing the Cabinets,
 “ and partly for the purpose of *exciting the*
 “ *people* against their tyrants. We want
 “ it for the North, we want it for the
 “ South, we want it for *the Indies*.” (40)

This passage undoubtedly applies to England. And a few lines after, Brissot adds :

“ It was Cambon and Barrere who caused the decree to be made, by which
 “ the Executive Council was authorised to
 “ take, under the head of army extraordinary
 “ *naries, unlimited sums for these secret operations*.” (41) Lastly, Brissot acknowledges,

(40) “ Ces républicains ne cessaient de dire : Si
 “ l'on veut réussir, il faut de secret, il faut de l'argent
 “ pour les *dépenses secrètes*, soit pour diviser les cabinets, soit pour *exciter les peuples* contre leurs tyrans.
 “ Il en faut pour le Nord, il en faut pour le Midi, il
 “ en faut pour les Indes.” A ses Commettans, p. 74.

(41) “ C'est Cambon avec Barrere, qui a fait rendre
 “ un décret pour autoriser le Conseil Exécutif à prendre

that before the declaration of war not less than *twenty-five millions of livres* had been sent to England from the national treasury, and that Cambon, the President of the Committee of Finance, had kept their destination a secret." (42)

That a plot, therefore, to overturn the English Government and Constitution, toward the close of the year 1792, not only existed, but that the National Convention took a very active part in it, admits of no

"des sommes illimitées sur l'extraordinaire des guerres,
"pour ces opérations secrètes." Ib.

(42) "A cette époque (lors de la déclaration de guerre) la trésorerie dirigée par Cambon, avait pour 25 millions de numéraire achetés en Angleterre, et qui furent exposé à être pris. Que sont-ils devenus? On l'ignore." Ib. 97. Immediately before this passage, he had said that five other millions had been deposited in the house of Bourdieu and Chollet in London, and that after the war broke out they fell into the hands of the English Government.

doubt.

doubt (43). The members of the National Convention in general, and of the Executive

(43) Another unanswerable proof of the part which the French Government took in this plot, is contained in the two following passages of a letter written by Mr. Miles to Le Brun, on the 2d of January, 1793: “ *Rappelez donc tous vos émissaires ; que le pro-
pagande finisse, et ne cherchez plus à troubler la
tranquillité publique dans ce pays.—Au nom de
Dieu, si vous voulez éviter un embrasement univer-
sel, ne vous mêlez pas de notre gouvernement ; si
nous sommes moins libres que vous, même si nous
étions dans l’esclavage le plus affreux, laissez nous
nos fers, et puisqu’ils ne nous gênent pas, pourquoi
vous inquiètent-ils ? Je m’étends d’autant plus sur
cet article, que je n’ignore pas les espérances mal-
fondées que vous avez conçues d’une révolte géné-
rale, et pendant que vous encouragez de tels projets,
il me sera impossible de vous aider, et même d’en-
treenir aucune correspondance ni avec vous, ni
avec le Conseil Exécutif.*” See p. 96, of the ap-
pendix to the work intitled, *Authentic Correspond-
ence with M. Le Brun, the French Minister, and
others, to February, 1793, inclusive ; published as an
appendix to other matter, not less important, with a
preface and explanatory notes. By W. Miles. Lon-
don, 1796-8. Mr. Miles further observes (Appendix,
p. 59), that persons were employed to propose, in*

Council in particular, believed likewise that nothing was more easy at that time than the excitement of a rebellion, as well in England as in Ireland: for they considered the numerous addresses, delivered to them in November, 1792, as expressive of the sentiments of the people at large, in which opinion they were undoubtedly mistaken, the great majority of the nation being even at that period well affected to the ancient constitution. Mr. Miles, who, during the time that he was intrusted with a mission to the Prince Bishop of Liege, had contracted an intimacy with Le Brun, afterwards French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who continued his correspondence with Le Brun and other men of consequence in France, till the National Convention thought proper to break with England; who had frequent intercourse in

the debating societies in London, such questions as were suitable to the views of the National Convention.

the

the latter part of the year 1792, with French agents in London, and even acted as mediator between them and the British Ministry; who may be supposed, therefore, to have been well acquainted with the views of the French Government, and who is certainly not, as appears from his present writings, unjustly partial to the present Administration, says expressly in a passage, where he speaks of the month of November: "It is
 " worthy of observation, that the Executive
 " Council had made up their minds *at this*
 " *time* on the part they had resolved to
 " take." (44) And then observing, that
 " the Executive Council looked upon a re-
 " volt as inevitable," he proceeds to give
 account of a note which he committed to
 writing in November, 1792, in the presence
 of a French agent, and says: "I have print-
 " the note exactly as it was taken in the
 " presence of the person with whom I con-

(44) Authentic Correspondence, p. 88.

" versed,

“ versed, omitting nothing but some wild
 “ assertions (45) respecting these societies,
 “ (46) which he, as well as the rest of his
 “ countrymen, considered as means in the
 “ last resort, to force the British Cabinet to
 “ chuse between dishonourable concession
 “ and a war, which they considered would
 “ place the Minister so completely between
 “ two fires, that Government, assailed at the
 “ same time by civil insurrection and foreign
 “ hostility, would inevitably fall, and this
 “ country, incapable of mischief, would fall
 “ into impotency and ruin by its own dis-
 “ tractions. *Such I aver on the faith of an*
 “ *honest man, were the delusive hopes enter-*

(45) Mr. Miles probably omitted them out of respect to this person, whom he calls (p. 87) his friend. But though they are omitted in the note (which is printed in the Appendix, p. 57-60) it is very easy to collect their meaning from what Mr. Miles himself relates, p. 88-89, in the passage which I here quote.

(46) Certain English societies, which Mr. Miles, however, has not mentioned by name.

“ *tained*

“ *tained by Le Brun, and many others, who,*
 “ *unfortunately for both nations, had more*
 “ *power and influence at that moment than*
 “ *sense and discretion.*”(47) In vain did

(47) The assertions and speeches of the French rulers themselves clearly prove, that Mr. Miles was not mistaken. Kerfaint, one of the principal orators of the National Convention, delivered a speech on the 1st of January, 1793, in which the following passages occurred: “ *Les inquiétudes du premier Ministre,*
 “ *Pltt, maître absolu de l’Angleterre, depuis huit ans,*
 “ *et que les orages d’une révolution, ou ceux d’une*
 “ *guerre menacent également de sa chute, &c.—L’Irlandais*
 “ *semble tourner ses regards vers nous, et nous*
 “ *dire: Venez, montrez vous, et nous sommes libres.—*
 “ *Le sentiment des vérités, que je viens de développer*
 “ *est répandu dans une foule de bons esprits en Angle-*
 “ *terre: le gouvernement doit en redouter l’explosion, et*
 “ *les événements de la guerre doivent la hâter.—C’est sur*
 “ *la ruine de la Tour de Londres, que vous devez*
 “ *signer, avec le peuple Anglais détrompé, le traité qui*
 “ *réglera les destins des nations, et fondera la liberté*
 “ *du monde.*” *Moniteur*, 3 Jan. 1793. Even in November 1792, a French agent said to Mr. Miles, that
 “ *Such was the actual state of Great Britain, that we*
 “ *did not dare to call out the militia.*” (*Authentic Correspondence*, p. 96): and in Condorcet’s *Journal*,
 though

Mr Miles attempt to undeceive Le Brun, and to convince him that his expectations of

though I do not recollect the particular number, it was asserted in positive terms, that the English Nation was on the eve of abolishing royalty, and of establishing a National Convention. In the reports both of Brissot and of Le Brun, in Dec. 1792, and Jan. 1793, to the French Convention, and even in Chauvelin's note to Lord Grenville, of the 27th of December, may be found expressions which indicate the same expectation. And this expectation had necessarily very great influence on the system of fraternisation, which was particularly calculated for England. See what Mr. Miles says on this subject, Appendix, p. 115. Lastly, as soon as war was declared, and the leaders of the French Convention had no longer need to conceal the motives of their actions, they openly avowed, not only that the expected rebellion was the grand inducement to their declaration of war, but that they believed the deluded English would be kind enough to become the instruments and the dupes of French ambition. For no sooner was the hostile decree pronounced, on the 1st of February, 1793, than Barbaroux said, in positive terms, " J'ai voté la guerre contre le Cabinet de Saint James, *parceque* j'ai l'espérance de voir le *peuple Anglais* sortir enfin de la stupeur, où l'a plongé la longue habitude de son esclavage

con-

a general insurrection in England were ungrounded : in vain did he attempt to convince the French Minister of the absurdity of declaring war against a powerful nation, which, with exception to a few democratic societies, was sincerely attached to the existing constitution, and ready to sacrifice the last drop of blood in its defence. (48) Le

constitutionnel, et nous venger *lui-même* d'une Cour, etc." Monit. 3 Fev. 1793.

(48) On the 19th of December, Mr. Miles wrote a letter to Le Brun, which ended with the following passage : " Mr. Maret vous donnera sans doute des " éclaircissémens sur bien des choses que vous ne pou-
 " vez savoir que par lui. Il ne vous dissimulera pas
 " l'attachement du peuple pour la constitution, et sa
 " loyauté pour le Roi et son Gouvernement. Il vous
 " dira que, loin d'adopter les rêveries bizarres, qui
 " sont à la mode actuellement en France, il est déter-
 " miné, coûte qu'il coûte, de laisser choses comme elles
 " sont, et de ne permettre, qu'on porte à la constitu-
 " tion aucune atteinte sous prétexte de réforme ; par
 " conséquent, on vous a cruellement trompé en vous
 " assurant " *que le peuple Anglais mécontent et opprimé*
 " *n'attend*

Brun, in defiance of all representations, persisted in the error into which both himself and his colleagues had fallen: the resolution, which had been taken in consequence, remained unaltered, and a war with England was irrevocably decided in the French Cabinet. (49)

*“ n’attend que le signal pour se révolter * ; au contraire, il est content, heureux, et attaché au Roi, aux loix, et à sa patrie, et prêt à les défendre jusqu’à la dernière goutte de son sang. Voilà le vrai état des choses. Jugez d’après cela, s’il vous convient de déclarer la guerre à une nation unanime et si puissante ? J’attends votre réponse avec empressement.”* Authentic Correspondence; Appendix, p. 65. Whether Le Brun sent an answer to this letter, Mr. Miles has not mentioned: but, if he did, it must have been a very unsatisfactory one, as Mr. Miles judged it necessary to write to him again on 2d. Jan. 1793, and to say to him what has been already quoted in Note 43.

(49) Dumouriez himself says: *“ Le Brun pria même le général, Dumouriez, d’écarter tout ce qui concernait les négociations avec l’Angleterre et la Hollande: il n’en fut pas du tout question.”* Mém. de Dumouriez, tom. i. p. 108. 2d. edit.

* “ Report of Le Brun to the Convention.” *Note of Mr. Miles.*

CHAP. XI.

Official Communications between the Governments of Great Britain and Holland, on the Progress of the French Arms in the Austrian Netherlands. Uneasiness produced by the Resolution to open the Scheldt. Further Alarm in Great Britain, occasioned by the Decree of the 19th of November, and the concomitant Measures taken by the National Convention, in Conjunction with certain British Societies. Proclamation of the First of December, for calling out the Militia: and another of the same Date, for the Meeting of Parliament. Spirited Declaration of the Bankers, Merchants, and other Inhabitants

of

of the City of London, in Favour of the Constitution. Meeting of Parliament, and Speech from the Throne. Means adopted for the external as well as internal Defence of Great Britain. Reflexions on this Subject.

TOWARD the close of the year 1792, Great Britain and Holland were nearly in the same political situation, and the interests of the two countries were so interwoven with each other, that an attack on the one might be justly considered as an attack on the other. In both countries there was a considerable French party, though in Holland it was not only more numerous, but possessed the power of impeding the operations of the Dutch Government, by means which were inapplicable in Great Britain. The protection of the two countries against the machinations of the French Convention
made

made one common cause : for it was easy to foresee that the ruin of Britain would inevitably draw after it the ruin of Holland, and that the conquest of Holland would place its ally at least in a very dangerous situation. Further, they were closely cemented by the treaty of 1788, by which they had engaged, in case of an attack from any European power, to protect each other by sea as well as by land, and reciprocally to guarantee all the countries, places, and privileges, which the contracting parties hitherto possessed. (1) In consequence of this intimate union, and reciprocal obligation, the British Ambassador at the Hague, seven days after the battle of Gemappe, when the army of Dumouriez was advancing toward the Dutch frontiers, delivered, by order of his government, the following note to the States General. (2)

(1) See the second article of this treaty in Martens' *Recueil des Principaux Traités*, tom. iii. p. 128.

(2) The French original is printed in the *Moniteur*,
VOL. I. Q

“ The undersigned Ambassador extraor-
“ dinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary of
“ his Britannic Majesty, has received the
“ King’s order to inform their High Mighti-
“ nesses the States General of the United
“ Provinces, that his Majesty, seeing the
“ theatre of war brought so near to the fron-
“ tiers of the republic by the recent events
“ which have happened, and being sensible
“ of the uneasiness which may naturally re-
“ sult from such a situation, thinks it due
“ to the connexion, which subsists between
“ him and the republic, that he should re-
“ new to their High Mightinesses, on this
“ occasion, the assurances of his inviolable

teur, 27th November, 1792. It is dated there, No-
vember 16: but 16 appears to be an error for 13, not
only because the answer of the States General is dated
November 16, and it is not probable that the answer
was given on the same day, but because Lord Auck-
land himself, in his note of the 25th January, 1793,
mentions it as dated 13th November. Mr. Dundas,
likewise, in his speech of 14th December, quoted it
by the same date.

“ friendship,

“ friendship, and of his determination to ex-
 “ ecute, at all times, with the utmost good
 “ faith, all the different stipulations of the
 “ treaty of alliance so happily concluded, in
 “ 1788, between his Majesty and their High
 “ Mightinesses. In making to their High
 “ Mightinesses this declaration, the King is
 “ very far from supposing the probability of
 “ any intention, on the part of any of the
 “ belligerent parties, to violate the territory
 “ of the republic, or to interfere in the in-
 “ ternal concerns of its government. The
 “ King is persuaded, that the conduct which,
 “ in concert with his Majesty, their High
 “ Mightinesses have hitherto observed, and
 “ the respect to which the situation of his
 “ Majesty and the republic justly entitles
 “ them, are sufficient to remove any ground
 “ of such apprehension. His Majesty, there-
 “ fore, confidently expects, that no events of
 “ the war will lead to any circumstance from
 “ without, which may be injurious to the

“ rights of their High Mightinesses ; and he
“ strongly recommends to them to employ,
“ in concert with his Majesty, an unremitting
“ attention and firmness to repress any at-
“ tempts which may be made to disturb the
“ internal tranquillity of the provinces. His
“ Majesty has directed this communication
“ to be made to their High Mightinesses, in
“ the full persuasion, that nothing can more
“ effectually conduce to the interests and
“ happiness of both countries, than the con-
“ tinuance of that intimate union, which
“ has been established between them for the
“ maintenance of their own rights and se-
“ curity, and with a view to contribute to
“ the general welfare and tranquillity of
“ Europe.”

(Signed) AUCKLAND.

This note was nothing more than a mea-
sure of precaution, which the existing cir-
cumstances required ; it contains nothing
which

which could give offence to the French Government, not even a supposition of hostile designs, (3) and displays a moderation which forms a striking contrast with the language adopted at this time in the National Convention relative to the British Government. On the 16th of November the States General returned the following answer. (4)

“ Their High Mightinesses are most strongly impressed by the renewal of the assurances, which his Britannic Majesty has

(3) The two orders of the French Executive Council, the one to open the Scheldt, the other to attack the Austrians on the Dutch territory, if they retreated thither, were not given, as appears from the preceding Chapter, before the 16th. Consequently, on the 13th there existed no public document, which *officially* proved a disposition on the part of the Convention to violate the neutrality in respect to Holland; and therefore prudence required, that the British Government should rather imply the contrary, as was really done.

(4) The original is printed in the *Moniteur*, 30th November, 1792.

“ now been pleased to make, of his inviolable
“ friendship for this republic, and his deter-
“ mination to execute at all times, with the
“ most scrupulous good faith, all the diffe-
“ rent stipulations of the treaty of alliance,
“ so happily concluded in 1788, between
“ his Majesty and their High Mightinesses.
“ The States General, have never doubted
“ these generous sentiments on the part of
“ his Britannic Majesty; but the declaration
“ which his Majesty is pleased to make of
“ them at the present moment, cannot but
“ be extremely agreeable to their High Migh-
“ tinesses, and inspire them with the live-
“ liest gratitude and the most devoted at-
“ tachment to his Britannic Majesty. The
“ States General, moreover, perfectly agree
“ with his Majesty in the persuasion, that
“ there is not the least reason to attribute
“ to any of the belligerent powers, hostile
“ intentions against the republic; and in-
“ deed their High Mightinesses are equally
“ persuaded

“ persuaded with the King, that the con-
 “ duct and the strict neutrality, which, in
 “ concert with his Majesty, they have hi-
 “ therto so carefully observed, and the re-
 “ spect to which the situation of his Ma-
 “ jesty and the republic justly entitle them,
 “ are sufficient to remove any ground of such
 “ apprehension. With respect to the inter-
 “ nal tranquillity of the republic, their High
 “ Mightinesses are perfectly sensible of the
 “ necessity of continuing to secure to its in-
 “ habitants so invaluable an enjoyment, and
 “ they are not negligent of any means, for
 “ the attainment of that salutary end. The
 “ States General, in concert with the pro-
 “ vinces of the union, have already taken,
 “ and continue to take, the necessary mea-
 “ sures for preventing any interruption of
 “ this tranquillity in the present circum-
 “ stances. They have the satisfaction of
 “ being able to assure his Majesty, that their
 “ efforts have so far been crowned with the

“ desired success; and they have reason to
“ flatter themselves, that, with the blessing
“ of Providence, those efforts will be equally
“ fortunate in future. Finally, their High
“ Mightinesses do not hesitate to declare;
“ that they agree with his Britannic Ma-
“ jesty in the persuasion, *that nothing can*
“ *more effectually conduce to the happiness and*
“ *mutual interests of the two nations, than the*
“ *continuance of that intimate union which has*
“ *been established between them, and which*
“ *their High Mightinesses, on their part, will*
“ *neglect no opportunity of cementing and*
“ *strengthening, for the maintenance of the*
“ *mutual rights and interests of the two coun-*
“ *tries, and for the security of the general wel-*
“ *fare and tranquillity of Europe.*”(5)

(Signed)

W. H. WASSENAER.

(Counter-signed) H. FAGEL.

(5) This last sentence proves, what some persons have called in question, that the Dutch Government, from the very commencement of the communications
between

But on the very day on which the States General expressed their expectation, that the neutrality, which they themselves had preserved, would not be violated by other nations, it was grossly violated on the part of France : for it was on this day, as appears from the preceding chapter, that the Executive Council made the two resolutions, to attack the Austrians even on the Dutch territory, and to deprive the United Provinces of their sovereignty over the Scheldt. The first resolution, indeed, created very little uneasiness, because, when the intelligence of it arrived at the Hague, the Austrians were already retreating towards Aix la Chapelle,

between Great Britain and Holland, relative to the power and influence of France, was decidedly of opinion, that it was necessary for the two countries to make one common cause. Indeed the necessity of it was so obvious, that no one, who did not wish that the arms and intrigues of France might overturn the Dutch constitution, could have supported a contrary opinion.

and

and gave no indications of a design to retire toward Holland; but the other resolution excited a general alarm throughout the United Provinces, because it was obvious, that the execution of it would be highly detrimental, if not destructive, to the Dutch commerce, and consequently to the general welfare of the nation. “It would be difficult,” says a Dutch correspondent in a letter, dated Hague, 30th November, and printed in the *Moniteur*, 9th December, 1792, “to form an idea in France of the terrible commotion which this decree has excited. At Amsterdam and Rotterdam the principal merchants have experienced a sudden coolness for the French cause, which is not at all surprising. Perhaps they propose to make a common cause with the Stadtholder, and to prevent the execution of the decree by force of arms. With respect to the Government, *they have instantly dispatched several couriers to* England

“ *England to demand succour* : and all means
 “ are employed to make Great Britain sen-
 “ sible, that its own interests are equally
 “ affected with those of Holland.”(6) The
 States General protested, likewise, publicly
 against the decree, and commissioned the

(6) La Haie, Nov. 30. “ On aura peine à se faire
 “ une idée en France de la terrible commotion, que
 “ ce décret a excité en quelques esprits. A Amster-
 “ dam et à Rotterdam les principaux négocians en
 “ ont éprouvé un refroidissement subit pour la cause
 “ Française, cela n’a rien d’étonnant. Peut-être
 “ songent-ils à faire cause commune avec le Stadthou-
 “ der, pour arrêter par la forces des armes l’exécution
 “ de ce décret. Quant au gouvernement, il a dé-
 “ pêché d’abord divers couriers en Angleterre pour en
 “ réclamer des secours : et tous les moyens sont mis
 “ en œuvre pour faire sentir à la Grande Bretagne,
 “ que son intérêt y est tout aussi compromis que celui
 “ de la Hollande.” *Moniteur*, 9 Dec. 1792. As this
 letter is printed in the *Moniteur*, and was therefore un-
 doubtedly written by a person attached to the French
 cause, no one can well object that the description, in
 this instance, exceeded the reality. However, as it
 is not an official document, I shall make no further
 use of it.

Stadtholder

Stadtholder to send positive orders to the Captain of the guardship, which lay at the mouth of the Scheldt, to prevent all French ships of war from entering it, and to inform the commanders, that, by virtue of treaties, the Scheldt was shut to all armed vessels. (7) Yet, notwithstanding this pro-

(7) The following is the official note, which the States General delivered to the Imperial Ambassador at the Hague, at the beginning of December, 1792.

“ Que depuis le commencement des troubles sur-
 “ nus entre le maison d’Autriche et la France, L. H. P.
 “ ont observé la plus stricte neutralité, et ont taché
 “ d’en concilier les devoirs avec l’amitié et les égards,
 “ qu’elles ont de tout tems manifesté pour S. M. I.
 “ Que les Etats Généraux sentent, que ce serait s’écarter de cette neutralité, que de permettre à des navires Français de remonter l’Escaut pour attaquer la citadelle d’Anvers. Que L. H. P. n’ignorent pas non plus combien cette démarche serait contraire aux traités subsistans; et que c’est d’après ces principes, qu’elles n’ont pu accorder la demande du commandant des chaloupes canonnières Françaises de remonter l’Escaut jusqu’à Anvers, mais qu’elles ont prié S. A. le Prince d’Orange et de Nassau, comme amiral-général de cette république, d’ordonner à l’officier qui
 “ commande

test, several French ships of war forced a passage, on the 1st of December, in order to bombard the citadel of Antwerp.

“ commande le vaisseau de garde, stationné à l’embou-
 “ chure de l’Escaut, *de ne pas accorder le passage, mais*
 “ d’informer le commandant Français, *qu’en vertu de*
 “ *traités la riviere d’Escaut est close pour les vaisseaux*
 “ *de guerre.*” *Moniteur*, 16th December, 1792. Here
 we have a formal protest, on the part of the Dutch
 Government, against the opening of the Scheldt;
 and this *official document* is alone sufficient to confute
 the assertion that the States General were wholly in-
 different on the subject (which even without this do-
 cument would be almost incredible), and that the Bri-
 tish Government determined to support their rights,
 when they themselves did not wish for any such sup-
 port. It is true that a great part of the Dutch, namely,
 the French party in Holland, were so far from desiring
 assistance from England, that they would, if possible,
 have repelled it. But at that time the French party
 in Holland by no means constituted the Dutch Go-
 vernment, and when two nations negotiate, whether
 they are monarchical or republican, the negotiations
 must be conducted by their respective governments.
 Nor could this party in the year 1792, though nume-
 rous and formidable, be considered as the Dutch na-
 tion: for the Stadtholderian party, especially if re-
 gard be had to landed property, was at that time very
 considerable.

The decree for the opening of the Scheldt, and the force which was employed to put it in execution, could not be regarded with indifference by the British Government. The dangerous consequences of it to England, when France is in possession of the Low Countries, have been already represented in the preceding chapter. At this time the political situation of England was very different from that of the year 1785, when the Emperor Joseph likewise proposed to open the Scheldt. For as long as the Netherlands were possessed by the Emperor, the opening of the Scheldt could do no injury to England. Austria was not a maritime power, could not therefore convert the Scheldt into a station for ships of war; and England could at all times, with only a few frigates, have closed the Scheldt, and put an end to the imperial commerce. Further, there was reason to believe that it was not so much Joseph's intention really to open the
the

the Scheldt, as to frighten the Dutch, and to induce them to ward off the danger by the payment of some millions of florins, which they effectually did. Nor was it the duty of England, in the year 1785, to assist the Dutch against the Emperor: England and Holland had been lately at war; the definitive treaty of peace was not signed before the 20th of May, 1784; (8) and in the short interval which elapsed, no treaty of alliance had been made between the two powers. But in the year 1792 England, by virtue of the treaty of 1788, was really bound to assist, in protecting not only the territory of the United Provinces, but likewise their franchises and liberties, of which that which they exercised over the Scheldt was one of the principal. (9) With great injustice,

(8) Martens' *Recueil des Principaux Traités*, tom. ii. p. 520.

(9) The second article of the treaty is: " Dans le
" cas, où une des deux parties contractantes ferait
" hostilement

therefore, has the British Government been accused of inconsistency, in remaining perfectly tranquil, when the Emperor attempted to open the Scheldt in the year 1785, and yet not shewing a similar indifference when the same resolution was formed by the French Government in the year 1792. The mere circumstance, that the French were become masters of the Austrian Netherlands, by whatever name the dependence of these countries on France might be decorated, could not but excite uneasiness in

“ hostilement attaqués par quelque puissance Euro-
 “ péenne, dans quelque partie du monde que ce puisse
 “ être, l’autre partie contractante s’engage de secou-
 “ rir son allié, tant par mer que par terre, pour se
 “ maintenir, et se garantir mutuellement dans la pos-
 “ session de tous les états, domaines, villes et places,
 “ franchises et libertés, qui leur appartenaient ré-
 “ spectivement avant le commencement des hostili-
 “ tés.” And in the fifth article is said: “ Elle l’as-
 “ sistrera même de toutes ses forces, si les circonstances
 “ l’exigent.” See Martens’ Recueil des Principaux
 Traités, tom. iii. p. 128, 129.

the

the British Ministry: and when we consider that the Scheldt was to become a station for French ships of war, they would have acted faithlessly, as well to their own country as to the allies of England, if they had not at least attempted to prevent the execution of the design. The superiority, likewise, which this station gave the French on an invasion of Holland, an invasion which was in agitation so early as December (10)

(10) In a letter written to Dumouriez by Pache, the War Minister, dated Paris, 6th December, 1792, occur the following expressions: "*Ainsi si l'armée de la Belgique se porte sur la Hollande, et ne passe point la Meuse, etc.*"—"Les divers motifs ci-dessus, Général, ont déterminé le Conseil à persister dans son ancien arrêté: il a délibéré comme mesure d'urgence, et qui devait devancer l'expédition de la Hollande, etc." Correspondance du Dumouriez avec Pache (Paris, 1793-8), p. 137. These expressions clearly prove, that even at that time an attack on Holland was in agitation. Chauffard likewise (*Mémoires*, p. 278) uses the expression, "*Opérations exécutées dans la Flandre, et projetées sur la Hollande.*" And Brissot, though before the declaration of war he

1792, was much too great to be disregarded by the British Government. And it was of the highest importance to England, to prevent, if possible, the French from becoming masters of Holland, as it was obvious that, with the additional advantage of the Dutch coast and the Dutch navy, they would take the earliest opportunity of attacking England with double force. (11)

denied, with his wonted hypocrisy, that the French Government had any design of invading Holland, made no scruple to complain afterwards (*A ses Commettans*, p. 79), *that Holland was not sooner attacked.*

(11) Brissot himself, in his speech of the 12th Jan. 1793, made the following acknowledgment, in speaking of the English nation: " Sans doute elle avait
 " raison, lorsque la France était sous le despotisme:
 " *elle avait raison à s'opposer à l'extension en Hollande*
 " *de l'influence de la France: cette influence ne ten-*
 " *dait qu'à augmenter ses forces.*" *Moniteur*, 15 Jan-
 vier, 1793. He immediately added, indeed: " Mais
 " si jamais la République Française était appelée à
 " rendre la liberté à la Hollande, ce ne ferait pas pour
 " augmenter son influence; elle n'en veut aucune sur
 " les

When we further take into the account the decree of the 19th of November, with all its concomitant circumstances, described in the preceding chapter, we must acknowledge, that the British Government had not a moment to lose, and that vigorous preparations were necessary to rescue Great Britain from the destruction with which it was threatened. On the 1st of December, therefore, as soon as intelligence arrived in London of the public encouragement which had been given by the National Convention on the 28th of November, to those societies who had announced their design of overturning the British Constitution, the follow-

“ les états étrangers.” But the sophistry of this distinction could deceive only those who either were, or chose to be, blind: and at present every one knows by experience, whether republican France displays less ambition, and less desire to extend its influence over foreign countries, than monarchical France formerly displayed.

ing proclamation was drawn up and immediately published.

“ Whereas, by an act passed in the 26th
“ year of our reign, intituled, an act for
“ amending and reducing into one act of
“ Parliament the laws relating to the mi-
“ litia in that part of Great Britain called
“ England, it is enacted, that if it shall be
“ lawful for us, in the cases and in the man-
“ ner therein mentioned, the occasion being
“ first declared in Council and notified by
“ proclamation, if no parliament shall be
“ then sitting, to order and direct the draw-
“ ing out and embodying of our militia
“ forces, or any part thereof: *and whereas*
“ *we have received information, that in breach*
“ *of our laws, and notwithstanding our Royal*
“ *proclamation of the 21st day of May last, the*
“ *utmost industry is still employed by evil dis-*
“ *posed persons within this kingdom, acting in*
concert

“ concert with persons in foreign parts, with a
“ view to subvert the laws and established con-
“ stitution of this realm, and to destroy all or-
“ der and government therein, and that a spirit
“ of tumult and disorder, thereby excited, has
“ lately shewn itself in acts of riot and insur-
“ rection: and whereas under the present
“ circumstances it is more particularly ne-
“ cessary that, for the immediate suppression
“ of such attempts, some addition should be
“ made, as the exigency of the case may re-
“ quire, to the force which may be in readi-
“ ness to act for the support of the civil
“ magistrate: we, therefore, being determin-
“ ed to exert the powers vested in us by
“ law for the protection of the persons, li-
“ berties and properties of our faithful sub-
“ jects, and fully relying on their zeal and
“ attachment to our person and government,
“ and to the happy constitution established
“ in these kingdoms, have thought fit to de-
“ clare in our Council our Royal intention,

“ for the causes and on the occasion afore-
“ said, to draw out and embody such part
“ of our militia forces as may more imme-
“ diately enable us to provide for the said
“ important objects. And we do hereby,
“ in pursuance of the said recited act, notify
“ to all our loving subjects our said inten-
“ tion, and the causes and occasion thereof.”

On the 1st of December was issued, likewise, another proclamation, by which the meeting of Parliament was fixed for the 13th of this month. (12) But before the Parliament assembled, a very numerous meeting of the merchants, bankers and traders of the city of London, was held at Mer-

(12) It is printed in the New Annual Register, 1792; Public Papers, p. 59. It contains nothing more than usual, except the mention of a law, which enacts, that if the militia be called out when the Parliament is not sitting, and the prorogation will not expire within fourteen days, a proclamation shall be issued for its assembling within that time,

“ chant-

chant-taylors' Hall, at which the following
Declaration in support of the Constitution of
Great Britain was unanimously resolved. (13)

“ We the merchants, bankers, traders,
“ and other inhabitants of London, whose
“ names are hereunto subscribed, perceiving
“ with the deepest concern, that attempts
“ are made to circulate opinions contrary to
“ the dearest interests of Britons, and sub-
“ versive of those principles which have pro-
“ duced and preserved our most valuable
“ privileges, feel it a duty we owe to our
“ country, ourselves and our posterity, to in-
“ vite all our fellow-subjects to join with us,
“ in the expression of a sincere and firm at-
“ tachment to the constitution of these king-
“ doms, formed in remote, and improved
“ in succeeding ages, and under which the
“ glorious Revolution in the year 1688 was
“ effected ; a constitution wisely framed for

(13) *Ib.* p. 67.

R 4

“ the

“ the diffusion of happiness and true liberty,
“ and which possesses the distinguished me-
“ rit, that it has on former occasions been,
“ and we trust in future will be found, com-
“ petent to correct its errors and reform its
“ abuses : our experience of the improve-
“ ments in agriculture and manufactures,
“ of the flourishing state of navigation and
“ commerce, and of increased population,
“ still further impels us to make this public
“ declaration of our determined resolution
“ to support, by every means in our power,
“ the ancient and most excellent constitu-
“ tion of Great Britain, and a government
“ by *King, Lords and Commons*, and to exert
“ our best endeavours to impress on the
“ minds of those connected with us a reve-
“ rence for, and a due submission to, the
“ laws of their country, which have hitherto
“ preserved the liberty, protected the pro-
“ perty, and increased the enjoyments of a
“ free and prosperous people.”

About

About the same time various associations were formed in support of the ancient constitution of *King, Lords and Commons*, in opposition to those societies who, on the 28th of November, had solemnly announced their design of introducing *a National Convention*. Active measures were taken also both by Government and by the Magistrates of London, to counteract the effects of the projected insurrection. The guard at the Bank was augmented, the Tower was put into a state of defence, and several regiments were assembled in the neighbourhood of the metropolis. On the 13th of December the Parliament met, and was opened by the following speech from the throne :

“ My Lords and Gentlemen,

“ Having judged it necessary to embody
 “ a part of the militia of this kingdom, I
 “ have, in pursuance of the provisions of the
 “ law, called you together, within the time
 limited

“ limited for that purpose, and it is, on
“ every account, a great satisfaction to me
“ to meet you in Parliament at this con-
“ juncture. I should have been happy, if I
“ could have announced to you the secure
“ and undisturbed continuance of all the
“ blessings which my subjects have derived
“ from a state of tranquillity: but events
“ have *recently* occurred which require our
“ united vigilance and exertion, in order to
“ preserve the advantages which we have
“ hitherto enjoyed. The seditious practices
“ which had been in a great measure
“ checked by your firm and explicit decla-
“ ration in the last session, and by the ge-
“ neral concurrence of my people in the
“ same sentiments, *have of late been more*
“ *openly renewed, and with increased activity.*
“ A spirit of tumult and disorder, the na-
“ tural consequence of such practices, has
“ shewn itself in acts of riot and insurrec-
“ tion, which required the interposition of
“ a military

“ a military force in support of the civil
 “ magistrate. The industry employed to
 “ excite discontent, on various pretexts, and
 “ in different parts of the kingdom, has ap-
 “ peared to proceed from a design to at-
 “ tempt the destruction of our happy con-
 “ stitution, and the subversion of all or-
 “ der and government: *and this design*
 “ *has evidently been pursued in connection*
 “ *and concert with persons in foreign coun-*
 “ *tries.* I have carefully observed a strict
 “ neutrality in the present war on the
 “ Continent, and have uniformly abstain-
 “ ed from any interference with respect
 “ to the internal affairs of France: *but it is*
 “ *impossible for me to see, without the most se-*
 “ *rious uneasiness, the strong and increasing*
 “ *indications which have appeared there of an*
 “ *intention to excite disturbances in other coun-*
 “ *tries, to disregard the rights of neutral na-*
 “ *tions, and to pursue views of conquest and*
 “ *aggrandizement, as well as to adopt toward*
 “ *my*

“ *my allies, the States General, who have*
“ *observed the same neutrality as myself, mea-*
“ *sures which are neither conformable to the*
“ *law of nations, nor to the positive stipula-*
“ *tions of existing treaties.* Under all these
“ circumstances I have felt it my indif-
“ pensable duty to have recourse to those
“ means of prevention and internal defence
“ with which I am entrusted by law ; and
“ I have also thought it right to take steps
“ for making some augmentation of my
“ naval and military force, being persuaded
“ that these exertions are necessary in the
“ present state of affairs, and are best calcu-
“ lated both to maintain internal tranquil-
“ lity, and to render a firm and temperate
“ conduct effectual for preserving the blef-
“ sings of peace. Nothing will be neglected
“ on my part, that can contribute to that im-
“ portant object consistently with the secu-
“ rity of my kingdoms, and with the faith-
“ ful performance of engagements, which
“ we

“ we are bound equally by interest and honour to fulfil.”

When we consider the magnitude of the danger, which immediately, as well as mediately, threatened the British empire, we must admit that his Majesty's speech was couched in terms of great moderation: and this moderation will appear still more conspicuously, if it be compared with the insulting and menacing language which had been lately held by the President of the National Convention. The speech contained no proposal of a declaration of hostilities, but expressed an ardent desire for the preservation of peace. It is true, that an augmentation was proposed both of the naval and military force: but this augmentation was absolutely necessary for the preservation of Britain, and presented the only hope which now remained of securing the continuance of peace with France; because, when one nation

tion

tion is threatened by another, especially by a nation which displayed such ambition and thirst of conquest, it cannot possibly expect to prevent the intended attack by any other means, than by vigorous preparations of defence. If, instead of having recourse to preparations of defence, an Ambassador had been sent to Paris, to make representations to the National Convention, which had already, in the most solemn and public manner, declared itself hostile to the British Government, and consequently to the British Nation, (14) the danger would not have been

(14) Whatever theory be adopted in regard to the origin of the power exercised by a government, or to the source from which that power is derived, every one must admit, that as long as the majority of a nation does not wish for a revolution, a declaration of hostilities against its government and constitution is a declaration of hostilities against the nation at large. But there can be no doubt, that the great body of the British Nation, even in the year 1792, was sincerely attached to the present constitution: and that, though the societies, who wished to establish a National Convention,

averted, but augmented : the Convention would have regarded the measure as a token of fear, the pride and ambition of the French rulers would have received new nourishment, and the resolution expressed on the 28th of November, would have been more strongly confirmed. The result of a conference, which Mr. Pitt, a few days before the meeting of Parliament, had already had with Mr. Maret, (15) affords ample proof of this

vention, were really formidable in consequence of their unremitted assiduity and their connexions with France, they were not, with all their proselytes and advocates, to be compared, either in point of property, or even in point of number, with those who wished to preserve the ancient constitution. For this objection, however, the French rulers had an excellent salvo. “ *Les révolutions, répondait-on, ne font qu’avec les minorités : c’est la minorité qui a fait la révolution Française.*” Brissot à ses Commetans, p. 87.

(15) This conference, with the result of it, will be related at large in the thirteenth chapter, where all the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France will be particularly examined.

assertion :

assertion: for Mr. Pitt's bare consent to negotiate with an agent of the Executive Council, was openly attributed in the National Convention by Le Brun, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to a supposed dread of the French power on the part of the British Ministry. Besides, what reception could an Ambassador of his Britannic Majesty have expected from the President of the French Convention, who had received with every mark of friendship, and every token of applause, the deputies of those societies, who declared their resolution of overturning the British Government and Constitution? The United States of America, against whom the present Directory of France acts the same insidious part, as the National Convention acted against England in the year 1792, have, in 1797, attempted an embassy under similar circumstances: and it has ended, as every man acquainted with the politicks and principles of the modern French

French rulers naturally expected. For the American Ambassadors, instead of obtaining satisfaction for past injuries, and security for the future, were not admitted even to an audience, and were obliged to return, after their mission had answered no other purpose than to increase the weight of the indignities which had been already offered to their government and nation. But there is no necessity for having recourse to analogical arguments: for the National Convention solemnly declared, on the 15th of December, 1792, that they acknowledged no political institution which was inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people, and, consequently, according to their own repeated explanations, no kingly government. (16) If, there-

(16) In the introduction to the decree of the 15th of December, (of which more will be said in the following chapter) was declared: “*La Convention Nationale, fidele aux principes de la souveraineté des peuples, qui ne lui permet pas de reconnaître aucune institution qui y porte atteinte, etc.*” *Moniteur*, 17 Dec.

fore, a British Ambassador had been sent to Paris in December, 1792, at a time when projects of revolution and conquest had reduced the National Convention to a state of political intoxication, he would in all probability have been received with an address of the following kind. “Do you come, Sir, “from the British people, or do you come “from the King? If you come from the “people, we are ready to receive you, and to “shew the same friendship and fraternity, “as we shewed to the deputies in the month “of November. But if you are sent by the “King,” to which the Ambassador must have replied in the affirmative, “our answer “has been already given: we acknowledge “no other sovereignty than that of the peo-

1792.—It is a curious circumstance, that it was on the very day on which the National Convention virtually refused to acknowledge any kingly government, that Mr. Fox made his motion in the House of Commons for sending an Ambassador from his Britannic Majesty to France.

“ple.”

“ple.” Thus would the British Government, in sending at that time an Ambassador to Paris, not only have failed of removing the causes of complaint, but would have brought on the whole nation new injuries and insults. Besides, when an unarmed nation negotiates with an armed nation, the latter will always prescribe laws to the former, especially if the unarmed nation takes the first step: for it is to be observed, that as soon as a negotiation was opened by the French Minister in London, the British Ministry continued it. They did not, therefore, absolutely refuse to negotiate with France: and the negotiation could be conducted full as well in London as in Paris. But we shall see, in one of the following chapters, what was the result of it: we shall see that the declarations of the French Government were in direct contradiction to its actions, that the former were as false as the latter were unjust, and that the whole negotiation

S 2

tiation had no other object than to amuse the British Ministry, till the plan for the destruction of Great Britain was ripe for execution. An armament, therefore, by sea as well as by land, was the only means of warding off the impending danger: and this inference was so obvious, that in the House of Lords the address to his Majesty was voted without a division, and even in the House of Commons the Opposition was reduced to fifty members. (17) The two houses of Parliament, or at least a very great majority, saw further, that beside an armament by sea and land, other measures were necessary, in order to prevent on the one hand the breaking out of the intended insurrection, and on the other hand, to disarm, as much as possible, the French Government, and to throw impediments in the way of its already avowed hostile designs. Of the for-

(17) New Annual Register, 1792; British and Foreign History, p. 21, 23.

mer kind was the alien bill, and the bill for preventing the circulation of French assignats in England: of the latter kind were the two bills, by which the exportation of corn, arms, and military stores to France were prohibited. But as each of these bills was made a subject of complaint, it will not be superfluous to take a cursory review of them.

The alien bill was brought into the Upper House, by Lord Grenville, on the 19th of December, 1792, and on the 4th of January, 1793, it finally passed the Commons. (18) On this bill, which equally affected strangers of every country, and included royalists as well as democrats, no government in Europe made the least complaint, except the French. It was regarded as a matter of national police, which every nation is entitled to regulate according to the existing circum-

(18) *Ib.* p. 36—43.

stances: and it was acknowledged, that more than usual precaution was requisite to counteract the machinations of the numerous emissaries, with which England was at that time over-run. But the National Convention made most bitter complaints, which was not at all extraordinary, as the alien bill presented a very material obstacle to its correspondence with the societies, with which it acted in concert. As this reason, however, could not be openly alleged, it was necessary to seek a pretext for complaint elsewhere: and they discovered a most excellent one, as they supposed, in the fourth article of the treaty of commerce. (19) But this

(19) The article runs thus: " Il sera libre aux sujets et habitans des états respectifs des deux souverains d'entrer et d'aller, librement et sûrement, *sans permission ni saufconduit général ou special,*" etc. Martens' *Recueil des Principaux Traités*, tom. ii. p. 682. To this article the French Minister, Le Brun, appealed in his speech in the Convention of 31st December, 1792, and Mr. Chauvelin, in a note to Lord Grenville, of 7th January, 1793. See the *Moniteur*, Jan. 3, 17, 1793.

article, though it has been quoted for the same purpose, likewise, by British orators and British writers, was the most unfortunate which could have been adopted: for it had been violated, seven months before the period in question, by a decree of the National Assembly, (20) which still continued in force; and consequently the article was no longer binding on Great Britain. On the 18th of May, namely, the National Assembly had passed a decree, relative to strangers resident in France, which perfectly corresponded to the alien bill proposed in

(20) Yet Mr. Chauvelin, in his note to Lord Grenville of the 7th January, 1793, had the assurance to say: "*C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement Britannique le premier voulu rompre un traité à qui l'Angleterre doit une grande partie de sa prospérité actuelle, onéreux pour la France, arraché par l'adresse et l'habileté à l'imperitie ou à la corruption des agens du gouvernement, qu'elle a détruit; traité qu'elle n'a cependant jamais cessée d'observer religieusement.*" Le Brun, likewise, ventured to assert the same in his speech of 31st December.

the British Parliament in the following month of December, (21) for by that decree was ordained, that every stranger (without any exception in favour of the English) who had arrived in Paris after 1st January, 1792, should, within eight days after the publication of the decree, declare to the committee of the section, where he lodged, his name, his character, his usual place of abode, and his abode in Paris, and likewise present his passport, if provided with one ; and it was further enacted, that every stranger, who

(21) Though the decree of the 18th May, 1792, or the French alien act, had probably escaped the notice of those members of the British Senate, who opposed our own alien act, yet, it could not have been forgotten by the French Ministers ; and, therefore, when *they* objected to the English alien bill on the ground of its being a violation of the fourth article of the treaty of commerce, they made the objection with the consciousness of having already broken it themselves. This is one of the many instances of hypocrisy and duplicity displayed by the virtuous republicans of France in their dealings with England

neglected

neglected to make the required declaration, should be fined an hundred livres, and sentenced to an arrest not exceeding three months, (22) but that whoever made a false declaration, should be fined a thousand livres, and condemned to an arrest not exceeding six months. (23) Further, every

(22) In a preceding debate on the French alien bill, Carnot proposed that every stranger, who neglected to make the required declaration within twenty-four hours after his arrival in Paris, should be imprisoned to the end of the war: and this proposal, though it was modified on the 18th of May, when the decree finally passed the Assembly, was received at the time with great applause. In the words of the original, Carnot's proposal run thus: "Tout voyageur, étranger
" et particulier, qui n'habite point Paris depuis le
" 1 Mars dernier, fera tenu dans les 24 heures de re-
" mettre à la police un bulletin signé de deux citoyens
" actifs, contenant l'indication de son nom, de son
" état, de sa demeure, *sous peine de prison jusqu' à la*
" *fin de la guerre.*" (On applaudit.) *Moniteur*, 17th May, 1792.

(23) The first and fifth articles of the decree of the 18th May are as follow:

1. "Toute personne venue à Paris depuis le 1 Janvier,
" vier,

Englishman, who travelled at that time in France, can attest, that he was not permitted to go from one place to another, till he was furnished with a passport as accurately descriptive of his person, as when a thief is advertised in a public newspaper : and it was even dangerous to deviate from the route which had been once assigned, and which was specified in the passport. (24) The

“ vier, 1792, fera dans la huitaine de la publication
 “ du présent décret, au comité de sa section, la déclara-
 “ tion de son nom, son état, son domicile habituel,
 “ et son domicile à Paris ; et il exhibera son passeport,
 “ s’il en a un.

5. “ Les étrangers, que ne feront pas la déclaration
 “ exigée, seront condamnés à une amende de 100
 “ livres, et à une détention, qui ne pourra être de plus
 “ de trois mois. Ceux qui font de fausses déclarations
 “ seront condamnés à 1000 livres d’amende, et six
 “ mois de détention.” *Moniteur*, 19 Mai, 1792.

(24) The French passports delivered to Englishmen in the year 1792, long before our own alien bill was introduced, contained a clause not generally known, namely, an order to arrest every one who departed from

municipal officers were likewise so strict in the examination of passports, that the British Ambassador himself, when he returned from Paris in August, 1792, was detained more than once on the road, and was obliged to send messengers to Paris, in order to remove the difficulties which were thrown in his way. (25) On these police regulations in France, which were a violation of the fourth article of the commercial treaty, to say the least of them, in an equal degree with any thing contained in the alien bill afterwards introduced in England, the Eng-

from the specified route ("s'il se détourne de la dite route, de le mettre en état d'arrestation"). Whether *all* the French passports delivered to Englishmen at that time contained this clause I cannot say: but I myself know an instance at least of one, and have no reason to suppose that it formed an exception to the general rule.

(25) For this assertion I have no other authority than the newspapers of the day: but, as it has never been contradicted, we may conclude that it is true.

lish

lish Government made no complaint, because it was declared in the National Assembly, that they were absolutely necessary to preserve internal tranquillity. (26) But similar regulations were at least as necessary in December, 1792, to preserve the internal tranquillity of England. Consequently, as the English Government made no objection to the ground on which the French alien bill was framed, notwithstanding the fourth

(26) On the 15th of May, 1792, when the French alien bill was proposed, the necessity of it was alledged in the following terms: “ Une des causes des inquiétudes de cette grande cité vient de la circulation rapide d'étrangers, que la curiosité, le besoin, ou leurs affaires y attire; elle doit accueillir sans doute tous ceux qui viennent accroître la masse de ses richesses, mais non recevoir les monstres, qui voudraient déchirer son sein. Les habitans de Paris n'ont pas de plus mortels ennemis, que ceux qui se couvrent d'un nom sacré pour former les projets les plus horribles.” *Moniteur*, 17 Mai, 1792. This description applies to the situation of London in December, 1792, still better than it applied to that of Paris in May, 1792.

article

article of the commercial treaty, by which it had been stipulated, that every Englishman should travel without a passport, without detention, and as freely in France as in England, the French Government ought, likewise, to have admitted the validity of the reasons in favour of the English alien bill. This, however, they thought proper to refuse, and by so doing subscribed their own condemnation: for their appeal to the treaty of commerce involved a tacit acknowledgment, that this very treaty had been already violated on the part of France by the decree of the 18th of May, and consequently could no longer be enforced on Great Britain. In whatever light, therefore, the British alien bill be viewed, the National Convention had no right to complain of it: (27)

(27) Another objection, however, occurs to me, which I cannot pass over in silence. It has been said, that the English Ministry ought to have offered to the Executive Government of France some explanation on the alien bill. But it may be asked in reply, Why
was

and, when we further take into the account, that when the French alien act was made, which no more excepted British subjects, than the British alien act excepted French subjects, the British Government had not deviated from the strictest neutrality, (28) but

was it necessary that the Government of Great Britain should make a diplomatic communication on this subject to that of France, when the French Government, at the time its own alien bill passed, made no such communication to the Government of Great Britain? And if we further ask in what the required explanation should have consisted, they who censure the omission of it, will find it difficult to give a satisfactory answer. For the explanation must either have implied, that the National Convention acted in concert with persons who were attempting to overturn the British constitution, or it must have implied the contrary. But an explanation, which implied the former position, would certainly not have satisfied either the French or their friends: and an explanation, which implied the latter, would have contained an absolute falsehood.

(28) See Le Brun's acknowledgment, made at the end of August, 1792, and quoted at the beginning of ch. ix. It deserves likewise to be noted, that Chauvelin's

that before the British alien bill was introduced, the National Convention had publicly expressed its readiness to assist in the overthrow of the British constitution, the charge which has been laid to Britain recoils with ten-fold force on France.

While the alien bill was still under the consideration of Parliament, the assignat bill was brought in by the Attorney General on the 26th of December, and passed in a few days, with hardly any opposition from either House. This bill, of which the object was to make both the payment and the tender of French assignats illegal, was equally necessary with the preceding: for, not to mention the immense loss which would have been finally sustained by a continued circu-

lin's letter of the 28th April, containing the most positive assurances of the pacific dispositions of the British Cabinet, was read in the National Assembly on the 7th of May, only a week before the French alien bill was proposed. See Ch. v. Note 2.

lation

lation of French assignats, (29) the National Convention, as long as its paper was taken in payment, could create at its pleasure, even in Great Britain, whatever sums it thought proper, and employ them as the means of effecting the intended insurrection. Merely during the time that Cambon was at the head of the Committee of Finance, assignats were issued to the amount of three thousand millions of livres: (30) and hence we may conclude, that the quantity which circulated in England in December, 1792, was not inconsiderable. Further, that Cambon sent thither, immediately from the National Treasury, at least as much paper, as

(29) I have been informed, from very good authority, that the city of Hamburg lost not less than four-and-twenty millions of livres, or a million of pounds sterling, by the French assignats.

(30) “Son génie est dans un mot: émettre et tous jours émettre des assignats. Il en a augmenté la masse de plus de trois milliards en dix-huit mois.” Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 95.

was

was necessary to purchase five-and-twenty millions of livres, appears from a passage quoted in the preceding chapter (31) from Brissot's address to his constituents: and that these five-and-twenty millions were purchased with *secret* views, is evident from the circumstance, that no account, as Brissot himself acknowledges, (32) was ever given of them. Lastly, that the *secret* views of the French rulers, in making these remittances to England, was to promote the rebellion which they expected would soon break out, appears likewise from their own confessions. (33) Under these circumstances, the intro-

(31) Note 42. The expression used by Brissot: "Vingt cinq millions de numéraire *achetés* en Angleterre," clearly proves that the remittance was made, not in hard cash, but in assignats, or other promissory notes from the French treasury.

(32) *Ib.*

(33) See Note 40 and 41 to the preceding Chapter. The French assignats were considered also as fit instruments for ruining the bank of England, as Chaussard acknowledges, p. 17: and that they were likewise ap-

duction of the assignat bill was a very wise and a very necessary measure, as it deprived the French Government of one of the most powerful engines, which it intended to employ in overturning the British Constitution.

Before the close of December, the two other bills were brought into Parliament, by which the exportation of arms and corn from Great Britain to France was prohibited. The necessity of this prohibition was so obvious, that it is extraordinary how any one could call it in question: for, as soon as one government has reason to believe that another is hostilely inclined (and the hostile designs of the National Convention against the British Government and Constitution

plied to the purpose of draining Great Britain of bullion as well as of coin, appears from Chalmers' Estimate of the Comparative Strength of Great Britain, where it is shewn that, in the year 1792, not less than 2,909,000 ounces of silver were purchased with assignats, and sent to France.

were

were already recorded in its own public acts), it would be the height of infatuation if the former continued to augment the strength of the latter by a further supply of the two grand materials of war, arms and bread. On the prohibition of the exportation of arms, neither Mr. Chauvelin, nor the National Convention made the least complaint, being conscious that a complaint of this kind would be too gross even for themselves: but as some writers have really ventured to make it, and to assert, that the arms and ammunition bill was a violation of the treaty of commerce, it will not be superfluous to note, that the National Assembly, thirteen months before the period in question, had strictly prohibited the exportation of arms and ammunition of every kind from France, (34) and consequently that, *if* such a prohibition was a violation of the treaty

(34) See the 13th Article of the decree of 8th Nov. 1791.

of commerce, France itself had already violated the treaty, likewise, in *this* point, and hence had forfeited all pretensions to the observance of it on the part of England.

With respect to the corn bill, it must be observed, that the exportation of wheat grown in England is subject to different regulations from that of foreign wheat, which has been imported into England. To prevent scarcity in our own country, his Majesty, with the advice of his Privy Council, is empowered by an act of parliament, made long before the present war, to prohibit, by a public order, the exportation of British wheat. An order of this kind was issued on the 15th of November, 1792, and was printed in the London Gazette. It was a *general* order, and affected all other countries as well as France; and it was nothing new, because at all times, when circumstances require it, a stop is put to the exportation

portation of British wheat. The French themselves had already adopted a similar measure : for during the whole of the year 1792, no wheat of French growth was exported from France, because they wanted it for their own consumption. On the order, therefore, which was published on the 15th of November, the French Government could make no complaint ; and Mr. Chauvelin himself, in his letter to Lord Grenville, of the 7th of January, (35) admitted, that it was nothing more than “ the effect “ of the foresight and prudence of the Eng-

(35) To prevent mistakes, it is necessary to observe, that Mr. Chauvelin sent two letters to Lord Grenville, on the 7th January, 1793. They are both of them printed in the *Moniteur*, 17th Jan. 1793 ; but the former, which related to the alien bill, and has been already quoted, is there termed, “ *Note remise par le citoyen Chauvelin à Lord Grenville :*” the latter, which relates to the corn bill, and is meant in the present place, is termed “ *Lettre du citoyen Chauvelin à Lord Grenville.*”

“lish Administration.” (36) But the act of parliament which passed at the end of December included foreign corn, which had been imported into England, and prohibited the exportation of it in any vessel bound to France. (37) This act affected, therefore, France alone, and consequently, had the National Convention acted amicably toward Great Britain, would have been an instance of blameable partiality. But who will venture to blame this partiality, who has read the facts recorded in the preceding chapter? (38) An enemy has no right to expect

(36) His own words were “un effet de la prévoyance et de la sagesse de l’Administration Anglaise.”

(37) About a week before the bill was brought into the House of Commons, Government had issued orders to stop the sailing of vessels laden with corn for France, till the Parliament should come to a decision on the subject, for which reason the bill was called “the corn indemnity bill.”

(38) Mr. Chauvelin, however, whose *temperateness* of language has been highly extolled, presumed, in his

that he should be treated as a friend; and as the National Convention had publicly professed itself, a whole month before the corn-bill passed, an enemy to the British Government, it could not be supposed that the latter would further contribute to the support of the former. Besides, there is great reason to believe, that the orders given by the French Government toward the close of the year 1792, for the purchase of corn in England had not merely the supplying of France for its object; for, though there was

already as much wheat in France as was necessary for the consumption of the country, (39) it was purchased in England by

his letter to Lord Grenville of the 7th of January, to term it, "*un acte de perfidie.*" He must undoubtedly have taken for granted that the British Ministers were wholly unacquainted, not only with the *secret* machinations of the French Convention, but even with the *public* declarations made on the 28th of November.

(39) This is expressly asserted in the report made by the Comité des Subsistances to the National Con-

the French Minister of the Interior, at the beginning of December, at a much higher price than it could have have been purchased elsewhere. (40) The French Government, therefore, had, without doubt, *secret* views; and these secret views were, to occasion a scarcity of corn in England, to excite thereby a general discontent, and thus promote the wished for insurrection. (41) Did
vention, on the 29th of November. See the *Moniteur*, 1st December, 1792.

(40) In the sitting of the 6th of December, 1792, Marat brought the following complaint against the Minister of the Interior. "Un citoyen honnête, qui a été dans le commerce des grains s'est présenté au Ministre de l'Intérieur; il lui a offert de procurer des grains à 27 livres le septier, tandis que le Ministre les achète à 54 livres dans les ports d'Angleterre." *Moniteur*, 8 Dec. 1792. It is true, that Marat's word is in general of no great authority; yet he would have hardly been so absurd, as to assert so simple a fact before the National Convention, which, had it been false, the Minister of the Interior could and would have instantly confuted.

(41) Brissot himself says, (*A ses Commettans*,
p. 78.)

France deserve then to be treated on the same footing with friendly nations? and is the complaint about partiality founded on justice? No one, who has a regard for truth, will venture to assert it, or to maintain that the British Government ought to have diminished its own, and have increased the strength of its enemy. Self preservation is not only a right, but a duty; and the preservation of the British Government and Constitution was a duty, which Ministers owed to the nation at large

It is evident, therefore, that the four acts of Parliament, which have been the subjects of the preceding inquiry, were nothing more than measures of precaution, which the danger then impending over Great Britain required. And as to the naval armament, which was ordered at this time, it was so

p. 78,) “Ainsi nous pouvions gêner les approvisionemens de nos ennemis, en défolant leur commerce, “*et exciter des mouvemens chez eux par la disette et la cherté de ces provisions.*”

very moderate, that it did not equal the number of ships which the French had already in commission. Only nine thousand seamen and marines were voted on the 20th of December, in addition to the peace establishment which was sixteen thousand : (42) and no further addition was made till ten days after the National Convention had declared war. (43) But five and twenty thousand seamen and marines were hardly sufficient to man eighteen ships of the line, with the proportionate number of frigates, sloops, and cutters: whereas the French, even three months before the present period, had not less than twenty-one ships of the line, thirty frigates, eighteen sloops, four and twenty cutters, and ten ships armed en flute, not only in commission, but actually at sea. (44)

(42) See the supplies granted by Parliament for the year 1793. in the *New Annual Register*; *Public Papers*, p. 121.

(43) *Ib.*

(44) See the report of the Minister of Marine, on the
the

The guards and garrisons in Great Britain amounted in December, 1792, to only fifteen thousand seven hundred men : and even this small number was not augmented, before the declaration of war, with more than sixteen hundred. (45) Hence, in that part of his Majesty's speech, which was particularly addressed to the House of Commons, it was estimated, that the preparations then making would be amply defrayed "from the excess of the actual revenue beyond the or-

the 23d of September, 1793, quoted in the preceding chapter, Note 5. Briffot likewise (*A ses Commettans* p. 157) says : "L'Angleterre, qui n'a commencé d'armer *que trois mois après nous etc.*" and p. 56 : "Dès le mois d'Octobre on avait prévu la possibilité d'entrer en guerre avec les puissances maritimes : le Comité diplomatique et de défense générale en avaient prévenu Monge ; *on avait mis à sa disposition des sommes considérables.*"

(45) Compare the army supplies granted by Parliament in February 16th, 1793, with those which were voted December 26th, 1792.

dinary

dinary expenditure.”(46) But it appears from the fourth chapter of the present work, that this excess, which had been added to the sinking fund, did not, after the reduction of the taxes that had taken place in the preceding session, amount to more than two hundred thousand pounds: and with two hundred thousand pounds it was not possible to fit out a fleet, which, if we consider the forward state of the French navy at that time, could do more than act on the defensive. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his report to the National Convention on the 19th of December, speaking of the preparations then making in England, said himself: “ *There is nothing in these armaments, which ought to alarm us, since they exceed by only four ships of the line the number which has been commissioned in the preceding years; since among the six-*

(46) New Annual Register, 1792; Public Papers, p. 61.

“teen ships now in commission, there are
 “at least ten, which are known by the
 “name of guardships, that is, the oldest and
 “the least serviceable in the English navy;
 “and lastly, since the King has declared that
 “these armaments would require no addi-
 “tional taxes, and that they would be de-
 “frayed by the additional sum appropriated
 “to the extinction of the national debt.” (47)
 On the 31st of December, the same French
 Minister, after several ships of the line had
 been put in commission, in addition to the
 four which he had mentioned on the 19th.

(47) “Ces armemens n’ont rien qui doive nous allar-
 mer, puisqu’ils n’excèdent que de 4 vaisseaux de ligne
 ceux qui ont eu lieu dans les années précédentes;
 puisque sur 16 vaisseaux en armement il y a au moins
 10 connus sous la dénomination de garde-côtes, c’est
 à dire, les plus vieux et les plus détériorés de la marine
 Anglaise; puisqu’enfin le Roi a déclaré, que ces arme-
 mens ne nécessiteraient aucun impôt extraordinaire, et
 qu’il suffirait, pour y subvenir, des fonds destinés à
 l’amortissement annuel de la dette nationale.” Mo-
 niteur, 21 Dec. 1792.

still acknowledged that France had no great reason to be alarmed. (48) Indeed he could not with truth have asserted the contrary; for he well knew that France had a more considerable fleet in readiness than Great Britain was then preparing, and that great exertions were making for a further augmentation of it. With great injustice, therefore, and with equally great inconsistency, were complaints made of the naval armament of Great Britain in December, 1792. For even, if the National Convention had betrayed no desire of conquest on the Continent, had seized neither on Savoy nor on

(48) His own words were : “*préparatifs qui toutefois ne sont pas encore trop effrayans, si nous considérons que les ordres pour l’armement de 13 vaisseaux de ligne n’ont été donnés que depuis quinze jours, si nous songeons à la grande difficulté de compléter l’équipage de ces gros vaisseaux par le manque de matelots etc.*” Monit. 3 Janv. 1793. Even on the 12th of January, 1793, Brissot made a similar acknowledgment, which will be quoted at length in the following chapter.

the

the Netherlands, had neither subdued a part of Germany, nor threatened Holland with an invasion, the mere circumstance that France had fitted out a formidable fleet, would have justified an equal armament on the part of Britain; and since the National Convention on the 28th of November, had formally declared itself the enemy of the British Government, the latter was not only justified, but in duty bound, to counteract the machines which were then at work for its destruction. The reproach, therefore, which was made to the British Government on account of the naval armament in December, 1792, deserves, like many other censures, which have been made to it during the present war, to be wholly inverted: and France itself must be reproached, not only with having armed at sea three months before Britain even made a commencement, (49) but with having ordered the armament at a time, when, by the acknow-

(49) See Note 44.

ledgment of the National Convention, the British Government had not transgressed the strictest limits of neutrality. (50)

In this situation of affairs, while the British Government was taking only measures of defence, a war between France and Great Britain might have been still avoided, had it been the will of the National Convention, and the Executive Council. (51)

(50) The introduction to the decree of 13th Jan. 1793, is as follows: "La Convention Nationale informée par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères des préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, considérant le changement de conduite de ce pays relativement au caractère de neutralité, *qu'il avait conservée jusqu'ici touchant les affaires de la France,*" etc. *Moniteur* 16 Janv. 1793. By this acknowledgment the National Convention has undesignedly subscribed its own condemnation.

(51) The following is an extract from a letter written by Mr. Miles on 2d January 1793 to Le Brun, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs: "Je vous ai tracé la route que vous avez à suivre; *et si vous suivez mes conseils, le Cabinet Anglais ne s'avisera*"
"pas

That it depended entirely on the French Government, whether peace should be pre-

“ *pas de vous déclarer la guerre. Mais foyez de*
 “ *bonne foi ; ne me trompez pas ; n’écoutez pas ces*
 “ *petits messieurs qui vous entourent, et vous flattent,*
 “ *et qui aimeraient mieux jouer du plus fin, que de*
 “ *marcher droit. Rappelez vous toujours, que vous*
 “ *tenez entre vos mains, par le hazard le plus extra-*
 “ *ordinaire et le plus bizarre, la destinée, pour ainsi*
 “ *dire, de l’Europe entière, et qu’en vous écartant*
 “ *des principes que je vous ai tracés dans une lettre*
 “ *précédente, et que Maret vous a certainement ré-*
 “ *pétés selon les instructions que je lui ai données,*
 “ *vous prononcerez un arrêt de mort contre des mil-*
 “ *lions peut-être de vos semblables. Pouvez-vous,*
 “ *osez-vous y penser sans frémir ? La paix, je vous*
 “ *le répète, est facile à conserver ; et la paix une fois*
 “ *assurée, voilà la pierre fondamentale posée de cette*
 “ *alliance entre nos deux pays, alliance que j’ai tant*
 “ *désirée, et que pour l’obtenir je suis prêt de sacrifier*
 “ *ma vie. La nation Anglaise est bien disposée vers*
 “ *la France, et comme la nation compte pour beau-*
 “ *coup dans ce pays-ci, le gouvernement n’osera*
 “ *jamais marcher en sens contraire : mais de votre*
 “ *côté il ne faut pas effaroucher ni fatiguer le peuple,*
 “ *en décrétant une Constitution à laquelle elle est at-*
 “ *tachée d’une manière que rien ne peut ébranler.*
 “ *Voilà cependant l’écueil, sur lequel je crains que*

served or not, has been admitted by French writers, who were not only intimately ac-

“ vous n'alliez échouer, et sans parler de l'indécence
 “ qu'il y aurait à vouloir s'immiscer dans les affaires
 “ intérieures d'une autre nation, il faut convenir
 “ qu'une démarche si peu mesurée serait aussi indé-
 “ cente, qu'injuste et dangereuse. Le malheur est,
 “ que vous semblez avoir le manie de vous mêler de
 “ tout ; et souvenez-vous, mon ami, qu'en se mêlant
 “ de tout, on gâte tout. Ecoutez-moi encore un
 “ fois et une fois pour tout ; *ne rendez pas la guerre*
 “ *nécessaire, ni commi mesure de precaution, ni par né-*
 “ *cessité, pour repousser une agression de votre part, et*
 “ *vous ne l'aurez pas ;* comptez là dessus et je répon-
 “ drai du reste. J'entrevois même des dispositions
 “ très favorables *en faveur de la paix* : ne forcez donc
 “ pas Mr. Pitt, par votre imprudence, à se déclarer
 “ contre vous.” *Authentic Correspondence, etc.*
 Appendix, p. 94—97. On the false report, which
 was propagated with great industry, that Mr. Pitt had
 then intermeddled in the internal affairs of France, in
 order to effect a counter-revolution, Mr. Miles had
 already written to Le Brun on the 18th Dec. 1792, as
 follows : “ Le rapport également dénué de tout fonde-
 “ ment que Mr. Pitt était l'ennemi juré de la revo-
 “ lution, fut reçu avec cette facilité aveugle, qui
 “ donne toujours aux mensonges la victoire sur la
 “ vérité. J'ose vous renvoyer à toutes les déclara-
 “ tions

quainted with the state of politics at that time, but were themselves in high and official employments. I will quote at the bottom of the page (52) only a few passages

“ tions publiques et reconnues du Ministre Anglais,
 “ depuis le commencement de la revolution, pour
 “ vous convaincre, qu’il s’est fait un devoir de ne
 “ point se mêler des affaires intérieures de votre
 “ gouvernement. Je crois qu’il a toujours rejeté
 “ avec fermeté toutes les propositions d’attaques qui
 “ lui ont été faites contre les Français, et qu’il n’a
 “ jamais voulu s’engager en aucun projet de contre-
 “ revolution ; s’il s’est fait un devoir de ne jamais se
 “ mêler de vos affaires, il se fait aussi une gloire,
 “ d’être resté attaché à ses principes sages et équi-
 “ tables.” *Ib.* p. 75.

(52) “ La Clos, qui venait d’être nommé com-
 mandant dans l’Inde, proposait qu’on le fit partir avec
 quinze mille hommes et quinze vaisseaux de guerre,
 ce qui supposait nécessairement la guerre avec les An-
 glais et les Hollandais, guerre qui n’était point dé-
 clarée, et qu’il eût été très-facile et très-nécessaire d’évi-
 ter.” *Mémoires de Dumouriez*, tom. i. p. 105, ed. 2de.
 “ Dans cette position on aurait pu négocier une paix
 avantageuse. L’Empire et le Corps Helvétique n’au-
 raient certainement pas rompu la neutralité que ce

from the writings of Dumouriez and Brissot, which remove the question beyond the possibility of doubt. That the views of Mr. Pitt were pacific, and that he really wished to avoid a war with France, is a fact, which even his enemies have been obliged to admit; for Kersaint, a leading man in the National Convention, and who was moreover decidedly in favour of a war with England,

dernier peuple a conservée jusqu' à présent. *La Hollande et l'Angleterre ne seraient pas non plus déclarées. L'Europe serait en paix, et la nation Française n'aurait pas comblé tous ses crimes par le meurtre de la famille royale, par la destruction de la religion et des lois, et par une anarchie barbare,*" Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 251.—" Cette guerre (avec l'Autriche) promettait les plus heureux succès; la chute de la maison d'Autriche, la liberté des Pays-Bas devait en être l'infailible conséquence, *si l'on avait eu la prudence d'éviter une guerre maritime.*" Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 68. Brissot wrote this in May, 1793; and his acknowledgment, that France might have avoided the war with England, is the more worthy of notice, as he himself, only a few months before, had been one of the principal advisers of the declaration of it.

entered,

entered, on 1st January, 1793, into a very minute examination of the views and interests both of the ministerial and the opposition party in England, and thence deduced the following conclusion: "*Pitt, therefore, does not wish for war.*" (53) It was, in-

(53) His own words were: "*Pitt ne veut pas donc la guerre.*" *Moniteur*, 3 Jan. 1793. Yet this very Kerfaint said, in a subsequent part of his speech: *C'est sur la ruine de la Tour de Londres que vous devez signer, avec le peuple Anglais détrompé, le traité qui réglera les destins des nations.*" The pacific views of the British Cabinet, and the hostile views of the French Government were acknowledged, therefore, without reserve, at one and the same time. Carra, likewise, who was not only a violent but even virulent adversary of the British Administration, said, in his speech of the 2d January, 1793: "*Ne jugez donc point de ce que vous devez craindre par les préparatifs de l'Angleterre, et la comédie qui s'est jouée dans le parlement de concert avec la cour, et croyez que l'intention de la cour n'est réellement pas de nous faire la guerre, mais seulement d'intimider la Convention Nationale.*" *Moniteur*, 4 Jan. 1793. That the British Government wished to deter the National Convention from the execution of its ambitious projects, could

deed, impossible that he should : for he must have foreseen that the execution of his favourite projects, the diminution of the national debt, the abolition of taxes, and the promotion of the general welfare of Great Britain, would be impeded by the expences resulting from a war with France. No man can wish to be disturbed in his darling occupation, no man can desire to be prevented from finishing a work, which he himself beholds with admiration ; nor is it possible to derive gratification from destroying the fruits of one's own ingenuity and labour. Lastly, the armament itself, which was so arranged, that the expences of it should be defrayed by the excess of the revenue above the ordinary

hardly be thought blameable, even by the French themselves. On the 12th of January, 1793, Brissot also, in a speech which is full of sophistry and contradictions, said : “ Je n'étendrai pas plus loin ces réflexions qui doivent vous prouver, *que vous ne devez pas craindre de voir le Cabinet d'Angleterre se joindre à vos ennemis.*” *Moniteur*, 15th Jan. 1793.

expenditure,

expenditure, without either loan or taxes, shews how firmly he held, and how unwilling he was to part with his adopted plan. But the National Convention wrested it from his hands ; and, as will appear from the following chapter, left him no other choice than either to prepare for a serious combat, or to lay his country at the feet of France. (54)

(54) Chronological order would require, that a few words should be said here in regard to the well known Mr. Maret, who was in London at the beginning of December, 1792. But as the thirteenth chapter will be wholly devoted to the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France, the story, that Mr. Maret was at this time authorized by the French Executive Council, to treat with the British Ministers, will be there examined, and confuted.



CHAP. XII.

I:

Decree of the 15th December, 1792, and the Interpretation of it by the Executive Council. New Exhortation to all Nations, who were inclined to Insurrection. Menace in the National Convention, of an Appeal from the Government to the People of Great Britain, with Brissot's Interpretation of it. Barailon's Proposal, to except Great Britain from the Decree of the 19th of November, rejected by the National Convention. Circular Letter of the Marine Minister, Monge, to the Inhabitants of the French Sea Ports, to rouse them to a War with Great Britain, and to attempt the Conquest of it. Attack on a British Ship of War before the Harbour of Brest, Mission of Mr. Genet to the United

United States of America, with Proposals of an Alliance with France against Great Britain. Order issued by the French Executive Council to General Miranda, on the 10th of January, 1793, to invade Dutch Flanders and the Province of Zealand, at furthest, within twelve Days. Armament of thirty Ships of the Line and twenty Frigates, in Addition to the twenty-two Ships of the Line and thirty-two Frigates already in Commission, in Order to act against Great Britain.

WHILE the British Government was engaged in taking measures of defence, in consequence of the danger with which it was already threatened, the National Convention still continued its hostile projects, and gradually converted the probability, that it was determined to involve Great Britain, as well as Holland, in a war with France, into absolute certainty.

By

By the decree of the 19th of November, and the conduct of the National Convention on the 28th of the same month, its sentiments relative to Great Britain had been already laid open to public view : but as various persons, either through ignorance, or with the view of throwing ridicule on the uneasiness expressed by the British Cabinet, had represented that decree as an empty gasconade, and since this notion, had it become prevalent, might have excited in the minds of many, who were inclined to insurrection, a distrust in the promised assistance of France, the National Convention judged it necessary, by a new decree of the same kind, to satisfy the world, that its intentions of overturning the neighbouring governments were really serious. On the 15th of December, therefore, a decree was made, which was prefaced by the following introduction : “ The
“ National Convention, after having heard
“ the report of the united finance, military,
“ and

“ and diplomatic committees, *faithful to the*
 “ *principles of the sovereignty of the people,*
 “ *which does not permit them to acknowledge*
 “ *any institution that militates against it, (1)*
 “ and willing to fix the regulations to be
 “ observed by the generals of the armies of
 “ the republic, in those countries to which
 “ they may carry their arms, decrees as fol-
 “ lows.” (2)

(1) Thus the National Convention virtually declared, that it acknowledged no kingly, and, consequently, not the British Government; for kingly government of every description had been repeatedly reprobated, as an institution inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people.

(2) Séance du 15 Décembre. “ La Convention Na-
 “ tionale, après avoir entendu le rapport de ses comités
 “ de finance, de la guerre, et diplomatique réunis,
 “ fidele aux principes de la souveraineté des peuples,
 “ *qui ne lui permet pas de reconnaître aucune institution*
 “ *qui y porte atteinte, et voulant fixer les règles à suivre*
 “ par les Généraux des armées de la république dans
 “ les pays où ils portent les armes, décrète ce qui
 “ *suit.*” Moniteur, 17 Dec. 1792.

The decree itself consists of eleven articles, and contains instructions to be observed by the French generals and commissaries, in every country into which the French arms might be able to penetrate. The Executive Council, that the purport of this decree might not be mistaken, accompanied it moreover with a commentary : and, as both the one and the other are worthy of notice, it will be necessary to quote a few passages from each. (3) The first article begins thus :

(3) The text of the decree, together with the commentary, is printed in Chauffard's *Mémoires Historiques et Politiques*, p. 180—228. The text itself is printed in Italic, the commentary in Roman characters, in order to distinguish them : the whole is signed by the six ministers who formed the Executive Council, Le Brun, Roland, Claviere, Monge, Garat, Pache ; and commentary and text are there dated 8th January, 1793. Of this celebrated decree there are various editions, which do not all agree, the reason of which is, that it received, on the 17th and 22d of December, some alterations and additions, whence it is called, in Chauffard's particular instructions, dated 31st December, “ *Le Décret de la Convention Nationale*
des

“ In those countries, which are, *or shall be*
 “ (4) occupied by the armies of the French
 “ Republic, the generals shall immediately
 “ proclaim, in the name of the French Na-
 “ tion, the sovereignty of the people, and
 “ *the abolition of all constituted authorities,*
 “ &c.” (5) Here we have a positive and de-

dés 15, 17, et 22 Décembre.” (Chauffard, p. 156).
 Hence, likewise, in the *Moniteur*, 17th December,
 the two last articles are not contained. Now, as that
 text of the decree in question, which was signed by
 the Executive Council, and delivered to the commis-
 saries for the Netherlands, of whom Chauffard was
 one, must be regarded as the authentic text, I have
 strictly adhered to it.

(4) This expression shews, that the decree was ap-
 plicable to all countries, and consequently to Great
 Britain.

(5) “ Dans les pays qui sont, *ou qui seront occupés*
 “ par les armées de la République, les généraux pro-
 “ clameront sur le champ, au nom de la Nation Fran-
 “ çaise, la souveraineté du peuple, *la suppression de*
 “ *toutes les autorités établies, &c.*” Chauffard, p. 187.
 cative

cisive declaration, that the National Convention was resolved to overturn the constitution of every country, which had either folly enough to receive, or not force enough to repel, a French army : (6) but the Executive Council, in order to give it more energy, added in the commentary : “ It is necessary that not even the *shadow* of these authorities remain.” (7) The means, likewise, by which even the shadow of the ancient authorities should be made to vanish, were assigned by the Executive Council : and these means consisted in the following order to their commissaries : “ They shall not only “ encourage the writings destined to this instruction (namely, the instruction of the “ people), the patriotic societies, and all the

(6) In this respect, every man must confess that the modern rulers of France have kept their word.

(7) Il ne faut pas que *l'ombre même* de ces autorités subsiste.” *Chaussard*, p. 189.

“ establish-

“ establishments consecrated to the propa-
 “ gation of liberty, (8) but they themselves
 “ shall likewise have immediate communi-
 “ cation with the people: they shall pre-
 “ vent, by frequent explanations, the false
 “ interpretations, (9) the false reports, and
 “ all the falsehoods by which evil-minded
 “ persons may endeavour to lead astray the
 “ public opinion. In short, it is with the
 “ view of assisting the commissaries in this

(8) It is well known that, in England particularly, this encouragement was given in every imaginable mode. But in England there was already as much liberty as any rational man could wish: and it was this rational liberty, this liberty founded on law, that the National Convention, under the pretence of promoting it, wished to destroy, that free-born Britons might become the slaves of French tyrants.

(9) No interpretation could place the conduct of the French in a more unfavourable light than the true one: for that must certainly be considered as the true interpretation which the Executive Council itself gave. The bitterest enemies of France, therefore, had no need of false interpretations.

“ important

“ important part of their ministry, that the
 “ Council has thought proper to associate
 “ with them a certain number of agents,
 “ more particularly destined to these instruc-
 “ tive communications with the inhabi-
 “ tants of the countries. Further, *in the*
 “ *different countries, to which they shall be*
 “ *sent*, (10) shall be transmitted to them lists

(10) As the above-quoted expression, “ *qui seront occupés*,” proves the universality of the decree, so this expression (*divers pays où ils seront envoyés*) proves the universality of the commentary, and shews, that though it was first used in Belgia, it was by no means designed for that country alone. Further, throughout the whole decree no particular mention is made of that country under any name whatsoever; and all the expressions are of such a kind, that they are equally applicable to every country. In the particular instructions given to Chauffard was laid likewise, “ *tous les peuples chez lesquels la république Française a porté, et portera ses armes.*” Chauffard, p. 157. Lastly, Chauffard himself, p. 25, has declared in positive terms, “ *Les instructions étaient générales.*” —This note deserves the attention of those gentlemen who were so fond of applying to the British Ministers, at the period in question, the title of *alarmists*.

“ of those citizens, who are known for their
 “ patriotic sentiments, and who are the most
 “ capable of co-operating in the mission of
 “ the commissaries.”(11)

In the first article of this decree was further promised to all nations who should receive a French army, “ the suppression of all

(11) “ Non seulement ils encourageront les écrits
 “ destinés à cette instruction, les sociétés patriotiques
 “ et tous les établissemens consacrés à la propagation
 “ de la liberté, mais encore ils communiqueront eux-
 “ mêmes avec le peuple ; ils préviendront par des ex-
 “ plications fréquentes les fausses interprétations, les
 “ faux bruits, et tous les mensonges par lesquels les
 “ malveillans chercheraient à égareter l’opinion. Enfin
 “ c’est pour seconder les commissaires dans cette partie
 “ importante de leur ministère, que le Conseil a cru
 “ devoir leur adjoindre un certain nombre d’agens des-
 “ tinés plus particulièrement à ces communications in-
 “ structives avec les habitans de ces pays. Il leur sera
 “ en outre remis des listes des citoyens *des divers pays*
 “ où ils seront envoyés, connus pour leurs sentimens
 “ patriotiques, et les plus capables de concourir à la
 “ mission des commissaires.” *Chaussard, p. 191.*

taxes;" (12) and in the second article was promised, "peace, aid, fraternity, liberty and

(12) Immediately after the words "la suppression de toutes les autorités établies," quoted in Note 5, was added, "des impôts ou contributions existans." By such alluring promises, and by assurances of exemption from all taxes, the National Convention hoped to seduce the ignorant and the unwary to its own interest, and to encourage them to rebel against their governments. But the artifice was so gross, that it is really astonishing that so many persons have been credulous enough to enter into the snare, especially as the decree itself carried with it its own antidote. For in the fourth article it is said: "*Les généraux mettront de suite sous la sauvegarde et protection de la république Française tous les biens meubles et immeubles appartenant au fisc, au prince, à ses fauteurs, adhérens, et satellites volontaires, aux établissements publics, au corps et communautés laïques et ecclésiastiques.*" *Chauffard*, p. 196. The expression "to put under the safeguard of the French republic" needs no explanation. Further, it was said in the seventh article: "*Le Conseil Exécutif nommera aussi des commissaires pour se concerter avec les Généraux et l'Administration Provisoire nommée par le peuple, sur les mesures à prendre pour la défense commune, et sur les moyens à employer pour se procurer les habillemens et subsistances nécessaires aux*
"*armées.*"

equality." (13) So far the decree has a very fine appearance; and one should suppose, that it was the will of the National Convention to fix the sovereignty of the people in all countries on so firm a basis, that they should at all times, and in all respects, enjoy the full power of acting according to their own fancy. It is true, that the first and second articles of this decree were equivalent to a declaration of war against all existing governments: but then they *seemed* at least, like the decree of the 19th of November, to favour the subjects of each country, whom the generous governors of France were willing to take under their high protection. The decree of the 19th of November had

*" armées, et pour acquitter les dépenses qu'elles ont faites,
 " ou feront, pendant leur séjour sur son territoire."*
 Chauffard, p. 207.

(13) " Ils (les généraux) annonceront au peuple
 " qu'ils lui apportent paix, secours, fraternité, liberté
 " et égalité." Chauffard, p. 193.

even left to every nation the choice of rebelling against its government, or not, a choice which could not be refused, without manifestly infringing on the *sovereignty* of the people. But on the 15th of December, the revolutionary zeal of the National Convention arose to such an height, that they deprived at once the *sovereign* people of all choice in regard to insurrection, and in the eleventh article of the decree in question, made the following declaration: "The French nation declares, *that it will treat as an enemy* that people which, refusing or renouncing liberty and equality, should chuse to preserve, or recall, or treat with its Prince and privileged orders." (14) Here we have a formal declaration of war, not only against every existing government,

(14) "La nation Française déclare, *qu'elle traitera comme ennemi* le peuple qui, refusant la liberté et l'égalité, ou y renonçant voudrait conserver, rappeler ou traiter avec le Prince et les castes privilégiés." Chauffard, p. 225.

but

but likewise against every *people* that did not choose to change their political constitution. But the great majority of the people of Britain were warmly attached to their present form of government, and by no means wished for a revolution : consequently the eleventh article of the decree of December 15th, contained a declaration of war against the *people*, as well as against the King of Great Britain. Nothing can be more clear than this article : but though it was not wanting in perspicuity, the Executive Council judged it necessary, by the following commentary, to give it a greater degree of energy : “ It is evident, that a people so
“ enamoured of its chains, (15) and so ob-

(15) But if any nation was really enamoured of its chains, what right had the rulers of France to rob it of the object of its admiration? And what right had they to determine, in the name of any nation, the question, whether the bands which united it in civil society were to be termed chains, or not? This was a question which every nation had probably a right

“stinately attached to its state of brutish-
 “ness as to refuse the restoration of its
 “rights, is the accomplice, not only of its
 “own despots, but even of all the crowned
 “usurpers who divide the domain of the
 “earth and of men; (16) that such a servile
 “people is the declared enemy, not only of
 “the French republic, but even of all other
 “nations, and therefore, that the distinction

to determine for itself, without calling in the aid of
 French arbitration. If it be further asked, in what
 the liberty consists, which these gentlemen every
 where substitute in the place of what they call slavery,
 the answer can be most easily given by the Dutch and
 the Swifs. These unhappy people would answer, if
 they dared to speak: “We now enjoy the liberty of
 “emptying our purses, of abandoning our trade and
 “manufactures, of sacrificing our privileges, of seeing
 “the true lovers of our country murdered or banished,
 “of returning thanks for the gracious chastisement
 “inflicted on us, and of applying to our executioners
 “the appellation of deliverers.”

(16) No crowned head on earth enjoys this privi-
 lege in an equal degree with the five uncrowned lords
 of France.

“which

“ which we have so justly established be-
 “ tween government and people, ought not
 “ to be observed in favour of a people of
 “ this description; (17) in short, that the
 “ right of natural defence, the duty of in-
 “ furing the preservation of our liberty and
 “ the success of our arms, (18) the gene-

(17) Unhappy people, that must be treated with all the rigours of war, for no other reason, than because it is contented with its government! The source of its happiness shall be dried up, *because* it thence derived its happiness! Such are the blessings bestowed by the Great Nation. Well, therefore, did Dumouriez say: “ C’est le 15 Dec. que fut donné le fameux décret, qui prouvait aux Belges, et à tous les peuples, qui avaient appelés les Français ou qui les avaient reçus, que la Convention n’envoyait les armées chez eux, que pour les spolier et les tyranniser.” *Vie de Dumouriez*, tom. iii. p. 373. He even protested against the decree, as he himself relates, *Mémoires*, tom. i. pref. p. 15, though without effect: for, as he further relates, p. 101, “ Le décret du 15 Décembre, bien loin d’être désapprouvé dans le Conseil, était appuyé par tous les membres.”

(18) That is, in plain English, “ the promotion of our plans of conquest and aggrandizement.”

“ ral interest of restoring peace to Europe,
 “ *which it cannot obtain but by the annihila-*
 “ *tion of the despots and their satellites* (19)
 “ all conspire in inducing us to treat such a
 “ *people according to the rigour of war and of*
 “ *conquest.*” (20)

(19) Is not this a manifest declaration, that the rulers of France were resolved not to lay down their arms, till all the governments of Europe were gradually overturned? And have they not acted, to the present hour, agreeably to that resolution?

(20) “ Il est évident qu’un peuple assez amoureux
 “ de ses fers, assez entêté de son abrutissement pour
 “ refuser la réstauracion de tous ses droits, est le com-
 “ plice, non seulement de ses propres despotes, mais
 “ même de tous les usurpateurs couronné, qui se par-
 “ tagent le domaine de la terre et des hommes; que
 “ ce peuple servile est l’ennemi déclaré non seule-
 “ ment de la république Française, mais même de
 “ toutes les autre nations: qu’ainsi la distinction si
 “ justement établie par nous entre les gouvernemens
 “ et les peuples, ne doit point être observé en faveur
 “ de celui-ci; qu’en un mot le droit de la défense na-
 “ turelle, le devoir d’assurer la conservation de notre
 “ liberté et le succès de nos armes, l’intérêt universel
 “ de rendre à l’Europe une paix, *qu’elle ne peut obtenir*
 “ *que*

It was further ordered, on the 15th of December, that the French Generals, on entering any country, at the same time that they published the decree, should publish likewise a proclamation, which began in the following manner: "The French people
 " to the people. (21) Brethren and
 " friends, we have conquered our liberty,
 " and we will maintain it. Our union and
 " our force are our guarantees. We offer
 " you the enjoyment of this inestimable
 " blessing, which has always belonged to
 " you, but of which you have been crimi-
 " nally deprived by your oppressors. *We*
 " *are come to expel your tyrants.*" (22)

" *que par l'anéantissement des despotes et de leurs satellites,*
 " *tout nous fait une loi, de traiter un tel peuple suivant*
 " *la rigueur de la guerre et de la conquête.*" Chauffard,
 p. 225.

(21) A vacant space was left, which was to be filled up with the name of each people, where the French generals should come. This is an additional proof of the universality of the decree. See the Notes 4, 10.

(22) "Le peuple Français au peuple Freres

That in all these measures the National Convention had its eye particularly fixed on Great Britain and Holland, is too obvious to need a proof: but should any one be really disposed to entertain a doubt on this subject, the following passage, in the opinion delivered and published by Chauffard (23) *on the decree in question*, will probably remove it.

“ Without doubt it was the interest of
 “ France to raise, to conquer the commerce
 “ of the Belgic provinces, swayed and neu-
 “ tralised by that of Holland, thence to alarm
 “ and menace the United Provinces, to plant
 “ our assignats in their very counting houses,

“ et amis, nous avons conquis la liberté et nous la
 “ maintiendrons. Notre union et notre force en font
 “ les garans. Nous vous offrons de faire jouir de ce
 “ bien inestimable, qui vous a toujours appartenu et
 “ que vos oppresseurs n'ont pu vous ravir sans crime.
 “ *Nous sommes venus, pour chasser vos tyrans.*” Mo-
 niteur, 18 Dec. 1792.

(23) Mémoires historiques et politiques, p. 11—30.

“ there

“ *there to ruin the bank of England, (24) and,*
 “ *in short, to complete the revolution of the*
 “ *money system. It was of consequence to*
 “ *France to engross, as it were, the vast*
 “ *workhouses of trade, these manufactures*
 “ *of national prosperity.”*(25) Such were

(24) Yet complaints were made about the assignat bill !

(25) “ Sans doute il importait à la France de rele-
 “ ver, de conquérir le commerce des provinces Bel-
 “ giques, dominé, neutralisé par celui de la Hollande ;
 “ et de-là d’inquiéter, de menacer les Provinces Unies,
 “ d’implanter jusques sur leurs comptoirs l’assignat, *d’y*
 “ *ruiner la banque de Londres*, et, enfin, d’achever la
 “ révolution du système monétaire. Il importait à la
 “ France d’accaparer, pour ainsi dire, ces vastes ate-
 “ liers de commerce, ces manufactures de prospérité
 “ nationale.” Chauffard, p. 17. And in a note to the
 words “ *d’y ruiner la banque de Londres*,” which is
 printed in the Appendix, p. 417, he says : “ Si le *pro-*
 “ *jet de pousser les armes de la république, jusqu’à Am-*
 “ *sterdam* avait eu lieu, il aurait été facile de s’empa-
 “ rer de la plus grande partie des effets sur la banque
 “ de Londres. La banque était ébranlée, si on lui eût
 “ présentée à la fois tous ces effets dont Amsterdam est

“ le

the remarks made by the French Commissary Chauffard on the decree of the 15th of December: and they sufficiently prove, that

“le centre et le pivot.” It may be observed, in general, that the leading men at that time in France made so little a secret of their designs against Holland, and consequently against England, (for, as we have just seen, the ruin of the latter was to be effected by the ruin of the former), that Cambon, in the Committee of General Defence, said openly to Abena and Van Staphorst, two deputies of the Dutch patriots: “Vous n’avez point de biens ecclésiastiques à nous offrir, pour nous indemniser: *c’est une révolution de porte feuilles, qu’il faudra faire.*” Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 88. This was uttered in the true spirit of the National Convention: for wherever estates of nobility and clergy have been wanting, the property of merchants and of all other men, who had any thing to lose, has supplied their place, as Boyer Fonfrede said at the time, when the proposal, to respect the Amsterdam merchant ships, was rejected under the pretence of their belonging to aristocrats: “La masse des Hollandais est riche, elle n’est donc pas amis de nos principes, et en admettant quelques exceptions, *si vous y avez des amis, ils doivent être seulement dans la classe des sans-culottes.*” Moniteur, 5th Feb. 1793.

at

at least one of the tendencies of this decree was the destruction of Great Britain.

But as the measures of precaution, which the British Cabinet had already begun to take, were impediments to the execution of this grand design, it was judged necessary to have again recourse to the favourite maxim, which has rendered so much service to modern France : “ the governed must be excited to rebel against their governors.” For this purpose, the Executive Council, according to Le Brun’s own report to the National Convention, on the 19th of December, gave *express order* to the Minister, Chauvelin, to “ embrace every opportunity of assuring the “ English *Nation* that, notwithstanding the “ ill humour of its *Government*, (26) the

(26) The English Government, therefore, after the National Convention had openly avowed its intention of overturning the constitution, should have remained in good humour !

“ French

“ French people desired nothing more ardently than to merit *its* (the English Nation’s) esteem.” (27) At the same time, Le Brun, who was himself member of the Executive Council, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave notice in this report to the National Convention, that Mr. Chauvelin, in

(27) “ Le Conseil exécutif provisoire a continué d’entretenir à Londres un Ministre de la République Française ; et il l’a *expressement* chargé de saisir toutes les occasions, pour assurer la Nation Anglaise, que malgré la mauvaise humeur de son Gouvernement, le peuple Français ne désire rien plus ardemment, que de mériter *son estime*, et de contribuer la bonne harmonie et l’amitié qui doivent à jamais unir deux nations généreuses et libres. La Convention Nationale a reçu à diverses reprises des témoignages éclatans de la réciprocité de cette bienveillance, et de la part sincère, que le peuple Anglais prenait aux succès de nos armes et au triomphe de la liberté Française. Mais ces mêmes événemens glorieux agissaient dans un sens très opposé sur le Ministère de Saint James.” *Moniteur*, 21 Décembre, 1792. That the expression “ *son estime*” applies not to the government, but to the people of England, is evident from the context.

case

ease the armament, which, by Le Brun's own acknowledgment, in the very same report, had nothing which ought to cause an alarm, (28) should be continued, was ordered to declare, "*that a solemn appeal would be made to the English Nation.*" (29) And at the utterance of these words, the National Convention applauded. (30) But what was truly ridiculous, and would really excite a

(28) "Il en résulte jusqu'ici que ces armemens n'ont rien *que doive nous allarmer*, puisqu' il n'ex-
cèdent que de quatre vaisseaux de ligne ceux qui ont eu lieu dans les années précédentes." *Ib.* It has been already proved in the preceding chapter, that even before Great Britain began to arm, France had an hundred and two ships of war, of which twenty-one were of the line, not only commissioned, but actually at sea.

(29) Le Brun's own words, in his report on the 19th of December, were: "Nous ne manquerions pas de faire *un appel solennel à la nation Anglaise.*" *Ib.*

(30) Immediately after the just-quoted words, is added in the *Moniteur*, "On applaudit."

smile,

smile, if the indignation excited by hypocrisy did not suppress it, Le Brun introduced them with the assertion, "that they would then have exhausted every explanation which could demonstrate *the purity of their views, and their respect for the independence of other nations.*" (31) This assertion is an example of insolence and hypocrisy, which is hardly to be found but in the annals of republican France: for it was made in the very week in which the National Convention had openly and solemnly declared its intention, not only of overturning all kingly governments, but of treating *whole nations* as enemies, which should refuse to take up arms against their lawful sovereigns. Nor did Brissot display less insolence and hypocrisy in his remarks on the menaced appeal: for in his report to the National Convention, on the 12th of

(31) "Comme alors nous aurions épuisé toutes les explications propre à démontrer *la pureté de nos vues et notre respect pour l'indépendance des autres puissances.*"

January, 1793, after having related, that the Executive Council had signified, on the 27th of December, through the organ of the Minister Chauvelin, "its firm resolution of opening the eyes of the people of England, by an appeal which should be made to them," (32) he proceeded to express his

(32) "Le 27. Décembre le Conseil Exécutif a fait
 "notifier au Gouvernement Anglais, par l'organe de
 "notre Ambassadeur, un écrit par lequel il repousse
 "vigoureusement toutes les inculpations élevées contre
 "lui, par lequel il se plaint des préparatifs hostiles de
 "la cour d'Angleterre, et annonce la ferme résolution
 "d'ouvrir les yeux du peuple Anglais dans un appel
 "qu'il lui fera." *Moniteur*, 15 Janv. 1793. To this
 menace, which, had it been made by a British Mi-
 nister at Paris, would have been answered by an order
 to quit the country, if not by order to arrest the person
 of the British Minister, Lord Grenville replied, on the
 31st of December, with equal moderation and dignity.
 "Quant à ce qui regarde moi et mes collègues, c'est
 "à sa Majesté que ses ministres doivent le compte de
 "leur conduite; et je n'ai point de réponse à vous
 "donner là dessus, non plus qu'au sujet de l'appel que
 "vous vous proposez de faire à la nation Anglaise.
 "Cette nation, d'après la constitution qui lui assure sa
 VOL. I. Y "liberté

surprise that the English Ministers were offended at this menace, and regarded it as an incitement to insurrection, (33) though, as Brissot added, it was nothing more than
 “ an appeal to the reason and justice of a
 “ great nation, which was duped by the
 “ tricks of its ministers, who wished to em-
 “ broil it with a people whose cause was *its*
 “ *own*, and which had sworn hatred only to
 “ *tyrants*.” (34) Language thus insulting

“ liberté et sa prospérité, et qu'elle saura maintenir
 “ contre toute attaque directe ou indirecte, n'aura
 “ jamais avec les puissances étrangères ni relation ni
 “ correspondance que par l'organe de son Roi, d'un
 “ Roi qu'elle chérit et qu'elle respecte, et qui n'a
 “ jamais séparé un instant ses droits, ses intérêts, et
 “ son bonheur, des droits, des intérêts, et de bonheur
 “ de son peuple.” *Moniteur*, 14 Janv. 1793.

(33) In what other light then was it possible that they should have regarded it?

(34) “ Rappellerai-je cette fausse interprétation de
 “ cet appel à la nation Anglaise dont le Ministre des
 “ Affaires Etrangères a menacé le Cabinet de Saint-
 “ James,

to the British Cabinet would surely not have been heard in the National Convention, if the Government of France had been desirous of avoiding a rupture: and its falshood, notwithstanding the veil of sophistry (35) in which it is involved, is so obvious, especially when we consider that the word "tyrant," in the mouth of the French rulers, is equivalent to "king," that the pre-

"James, s'il persistait dans ses projets hostile, appel, dans lequel ce Cabinet a feint du voir un signe d'insurrection, tandis que ces mots signifient un appel à la raison, à la justice d'une grande nation, dupe du charlatanisme de ses ministres, qui veulent la brouiller avec un peuple, dont la cause est la sienne, et qui n'a juré de haine qu'au tyrans." *Moniteur*, 15 Janv. 1793. In a former part of this speech, Brissot had said: "Il importe que la nation Anglaise, qui n'est égarée que par son gouvernement, soit promptement désabusée. C'est par respect pour la fraternité qui nous unit, que nous devons lui peindre avec franchise les manœuvres de son gouvernement.

(35) Brissot's sophistry, though it produced a great effect at the time, is now become proverbial.

tended apology affords a new proof, that the appeal to the people of Great Britain had no other object than to promote the already expected insurrection.

On the 24th of December, five days, therefore, after Le Brun had given notice of the appeal, Mr. Barailon, one of the few temperate members of the National Convention, observed that the decree of the 19th of November had excited uneasiness in the British Government, and in order to remove this uneasiness, he proposed the addition of a clause, by which the decree should be restricted to those countries with which France was actually at war. But the National Convention not only rejected the proposal, but rejected it even without a debate: for the previous question was immediately demanded, and it was determined "that there was no room for deliberation." (36) Now as the

(36) Barailon. "Ce décret a déjà fait beaucoup
d'ennemis ;

British Government was particularly mentioned by Mr. Barailon, and the proposal was made with a view of removing its uneasiness, the decisive rejection of the proposal was equivalent to a formal declaration, that the National Convention was resolved to apply the decree to Great Britain.

Nor did eight days elapse, before a very remarkable application of it to Great Britain was actually made: for on the 31st of December the Marine Minister, Monge, sent

“ d’ennemis : il les multipliera encore. Le Ministère
 “ Anglais en a témoigné son mécontentement au
 “ nôtre, qui a été forcé de l’interpréter dans le sens le
 “ plus raisonnable. Je demande que dans le décret du
 “ 19 Nov. après ces mots, “ la Convention Nationale
 “ déclare, au nom de la Nation Française, qu’elle ac-
 “ cordera fraternité et secours à tous les peuples,”
 on ajoute, “ contre les tyrans desquels elle fera en
 “ guerre.”

La question préalable est invoqué contre cet amendement.

Il est décrété, *n’y avoir pas lieu à délibérer.* *Moniteur*, 25 Déc. 1792.

a circular letter (37) to the sea-port towns of France, containing the following passage :
 “ The King and his Parliament wish to make
 “ war on us. (38) But will the English re-
 “ *publicans* suffer it? These free men already
 “ shew their discontent, and their abhor-
 “ rence of bearing arms against their bre-
 “ thren, the French. Well, then ! we will

(37) It is superscribed : “ Lettre du Ministre de la Marine aux amis de la liberté et égalité dans les villes maritimes.” Paris, 31 Décembre, 1792 : and it is printed in the *Moniteur*, 20th January, 1793. It was not printed immediately, because the French Government wished to wait the effects of it ; but before the 20th of January, favourable answers had been transmitted from some of the sea ports. The answer sent by the community of St. Malo on the 17th of January, expressive of their readiness “ to co-operate with the “ executive power,” will be quoted in the fourteenth chapter.

(38) Of this assertion Monge neither did, nor could give a proof ; for the circumstance, that a Government puts itself in a posture of defence, when threatened with imminent danger, is no argument that it *wishes* for war.

“ fly

“ fly to their assistance ; we will make a de-
 “ scent in that island; (39) we will hurl
 “ thither fifty thousand caps of liberty ; we
 “ will plant there the sacred tree, (40) and
 “ stretch out our arms to our brother republi-
 “ cans ; (41) the tyranny of their government

(39) A landing in England with a considerable army was even at that time regarded as a matter very easy to be executed : for Kerfaint, in his speech of the 1st of January, 1793, said : “ Les barques de nos pe-
 “ cheurs (sont) toujours prêtes à y transporter cent mille
 “ Français, car c’est par cette expédition que nous
 “ devons terminer cette querelle, et c’est sur la ruine
 “ de la Tour de Londres,” etc. *Moniteur*, 3 Jan. 1793.

(40) Had the sacred tree been planted in Great Britain, and borne the same fruits as it has borne in the Netherlands, in Holland, in Switzerland, in Italy, in Germany to the left of the Rhine, and likewise in France itself, we should have been no great gainers by the exchange of the old British for the new French tree of liberty.

(41) In order to crush them to atoms.

*"shall soon be destroyed. May we all be strongly
 " animated with this thought !"* (42)

Nor was it long before this thought very strongly animated the garrison of Brest : for in the first week of January an attempt was made by the batteries of that port to sink a British sloop, which was cruising before the outward harbour. The attack on this vessel was an act of open hostility, and it was undoubtedly made with the approbation of the French Government, for otherwise

(42) *"Le roi et son parlement veulent nous faire la
 " guerre ; les républicains Anglais le souffriront-ils ?
 " Déjà ces hommes libres témoignent leur mécon-
 " tentement et la répugnance qu'ils ont à porter les
 " armes contre leurs freres, les Français. Eh bien !
 " nous volerons à leurs secours ; nous ferons une de-
 " scente dans cette ile ; nous y lancerons cinquante mille
 " bonnets de la liberté ; nous y planterons l'arbre sacré,
 " et nous tendrons les bras à nos freres républicains.
 " La tyrannie de leur gouvernement sera bientôt détruit.
 " Que chacun de nous se pénétre fortement de cette idée."*
 Moniteur, 20 Janv. 1^{re} feuille.

some

some apology, or at least some explanation would have been given of it. If the commanding officer in the forts at Brest suspected that the sloop had been sent with the view of reconnoitring the Brest fleet, he might have sent off a boat with orders to the captain, to quit the road. But to hoist, as appears from the account given in the *Moniteur*, (43) the flag of war over the

(43) The following relation of this affair is printed in the *Monit.* 23 Janv. 1793. "Plymouth le 5 Janvier. Le Childers étant à croiser Vendredi à deux heures de l'après-midi devant Brest, s'avança à trois quarts de mille des batteries de ce port. Il était sans couleurs. Une des batteries lui tira un coup à boulet, qui passa heureusement par dessus, sans lui causer aucun dommage. Le Childers alors arbora pavillon Anglais. Mais le fort arbora aussitôt les couleurs nationales, avec un pendant rouge sur l'enfeigne. Les autres forts suivirent son exemple. Pendant ce tems-là le Childers avait été entraîné par la marée à un demi mille environ de ces forts, et obligé à cause du calme d'avoir recours aux rames, pour ne pas arriver trop près. Tout à coup, les batteries, à un signal qui fut fait, commencèrent

French flag, as soon as the British captain had hoisted the British flag, and not merely to fire a single gun, as a signal for departure, but to make a cross fire from several batteries, with the view of sinking the sloop, was to treat it, in every respect, as the ship of an enemy. And if the French Government had been desirous of avoiding a rupture with Great Britain, it would have at least attempted to make some excuse to the British Cabinet, which necessarily felt itself insulted, as well as the nation at large. But no attempt of this kind was made: and this very neglect afforded a new proof of the sentiments entertained by the Executive Council and the National Convention.

About this time it was resolved, to send Mr. Genet as Ambassador to the United

mencerent sur lui un feu croisé, qui l'eût criblé, si un vent frais, qui s'éleva, ne l'eût mis à même de se dégager.

States

States of America, in order to engage them to enter into a war with Great Britain, in conjunction with France. His instructions (published by Mr. Genet himself in the following month of December) were signed the 3d of January, 1793, to which some additional instructions were annexed on the 17th of that month. (44) So early as the 21st of December, 1792, the Executive Council had given notice to the National Convention, that they had fixed on Mr. Genet to go as Ambassador to the United States of America, with the view "of drawing closer the bands which united the two

(44) I have not been able to procure the edition of Mr. Genet's instructions, which he himself published: but extracts from them, on which we may certainly depend, are given in Mr. Harper's "Observations on the Dispute between the United States and France," printed at Philadelphia in 1797, and reprinted for Stockdale, London, in 1798. For the date of Mr. Genet's instructions, see p. 95 of the fourth London edition.

nations."

nations.” (45) Now, when we consider the avowed object of the French Government in regard to Great Britain, this closer drawing of the bands which united France and America, could have no other meaning than the engaging of the latter to concur in the hostile designs of the former: but, should any one really entertain doubts on this subject, the instructions which Mr. Genet received from the Executive Council will certainly remove them. For, after several passages, which have undoubtedly reference to Great Britain, such as, “to punish those

(45) Séance du 21 Décembre. Un Secrétaire fait lecture d’une lettre du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères ainsi conçue : Citoyen Président, les preuves de talent “et de civisme qu’a données le citoyen Genet dans “les différentes missions, dont il a été chargé, ont déterminé le Conseil Exécutif à récompenser son zèle “en le nommant ministre plénipotentiaire auprès des “Etats Unis d’Amérique. *Il doit travailler à resserrer “les liens, qui unissaient les deux nations.*” Moniteur, 23 Décembre, 1793.

“ powers

“ powers which still keep up an exclusive
 “ colonial and commercial system, by de-
 “ claring that their vessels shall not be re-
 “ ceived in the ports of the contracting
 “ parties,” it is expressly said, “ we (the
 “ French) have at this moment a *particular*
 “ *interest* in taking steps to act *efficaciously*
 “ against *England* and Spain, if, as every
 “ thing announces, those powers should at-
 “ tack us. In this situation of affairs, we
 “ ought to excite, by all possible means, the zeal
 “ of the *Americans*, &c.” Great commercial
 advantages are then promised to the United
 States, “ in expectation that the American
 “ Government will finally *make a common*
 “ *cause with us*, to take such steps as exi-
 “ gencies may require.” (46) According,
 therefore, to the clear and express words of
 the instructions, the object of Genet’s mis-

(46) All these passages, with others to the same purport, are quoted in Mr. Harper’s *Observations*, p. 32, 33.

sion was to effect an alliance between France and America, in order to act against Great Britain. It is true, that this alliance was proposed under the title of a mere defensive one: but it is evident, that the words, "if those powers should attack us," were inserted for no other purpose than to preserve an appearance of justice, it being wholly inconsistent with diplomatic caution to have said in plain terms, "We have formed the resolution to overturn the British Government and Constitution; we request you, therefore, to assist us in the accomplishment of this end." But that the French Government, before the 3d of January, 1793, the day on which Mr. Genet's instructions were signed, really had formed this resolution, and that, on the other hand, the measures which had been taken by the British Government were nothing more than what was necessary for self-defence, has been proved, by documents which no one can call in question.

question. Consequently, it was the object of the Executive Council, in sending Mr. Genet to America, to effect, according to the *letter* of his instructions, indeed, only a defensive, but according to their *spirit*, an *offensive* alliance against Great Britain. (47)

' We have hitherto seen only preparatory steps to the execution of the great plan, which consisted, first in the overthrow of the British and Dutch Governments, and then in the subjugation of the two countries. We have seen, that the National

(47) The prudent Washington soon perceived this, and did not suffer himself to be drawn into the snare : on which Mr. Genet not only made bitter complaints, but endeavoured to act the same part toward the American, as his principals at home acted toward the British Government; that is, he applied the favourite maxim, " the governed must be excited against their governors." See his Notes to Washington and Jefferson, printed in the New Annual Register, 1793, Public Papers, p. 108, 111, and Harper's Observations, p. 9.

Convention,

Convention, on the 28th of November, 1792, had openly declared its sentiments in regard to the British Government, that the decree of the 19th of November, which was both confirmed and amplified by that of the 15th of December, had been particularly applied to Great Britain by the resolution of the National Convention on the 24th of December, that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had menaced the British Government with an appeal to the people; that another French Minister of State had threatened a landing in Great Britain with fifty thousand caps of liberty, and that these menaces were supported by a considerable fleet, which was already at sea, even before Great Britain began to arm, not to mention other measures, which have been already described, and the insolence and contempt with which kingly government of every description was treated in the National Convention. Nor were the hostile designs of
France

France less visible in regard to Holland. The resolution to open the Scheldt, and the forcing of a passage up to Antwerp, in defiance of the protestation of the Dutch Government, were acts of open hostility against an independent state: and that before the close of 1792, a plan was in agitation for an actual invasion of Holland, appears from several expressions in the letter written on the 6th of December by the War Minister, Pache, to General Dumouriez. (48) The hostile designs of France in respect to

(48) In this letter the following expressions occur: "Si l'armée de la Belgique se porte *sur la Hollande*, et ne passe point la Meuse, etc."—"Les divers motifs ci-dessus, Général, ont déterminé le Conseil à persister dans son ancien arrêté: il a délibéré comme mesure d'urgence, et qui devoit dévancer l'expédition *de la Hollande.*" Correspondance du Général Dumouriez avec Pache, Ministre de la Guerre, pendant la campagne de la Belgique en 1792, (Paris, 1793-8) p. 138. Chauffard likewise, p. 278, speaks of "opérations exécutées dans la Flandre, et projetées sur la Hollande."

Holland appear further from the circumstance, that a corps of Dutch patriots, as they were called, to the amount of ten thousand, were taken into the French service, under the name of the Batavian legion; that this corps was stationed on the frontiers of the Dutch territory; that a revolutionary committee of this legion was permitted to correspond with the French party in Holland, in order to promote the expected insurrection, and facilitate the entry of a French army; and lastly, that a French agent was appointed to reside with the revolutionary committee, and communicate an account of its proceedings to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris. (49)

(49) “ Les réfugiés Hollandais avaient assemblé un petit comité révolutionnaire à Anvers, où était aussi la légion Batave. Ils avaient plus de zèle que de lumières, et quoiqu'ils dépensassent beaucoup d'argent pour entretenir des correspondances avec les diverses provinces de leur république, etc.” Mémoires de Dumouriez, tom i. p. 5, ed. 2de.—“ Il fut décidé que les
réfugiés

After all these preparatory steps, the Executive Council was of opinion, on the 10th of January 1793, that the plan, as far as it related to Holland, was ripe for execution : for *on this very day* orders were sent to General Miranda, who then commanded the French army in the Netherlands, in the absence of Dumouriez, *to invade Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand at furthest within twelve days.* Dumouriez himself was at that time in Paris, concerting measures with the Executive Council for the next

réfugiés Hollandais se transporteraient à Anvers avec un comité révolutionnaire formé par eux. Bientôt une légion de dix mille hommes, que ces Hollandais avaient levés sous le nom de légion Batave, eut ordre de se porter sur la même ville, pour faire l'avant-garde de l'armée, en cas qu'on se decidât à pénétrer en Hollande. Un agent du gouvernement fut placé auprès de ce comité révolutionnaire pour rendre compte au Ministre Lebrun, chargé des relations étrangères, des mesures qu'on y prenait." Defodoards Hist. Phil. de la Révolution Française, tom. ii. p. 1792, ed. 2de. Paris, 1797-8. Dumouriez likewise gives the very same account. Mem. tom. i. p. 126.

campaign : and, as being commander in chief of the army in the Netherlands, he was commissioned to communicate the order of the Council to General Miranda, which he did in the following terms : (50)

“ I send you at present *the resolution of the*
 “ *Council*: and as Valence comes to Paris,
 “ and as you command the army in the
 “ mean time, you are charged with the ex-
 “ ecution of the following plan, which you
 “ must arrange with *the most profound secre-*
 “ *cy*. In the first place, General Bourdon-
 “ naye will be dismissed, that he may not
 “ counteract the project which you have to
 “ execute, and all the troops, in French
 “ maritime Flanders will be placed under

(50) Dumouriez's Letter to Miranda is superscribed : “ Le Général Dumouriez au Général Miranda, Paris le 10 Janvier : and is printed, p. 3--8 of the following publication, printed at Paris in 1793. Correspondance du Général Miranda avec le Général Dumouriez, et les ministres de la guerre, Pache et Beurnonville, depuis Janvier, 1793.

“ your

“ your command, that all the parts may be
 “ put in motion by one will. At Bruges
 “ you have General Deflers, who is very
 “ good, to whom you will send your in-
 “ structions, and charge him with the dis-
 “ position of the troops in the lower Au-
 “ strian Flanders, while General Pascal,
 “ commandant at Dunkirk, is intrusted with
 “ the disposition of the troops in the lower
 “ French Flanders. Arrange matters in
 “ such a manner, as to be able, *within twelve*
 “ *days at farthest, to approach Zealand, and*
 “ *get possession of Dutch Flanders, at the same*
 “ *time that you will order your troops to enter*
 “ *the island of Zuyd-Beveland, and thence*
 “ *cross over to the isle of Walcheren, of which*
 “ *we wish to make ourselves masters, before the*
 “ Stadtholder has time to retreat thither, and
 “ before it is fortified, and has received a
 “ garrison. *There is no time to lose: and,*
 “ though the patriots pretend that the Zea-
 “ landers are prepared, and that in all Zea-

“ land there are not more than fifty-five
“ companies of infantry, consisting each of
“ only forty men, and no cavalry, and con-
“ sequently that this expedition does not re-
“ quire above three thousand men, I am of
“ opinion, that we shall want eight batta-
“ lions of infantry, the Batavian legion,
“ Moultsen's flotilla, two regiments of ca-
“ valry, eight twelve-pounders, four howit-
“ zers, a company of flying artillery, and
“ sixteen battalion pieces. You will go to
“ Antwerp, where you will be joined by the
“ Dutch patriots, who will bring you their
“ maps, and serve as your guides, as they
“ themselves have already acknowledged the
“ facility of the expedition. *The Minister*
“ *of the Marine gives orders to prepare furnaces*
“ *and grates in each of the three gun vessels, in*
“ *order to fire with red hot balls. These three*
“ vessels draw but little water, and will ea-
“ sily beat off the frigates by the superiority
“ of their four-and-twenty pounders, and
“ their

“ their red hot balls.” (51) After a few lines relative to a forced loan at Antwerp, by

{ 51 (“ Voici à présent la résolution du Conseil : et comme Valence vient à Paris, comme vous êtes chargé par interim du commandement de l’armée, voici dont vous êtes chargé, et que vous devez arranger dans le plus profond secret. 1^{mo}. On donne congé au Général Bourdonnaye, pour qu’il n’entrave point ce que vous avez à faire, et on met à votre disposition toutes les troupes de la Flandre maritime, pour qu’une seule volonté fasse agir toutes les parties. Vous avez à Bruges le Général Desfiers, qui est fort bon, à qui vous enverrez vos ordres et que vous chargerez de la disposition des troupes sur la basse Flandre Autrichienne, pendant que vous ferez faire celle de la basse Flandre Française au Général Pascal, commandant à Dunquerque. Arrangez les troupes de manière à pouvoir sous douze jours au plus se rapprocher de la Zélande, et s’emparer de la Flandre Hollandaise, pendant que vous ferez entrer vos troupes dans l’isle de Zuyd Beveland, et de là dans l’isle de Walcheren, dont on veut s’emparer, avant que le Stadthouder ait le tems de s’y réfugier, qu’elle soit fortifiée, et qu’elle ait reçu garnison. Il n’est pas de tems à perdre : et quoique les patriotes prétendent, que les Zélandais sont préparés, qu’il n’y a dans toute la Zélande que cinquante cinq compagnies d’infanterie tout au plus, à quarante hommes chacune,

which the expences of the expedition were to be defrayed, was then added: " Contrive, " likewise, that Deflers assemble at Bruges " four or five thousand infantry, with four " twelve-pounders, two hundred cavalry, " two howitzers, two four pounders for each " battalion, *and advance with the utmost cer-* " *lerity* to Middlebourg, and thence to the " isle of Cadfand and Biervliet. Send me a

et point de cavalerie, et que par conséquent cette expédition n'exige que 3000 hommes, je crois qu'il faut huit bataillons d'infanterie, la légion Hollandaise, la flotille de Moulton, et deux régimens de cavalerie, huit pieces de douze, quatre obusiers, une compagnie d'artillerie à cheval, et seize pièces de bataillon. Vous irez à Anvers, vous y ferez joint par les patriotes Hollandais, qui doivent vous apporter des cartes, et vous guider, ayant reconnu eux-mêmes toutes les facilités de cette expédition. *Le Ministre de la Marine donne ordre de préparer des fourneaux et des grils sur chacune des trois chaloupes canonnières, pour pouvoir tirer à boulets rouges.* Ces trois batimens tirent peu d'eau, et chasseront facilement les frégattes, par la supériorité de leur calibre de vingt-quatre, et par leurs boulets rouges,"

" courier,

“ courier, to inform me of the difficulty or
 “ facility which may present itself in the
 “ execution of the plan. This you will
 “ know to a certainty, when you have seen
 “ the Dutch patriots, and have examined
 “ their maps and their projects. *The whole*
 “ *depends on promptitude and secrecy.*” (52)

Now, when we consider that the States General had hitherto observed the most strict neutrality, that they not only had given no indications of a design of attack-

(52) “ Arrangez aussi dans votre plan, que Desfiers fasse à Bruges un rassemblement de quatre à cinq mille hommes d’infanterie, avec quatre pieces de douze, deux cens hommes de cavalerie, deux obusiers, deux canons de quatre par bataillon, et se porte avec la plus grande promptitude à Middlebourg et de là dans l’isle de Cadfand, et Biervliet. Expédiez moi un courrier pour me donner connoissance de ce qui se rencontrera d’obstacles, ou de facilités, dans l’exécution de ce plan. C’est ce que vous saurez positivement, quand vous aurez vu les patriotes Hollandais, et que vous aurez examiné leurs cartes et leurs projets. *Tout dépend de la promptitude et du secret.*”

ing

ing France, but on the contrary, on the supposition that the neutrality, which they themselves had observed, would secure them from an attack on the part of any other power, had taken no measures to put their garrison towns on the frontiers in a proper state of defence, we must acknowledge that the order of the Executive Council, which was given on the 10th of January, was an act of perfidy, which very little accorded with the boasted magnanimity of the French rulers, or with the declaration at that time too generally believed, that they fought only for their own preservation, and the political liberty of France. It was in fact worse than an *open* declaration : for an open declaration gives the attacked power at least a short notice of the intended hostilities, whereas the *secret* order given by the Executive Council had no other object, than to take a neighbouring country by surprise in the midst of peace. It is true, that the order was not executed immediately, because General Miranda.

randa, as he mentioned in his answer of the 15th of January, (53) could not instantly

(53) Je crois votre plan bien difficile à exécuter, dans la situation de nudité et manque absolu de magasins, où nos armées se trouvent. Correspondence du Général Miranda, etc. p. 8. On the receipt of this letter the Executive Council came on the 18th of January to the following resolution, which was communicated to General Dumouriez: “Le Conseil Exécutif provisoire, Général, a reçu la lettre que vous lui avez écrite concernant l’opération de la Zélande, avec la copie de celle du Général Miranda. Le Conseil, après avoir délibéré sur leur contenu, a arrêté qu’il ferait surcis *de nouveau* à l’expédition projetée sur la Zélande, et il vous prie de le mander au Général Miranda, en y ajoutant, qu’il désirerait que ce Général attendît les patriotes Hollandais, qui doivent se rendre à Liege, et qu’il prit des mesures pour vérifier les dispositions annoncées des Zélandais et leurs différens rapports. *Le Général Miranda conservera d’ailleurs la disposition des troupes qui ont été mises en mouvement pour cette opération, et qui sont hors du territoire Français.*” Ib. p. 10. The expression “de nouveau” affords an additional proof, that even before the 10th of January an invasion of Holland had been in agitation; and last period clearly shews, that the execution of the order given on that day was not abandoned, but merely *postponed*. This is further confirmed by Dumouriez’s letter to Miranda of the 23d of January, in which

put his troops in motion on account of the want of magazines; but this circumstance is of no more importance to our present inquiry, than when, after a *public* declaration of war, a general, to whom orders for an attack are sent by his government, does not find himself in a situation to comply with them at the instant. In our judgment of French politicks, therefore, the whole depends on the time of the order, and not on the time of its execution. Consequently it must be admitted, that the Executive Council, on the 10th of January, 1793, declared itself in a state of war with Holland.

But France, by declaring itself in a state of war with Holland, virtually declared itself in a state of war with England. The common interest, and the mutual obligations,

which it is said: “Je vous ai mandé, mon cher Miranda, que j’abandonnai comme vous le projet de Zélande, mais c’est une raison de plus de pousser très-vigoureusement celui de l’attaque de Mastricht, Venlo et Nimégue, *Ib.* p. 14.

which

which then united these two countries, (54) made them really *one* nation, in regard to an invasion on the part of France: and an attack on Holland in January, 1793, was as much an attack on Great Britain, as a declaration of war against Holland in the present year would be a declaration of hostilities against France. This was not unknown to the National Convention; and accordingly, when war was *openly* declared three weeks afterwards, it was declared against Great Britain and Holland at the same time. Brissot likewise acknowledged in his speech of the 1st of February, that a declaration of hostilities against the British Government alone involved in it a similar declaration against that of Holland: (55) consequently, as the converse of this proposition must be

(54) See what has been said in the eleventh chapter on this subject.

(55) Brissot's own words were: "En déclarant, que la France est en guerre avec le Gouvernement Anglais, c'est déclarer qu'elle l'est avec le Stadthouder." Monit. 3 Feb. 1793.

equally

equally true with the proposition itself, the interest being common, and the obligations mutual, it follows from Brissot's own concessions, that the order of the 10th of January was equivalent to a declaration of hostilities against Great Britain. Further, that the rulers of France not only had their eyes constantly fixed on these two countries at the same time, but that it was their design to make the ruin of the one subservient to the ruin of the other, appears both from their speeches and actions. "Assurances, that I received at this time from Paris," says Mr. Miles, (56) speaking of the 18th of January, 1793, "convinced me that the great object of the Executive Council was to throw
" this country into an insurrection, and that
" the explosion was expected to happen first
" in Ireland. *The projected invasion of Hol-*
" *land*, preceded by the opening of the
" Scheldt, as a preparatory step to the fall of
" Amsterdam, were measures that would

(56) Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 115.

“ not have been attempted, but for the firm
 “ persuasion that the people in England
 “ were on the eve of revolt, and that a revo-
 “ lution would inevitably happen the very
 “ instant, if not sooner, that war was de-
 “ clared. The entire conduct of the Con-
 “ vention, and of its Executive Council, the
 “ efforts of private individuals, *all tended to*
 “ *this solitary but important object.*” In what
 manner the conquest of Holland was to
 be made subservient to the destruction of
 England, may be seen in two passages of
 Chauffard’s Memoirs. The one, by which
 it appears that the bank of England was
 to be ruined by certain finance operations
 in Holland, has been already quoted in this
 chapter. (57) The other passage, which
 Chauffard has taken from a speech delivered
 in the National Convention, shews not only
 that the members of the Convention re-
 garded the fall of Holland as a preparatory
 step to the fall of England, but that they

were well aware, their views were not unknown to the English Government. For the orator, speaking of England and Prussia, said : “ These two powers well know that
 “ France has the greatest interest to substitute a popular and representative government to the aristocratic and degenerate one, that actually exists in Holland : *that, with the forces of that country, France would irrevocably destroy the commerce of England, and, by means of its navy, soon command the Baltic ; that nothing more would be wanting, than a renewal, in that part of the North, of an alliance of situation then become necessary ; and, that after an intimate Union of France and Holland, the supremacy of the English commerce in the two Indies would rapidly disappear.*” (58)

(58) “ Ces deux puissances savent très-bien que la France a la plus grande intérêt à substituer un gouvernement populaire et représentatif au gouvernement aristocratique actuel et dégénéré de la Hollande ; *qu’avec les forces de ce pays, la France écraserait sans retour le commerce de l’Angleterre, et qu’avec ses forces navales elle*

Under these circumstances it would have been perfectly justifiable to have declared war against France in the middle of January, 1793. The existence of the British empire was now at stake: for not only had the plan been laid for its destruction, but the wheels of the machine, by which its destruction was to be effected, were already in motion. It was not merely the ruin of an ally, the order for whose political annihilation had been signed on the 10th of January: It was not merely the loss of a balance of power, or the effects of an aggrandizement, which might be dangerous to Britain at a future period; it was the immediate downfall of Britain itself, of its constitution, its laws, its liberty, its commerce, which was now in agitation, and in agitation by an

elle dominerait bientôt dans la Baltique; qu'il ne faudrait que renouer dans cette partie du Nord une alliance de situation, dès-lors rendue nécessaire; et qu'après l'intime union de la France et de la Hollande, la suprématie du commerce Anglais dans les deux Indes disparaîtrait rapidement." Chauffard, p. 277.

enterprising, a restless, and implacable foe. The measure of iniquity was already full : yet the British Government, desirous of maintaining peace to the very last, still waited with patience till the measure was not only full, but overflowed. That Ministers, therefore, *precipitated* their country in a war with France, is an opinion, which nothing but party malevolence could suggest.

Lastly, within three days after the order was signed for the invasion of Holland, the National Convention decreed, that in addition to the twenty-two ships of the line, and the thirty-two frigates, which were already in actual service, thirty ships of the line and twenty frigates should be instantly put in commission, beside forty-five ships of the line and frigates, which were ordered to be built with the utmost dispatch. (59) Now

(59) The two first articles of the decree of the 13th January, 1793, are as follow :

1. Le Ministre de la Marine donnera incessamment
des

it is impossible that merely self-defence could have been the object of this additional armament, which enabled France to operate in a very short time with fifty two ships of the line, and an equal number of frigates, not to mention the ships of inferior force, which amounted to more than fifty, even in the preceding month of September. (60) For, on the 13th of January, 1793, France had a greater number of ships of the line, and frigates, in actual service, than the British Cabinet had at that time even ordered to be put in commission: (61) nor had these or-

des ordres dans tous les ports pour armer 30 vaisseaux de guerre, at 20 frégattes, indépendamment de 22 vaisseaux de ligne et 32 frégattes déjà armées ; ce qui portera l'armée navale à 52 vaisseaux de ligne et 52 frégattes. Les vivres seront ordonnés on conséquence.

2. Il sera mis incessamment en construction 25 vaisseaux de ligne, 5 de cent canons, 6 de quatre vingt, 14 de soixante quatorze ; et 20 frégattes. Moniteur, 16 Janv. 1793.

(60) See Chay. x. Note 5.

(61) In the very same number of the Moniteur, in which the decree of the 13th of January is printed, by which it appears, that the French ships of the line,

ders been given till three months after the French had begun to arm, and till after the National Convention had publicly declared its design of overturning the British Constitution, whereas the French naval armament was commenced at a time when, by the avowal of the Convention itself on the very day on which the additional armament was ordered, the British Government had in no respect violated the laws of neutrality toward France. (62) Further, not only Le Brun, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had, on the 31st, as well as on the 19th of De-

and frigates already in commission, amounted to *fifty four*, is given a list of the British ships of the line and frigates, which were either already commissioned, or had been ordered to be put in commission; and their whole number amounted only to *forty-five*.

(62) The introduction to the decree of the 13th of January, 1793, ran thus: "La Convention Nationale informée par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères des préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, considérant le changement de conduite relativement au caractère de neutralité, qu'il avait conservée *jusqu'ici* touchant les affaires de la France, &c." *Moniteur*, 16 Jan. 1793.

cember, represented the British armament, as a matter at which France had no reason to be alarmed, (63) but what deserves particularly to be noticed, Brissot, *on the day which preceded the order for the additional French armament*, delivered a report to the National Convention, in the name of the marine and diplomatic committees, relative to the British armament, in which there occurred the following passage. “ *Can we suppose that these demonstrations of war are serious, when we see that the English Ministry carry on the negotiations with those very agents whose official character they affect not to acknowledge; when we see that they have ordered only the same number of men and of ships, which were ordered in the pretended armaments against Spain and Russia, and particularly when we see that they abstain from the terrible expedient of impressing, without which it is impossible to*

(63) See Chap. xi. Notes 47-48.

" *man a fleet of any considerable force ?* (64)

Nor could the Marine and Diplomatic Committees have spoken to a different purport: for they were conscious that only nine thousand seamen had been voted by the British Parliament, in addition to the peace establishment. (65) It is clear, therefore, that the additional French armament, which was ordered on the 18th of January, had not merely self-defence for its object: and it is equally clear, when we reflect on the conduct of the National Convention, as de-

(64) *Peut-on croire, que ces démonstrations de guerre soient sérieuses, quand on voit le Ministère Anglais continuer les négociations mêmes avec les agens, dont il feint de ne pas reconnaître le caractère; quand on voit n'ordonner que l'addition du même nombre d'hommes et de vaisseaux, qu'il ordonna dans les préparatifs simulés contre l'Espagne et la Russie, et s'abstenir sur tout de ce terrible moyen de la presse, sans lequel il lui est impossible d'équiper même une flotte peu considérable."* *Moniteur*, 15 Janv. 1793.

(65) No further addition was made till ten days after the French had declared war. See the supplies granted by Parliament for the year 1793, printed in the New Annual Register, Public Papers, p. 121.

scribed in the tenth and twelfth chapters of the present work, that it was destined to act offensively against Great Britain. (66)

(66) The important and decisive facts recorded in this chapter, which place the sentiments and conduct of the French Government in the clearest point of view, are *wholly omitted* by a celebrated Opposition writer, whose pamphlet, in the year 1797, met with a very unusual sale. The same pamphlet contains likewise *not a syllable* of what has been related in the latter part of the seventh chapter, where the hostile views of the republican rulers of France have been proved from their own declarations: nor does it take notice of the conduct of the National Convention on the 28th of November, with many other acts recorded in the tenth chapter, which shew a decided resolution to overturn the British Government and Constitution. In like manner, the facts related in the first, second, fourth and fifth chapters, which prove beyond a doubt the pacific sentiments of the British Cabinet, as also the numerous acknowledgments made on this very subject by the French themselves, with their concessions, that the British Cabinet had observed the strictest neutrality, and that a war with Great Britain might have been avoided, if they had chosen it; all which acknowledgments and concessions have been quoted at large in the fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth and eleventh chapters of the present work, are in the said pamphlet.

the

The French Government, however, attempted, by various explanations, to give its actions a colour of justice, and to alleviate the uneasiness expressed by the British Cabinet. We will examine, therefore, in the following chapter, in which the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France shall be fully considered, whether the explanations given by the French Government were of such a kind that the British Cabinet could depend on them, or whether they were not designed merely to amuse the Ministers, and to impose on the nation, till the plan of the Convention was as ripe for execution against Great Britain, as we have already seen that it was against Holland.

passed over in total silence. Nor is the reader even informed there, that the public declaration of hostilities proceeded from the part of France.—Yet it is called, on the title-page, a view of the *causes* of the war!

736

END OF VOL. I.



